|Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents)||2002 SCC 76|| 4 S.C.R. 45||
The respondent applied for a patent on an invention entitled “transgenic animals”. In its patent application, the respondent seeks to protect both the process by which the "oncomice" are produced and the end product of the process, i.e. the founder mice and the offspring whose cells contain the oncogene. The process and product claims extend to all non‑human mammals. The process claims were allowed by the Patent Examiner, while the product claims were rejected. The appellant Commissioner confirmed the refusal of the product claims. The Federal Court, Trial Division, dismissed the respondent’s appeal from the appellant’s decision. At the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held the appeal should be allowed. A higher life form is not patentable because it is not a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of “invention” in s. 2 of the Patent Act .
|Canada - British Columbia - Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act||R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 372, s. 1 - 26(4)||This set of British Columbia, Canada laws establishes the guidelines for establishment of individual chapters of The British Columbia Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. The laws allow these societies to relieve animals in "distress" as defined by law. A person who wilfully or knowingly interferes with or obstructs a person in the discharge of duties or the exercise of powers under this Act commits an offence punishable by a fine of not more than $2000 or to imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or to both.||Statute|
|Canada - Alberta - Alberta Statutes. Animal Protection Act||R.S.A. 2000, c. A-41, s. 1||This set of laws from Alberta, Canada comprises the Animal Protection Act. The Act states that no person shall permit or cause an animal to be in distress. Specifically, a person who owns or is in charge of an animal must ensure that the animal has adequate food and water, must provide the animal with adequate care when the animal is wounded or ill, and must provide the animal with reasonable protection from injurious heat or cold as well as adequate shelter, ventilation and space. A person who contravenes this Act is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of not more than $20,000 in addition to restrictions on owning animals for a specified period of time. The Act also outlines the power of both peace officers to take animals in distress into their custody and humane societies to provide care for seized animals.||Statute|
|Reece v. Edmonton (City)||335 DLR (4th) 600; 513 AR 199;  CarswellAlta 1349; 530 WAC 199||This case dealt with the procedure the applicants used to get their claim heard by the court. The respondent City holds a licence under the Wildlife Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W‑10 to operate a zoo, which houses a lone Asian elephant named Lucy. The appellants commenced this action by originating notice for an order. The chambers judge concluded that the proceedings were an abuse of process because a private litigant cannot seek a declaration that the respondent is in breach of a penal provision in a statute, namely that the elephant was kept in distress because of health concerns. Alternatively, he concluded that the application should have been brought by way of statement of claim, not originating notice. Further, the chambers judge concluded that the appellants had no private interest standing, and that there were barriers to them being awarded public interest standing. On appeal, the parties raised two issues: (1) whether the chambers judge erred in denying the appellants standing to seek a declaration; and (2) whether the chambers judge erred in concluding that the proceedings were an abuse of process. This court held that the chambers judge came to the correct conclusion that these proceedings are an abuse of process. APPEAL DISMISSED.||Case|
|Tulloch v. Melnychuk||1998 CarswellAlta 573||
In this case, the Plaintiff seeks damages from the Defendants for trespass to chattels. She alleged that the Defendants shot her valuable dog. The Defendants countered that they were justified in shooting the dog since it was on their land chasing and worrying their cattle contrary to the Stray Animals Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-23, Part 3. Here, the court found credible the testimony from the defendant cow-operator that the dog was chasing a lame cow to the point where the cow was exhausted. The action by plaintiff was dismissed.
|Canada - Yukon Statutes. Animal Protection Act||R.S.Y. 2002, c. 6, s. 1 - 14||This set of laws comprises the Yukon, Canada Animal Protection Act. The Act provides that no person shall cause or allow an animal to be in distress. Any person who contravenes this Act is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $500 and, in default of payment, to imprisonment up to six months, or to both fine and imprisonment. A judge may also prohibit a person convicted of an offence under the Act from owning an animal or from having charge of an animal for any specified time period. The Act also outlines the power of peace officers to seize animals in distress as well as those powers of humane societies to provide care for such animals.||Statute|
|Canada - Alberta - Service Dogs Act||S.A. 2007, c. S-7.5||This Alberta, Canada law provides that no person shall deny to any person the accommodation, services or facilities available in any place to which the public is customarily admitted, or discriminate against any person for the reason that the person is a disabled person accompanied by a service dog or a certified dog-trainer accompanied by a dog in training. The law goes into effect January of 2009.||Statute|
|Whelen v. Barlow||1975 CarswellAlta 242|| W.W.D. 35||
Plaintiff Whelen was drunken, threatening and disorderly in defendant Barlow's hotel bar, where he kept guard dogs for the purpose of preventing break-ins and keeping the peace. After the plaintiff and friends were asked to leave the premises and not return, he later returned, making threatening gestures and was bitten on the face and arm by one of the guard-dogs. The court held that the plaintiff was 2/3 contributorily liable for his injuries, since when he returned he was trespassing; the defendant was 1/3 contributorily liable since the court held that keeping volatile guard-dogs as bouncers was not reasonable.
|Morsillo v. Migliano||1985 CarswellOnt 786||13 C.C.L.I. 1, 52 O.R. (2d) 319, 32 A.C.W.S. (2d) 207||
The child plaintiff Morsillo was attacked and bitten by a neighbour's pet German Shepherd, which tended to 'bark savagely' at local children, had bitten once before, and was kept in a secure fenced yard and only taken out on a leash and choke-chain. The boy was playing cops and robbers with the owner's son on the owner's front lawn, while the owner's teenaged daughter was taking the leashed dog to the garage, when it escaped and attacked. No provocation of the dog was proven so the owners were found strictly liable under the Dog Owner's Liability Act (which abrogates scienter in that province) and also liable in negligence, with no contributory negligence by the plaintiff; the provincial Ontario Health Insurance Plan was entitled to recover the costs of the plaintiff's care from the defendants.
|Canada - Federal Cruelty to Animals||Canada R.S.C. 1985, c. C46||This section of the criminal code is the national anti-cruelty law for Canada.||Statute|