Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prasad v. Wepruk | 2004CarswellBC946 | 2004 BCSC 578 |
Plaintiff Prasad, an elderly newpaper-deliverer, was attacked in the street by defendant owner Wepruk's usually chained guard-dog, which escaped due to a rusted chain. The court found the defendant strictly liable under the doctrine of scienter's subjective test: he knew the dog was aggressive, but kept it anyway and it harmed Prasad. He was also liable under the objective test for negligence, for not taking reasonable precautions to ensure the dog's chain was in good repair, in order to prevent foreseeable harm to others. damages of $35,000 were awarded for Prasad's injuries and lost future earnings. |
Case |
| Canada - P.E.I. Statutes - Animal Health and Protection Act | S.P.E.I. 1988, c. 11, s. 1 - 20 |
This set of laws comprises the Prince Edward Island (PEI) Animal Health and Protection Act. The object of the Act is to promote animal health and to eradicate, prevent or control the spread of disease among animals in the province.The Act gives broad authority to inspectors in ascertaining the presence of disease. Section 8 also includes the anti-cruelty provisions of the Act. |
Statute | |
| Canada - B.C. - B.C. Statutes - Vancouver Charter. Part XIV -- Nuisances | S.B.C. 1953, c. 55, s. 323 - 324(A)3 |
These British Columbia, Canada laws provide the laws for preventing, abating, and prohibiting nuisances, which include dangerous dogs. The laws describe what constitutes a dangerous dog and what actions may be taken with a dangerous dog. The set also contains provisions that allow for the creation of by-laws to control and impound animals. |
Statute | |
| Friesen v. Saskatchewan Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | 2008 CarswellSask 438 | 2008 SKQB 150 |
An animal protection officer received a complaint that two dogs were not receiving proper care. Officer Barry Thiessen, an animal protection officer employed by the S.S.P.C.A., observed that dogs appeared malnourished and in distress from lack of food and water. Upon returning the next day, Thiessen determined that the conditions were unchanged and the dogs were then seized pursuant to the warrant. The appellant dog owner brought an application for declaration that the officer seized dogs in contravention of an owner's rights under s. 8 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and in excess of officer's authority. In dismissing his application, the court found that the warrant was lawfully obtained pursuant to provisions of the Animal Protection Act, 1999. The officer had a legitimate reason to come to property of the dog owner to investigate after he received a complaint, and it was there that he saw the dogs’ condition in "plain view" according to the court. |
Case |
| Canada - P.E.I. Statutes. Dog Act | R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. D-13 s.1 - 21 |
This set of laws comprises the Prince Edward Island (PEI) Dog Act. The Act provides that no owner of a dog shall allow his dog to run at large; any dog found at large shall be deemed to have been allowed to be at large by its owner. In addition, the owner of livestock or any enforcement officer authorized by the owner of livestock, may kill a dog that is killing or injuring the owner's livestock, except where the livestock is on property held under lease, license or permit by the owner of the dog. This Act also outlines licensing requirements for dogs as well as impoundment procedures. |
Statute | |
| Canada - Canada Federal Statutes. Criminal Code. Part VIII -- Offences Against the Person and Reputation. Criminal Negligence. | R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 219 - 221 |
The statutory definition of criminal negligence involves doing any act or omitting to do a legal duty that shows ‘wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of others.’ Use of the words ‘others’ suggests that only attacks on human beings, rather than pets, livestock or inanimate property, can trigger charges under this statute. In alleged criminal cases, it is the State rather than the attack victim who lays the charges. |
Statute | |
| R. v. McConkey | 2008 CarswellAlta 156 | 2008 ABPC 37, [2008] A.W.L.D. 3238, 438 A.R. 87 |
In this case, the defendants pleaded guilty to violations of the Animal Protection Act after a peace officer for the humane society found four dogs in distress due mainly to a lack of grooming. On appeal, the defendants did not contest the amount of the fines, but suggested that the court should consider the economic status of the defendants (both were on government assistance). The court found that the conduct of the defendant and the level of the distress experienced by the dogs over a long period of time was an aggravating factor in determining the fine. With regard to a Section 12(2) prohibition to restrain future animal ownership, the court was reluctant to inflict stress on the animals still residing at the home by removing them from their long-time home. |
Case |
| Canada - Saskatchewan - Northern Municipailities Act (dangerous animal) | S.S. 1983, c. N-5.1, s. 100 - 100.09 | SS 2010, c N-5.2 |
Dangerous Dog Laws for Saskatchewan's Northern Municipalities |
Statute |
| Canada - Manitoba Statutes. The Animal Liability Act | S.M. 1998, c. 8 [C.C.S.M., c. A95], as am. S.M. 2002, c. 24, s. 4; 2002, c. |
This set of laws comprises the Manitoba Animal Liability Act. Under the Act, the owner of an animal is liable for damages resulting from harm that the animal causes to a person or to property, but the damages awarded can be reduced depending upon the contributory fault or negligence of the plaintiff. In addition, no animal may run at-large under this law. Any person who finds a dog,wild boar, or prescribed animal worrying, injuring or killing livestock on the premises of the owner or possessor of the livestock that person may destroy the dog, wild boar or prescribed animal. |
Statute | |
| Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) | 2002 SCC 76 | [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 |
The respondent applied for a patent on an invention entitled “transgenic animals”. In its patent application, the respondent seeks to protect both the process by which the "oncomice" are produced and the end product of the process, i.e. the founder mice and the offspring whose cells contain the oncogene. The process and product claims extend to all non‑human mammals. The process claims were allowed by the Patent Examiner, while the product claims were rejected. The appellant Commissioner confirmed the refusal of the product claims. The Federal Court, Trial Division, dismissed the respondent’s appeal from the appellant’s decision. At the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held the appeal should be allowed. A higher life form is not patentable because it is not a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of “invention” in s. 2 of the Patent Act . |
Case |