Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NE - Ferret - § 37-526. Ferrets; use or possession prohibited, when; violation; penalty | Neb.Rev.St. § 37-526 | NE ST § 37-526 | This Nebraska statute states that it shall be unlawful to hunt rabbits, squirrels, or any fur-bearing animal with or by the aid of a ferret. It is also unlawful to have a ferret in one's possession or control in a field or forest or in any vehicle going to or from hunting territory. Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a Class III misdemeanor and shall be fined at least fifty dollars. | Statute |
| AR - Facility Dog - § 16-43-1002. Certified facility dogs for child witnesses | Ark. Code Ann. § 16-43-1002 | A.C.A. § 16-43-1002 | This statute deals with the use of certified facility dogs for child witnesses and vulnerable witnesses (a person testifying in a criminal hearing or trial who has an intellectual and developmental disability or has a significant impairment in cognitive functioning acquired as a direct consequence of a brain injury or resulting from a progressively deteriorating neurological condition, including without limitation Alzheimer's disease or dementia). In order to qualify as a certified facility dog, a dog must graduate from an assistance dog organization after receiving at least 2 years of training and passing the same public service access test as a service dog. | Statute |
| NM - Dog Bite - Chapter 77. Animals and Livestock. | N. M. S. A. 1978, § 77-1-6 | NM ST § 77-1-6 | This short New Mexico statute provides that state health department shall prescribe regulations for the reporting of animal bites, confinement and disposition of rabies-suspect animals, rabies quarantine and the disposition of dogs and cats exposed to rabies, in the interest of public health and safety. | Statute |
| People v. Berry | 1 Cal. App. 4th 778 (1991) | 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416 (1991) |
In a prosecution arising out of the killing of a two-year-old child by a pit bulldog owned by a neighbor of the victim, the owner was convicted of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)), keeping a mischievous animal (Pen. Code, § 399), and keeping a fighting dog (Pen. Code, § 597.5, subd. (a)(1)). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that an instruction that a minor under the age of five years is not required to take precautions, was proper. The court further held that the trial court erred in defining "mischievous" in the jury instruction, however, the erroneous definition was not prejudicial error under any standard of review. The court also held that the scope of defendant's duty owed toward the victim was not defined by Civ. Code, § 3342, the dog-bite statute; nothing in the statute suggests it creates a defense in a criminal action based on the victim's status as a trespasser and on the defendant's negligence. |
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| ME - Equine Liability - Chapter 743. Equine Activities | 7 M. R. S. A. § 4101 - 4104-A | ME ST T. 7 § 4101 - 4104-A | This act stipulates that an equine sponsor, equine professional, or any other person engaged in an equine activity, is immune from liability for the death or injury of a participant, as well as property damage, which resulted from the inherent risks of equine activities. However, there are exceptions to this rule: a person will be held liable for injuries of an equine activity participant if he or she displays a willful and wanton or intentional disregard for the safety of the participant and if he or she fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts in ensuring the safety of the participant. In addition, a person will also be held liable for the injury of an equine activity participant if he or she is injured on the land or at a facility due to a dangerous latent condition of which was known to the equine sponsor, professional or other person. | Statute |
| Earl v. Piowaty | 42 A.D.3d 865 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) | 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 06212, 2007 WL 2127342 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.), 839 N.Y.S.2d 861 | Plaintiffs' son was seriously injured when he was bitten in the face by a dog that belonged to defendant Susan Piowaty. Plaintiffs brought action on behalf of their son against Piowaty and the animal shelter from which Piowaty had adopted the dog two weeks prior to the incident, alleging that they had constructive notice of the dog's vicious propensities because of a minor incident earlier that week. However, this court agreed with the denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because there remains a triable issue as to the defendants' notice of the dog's vicious propensities at the time of the son's injury. | Case |
| MONICA NEWMAN, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated; MATTHEW KEITH DOUGLAS, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated; and RUBY JUDINE MALMAN, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PAYETTE, | 2015 WL 6159471 (D. Idaho, 2015) | District Court ruled City of Payette's pit bull ordinance's procedural aspects were unconstitutional, finding that the lack of hearing provisions for a dog that was impounded due to an attack or bite violated procedural due process. The court also found that forcing the dog owner to bear the burden of proving his or her dog's innocence violated due process. The court, however, found no constitutional infirmity with the notice procedure employed by Payette's pit bull ordinance, provided Payette adhered to Idaho Code § 25-2804. The court ordered Plaintiff Douglas’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to be granted in part and denied in part; the claims asserted against the city of Payette by Plaintiffs Monica Newman and Ruby Judine Malman to be dismissed without prejudice; and all claims asserted by Plaintiffs against the city of Fruitland to be dismissed without prejudice. | Case | |
| MT - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | MCA 7-23-101 to 7-23-105; 7-23-2108 to 7-23-4104; 7-23-4201 to 7-23-4203; 27-1-715; 81-7-401 to 81-7-403; 87-6-106; 87-2-519, 521; 87-3-601, 602; 87-6-404 | MT ST 7-23-101 to 7-23-105; 7-23-2108 to 7-23-4104; 7-23-4201 to 7-23-4203; 27-1-715; 81-7-401 to 81-7-403; 87-6-106; 87-2-519, 521; 87-3-601, 602; 87-6-404 | These Montana statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include strict liability for all dog bites, authority for counties to enact ordinances regarding dangerous dogs, barking dogs, and destruction of unlicensed dogs, as well as general laws related to registration and licensing. | Statute |
| IL - Hunting - 5/2.33b. Computer-assisted remote hunting; prohibition | 520 I.L.C.S. 5/2.33b | IL ST CH 520 § 5/2.33b | This Illinois law provides that no person shall operate, provide, sell, use, or offer to operate, provide, sell, or use any computer software or service that allows a person not physically present at the hunt site to remotely control a weapon that could be used to take wildlife by remote operation. This also includes weapons or devices set up to fire through the use of the Internet or through a remote control device. | Statute |
| Glover v. Weber | Glover v. Weber,183 Wash.App. 1044 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2014) | 2014 WL 4988156 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2014) |
In this case, Sylvia Weber filed suit against Monika Glover for injuries sustained when Weber’s daughter fell off a horse owned by a third party and boarded on Glover’s land. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Weber. Glover appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that she was immune from liability under the Equine Activities statute. The court of appeals reviewed the issue and reversed the trial courts decision and granted summary judgment in favor of Glover. The main issue of the case whether or not Glover fell under the definition of “equine activity sponsor” provided in the act. Weber argued that Glover was not an “equine activity sponsor” because she was not participating in a public or group-based equine activity or a professional equine activity. The court of appeals disagreed with Weber’s argument and determined that noting in the plain language of the statute requires the equine activity to be public or group-based or professional to be covered under the statute. For this reason, the court of appeals found that Glover was considered a “equine activity sponsor” under the act and was therefore immune from liability. |
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