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Displaying 11 - 20 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Noah v. Attorney General | appeal 9232/01 |
Court held that the forsed feeding of geese for making foie Gras was a violation of the laws of Israel.(In Hebrew)( English language .pdf - translated by CHAI) |
Case | ||
| State ex rel. William Montgomery v. Brain | 422 P.3d 1065 (Ariz. Ct. App., 2018) | 2018 WL 2348473 (Ariz. Ct. App., 2018) | The special action considers whether a person who uses a dangerous instrument in committing an animal cruelty offense may be sentenced as a dangerous offender. The facts in the underlying case are as follows. A witness in an apartment complex heard a dog crying and observed Shundog Hu using a rod to hit a dog that was inside a pet enclosure. Hu was charged with both intentionally or knowingly subjecting an animal to cruel mistreatment, a felony, and under the "dangerous offense" laws because the animal cruelty "involved the discharge, use, or threatening exhibition of a pole and/or rod, a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-105 and 13-704." Hu moved to dismiss the dangerous offense allegation stating that, as a matter of law, "a dangerous offense cannot be committed against an animal." Hu contended that the legislature's inclusion of the phrase "on another person" in the statutory definition for "dangerous offense" evinces this intent. The State, on the other hand, argued that sentencing enhancement is based on the use of the dangerous instrument rather than the target of the instrument. The superior court granted Hu's motion and the State petitioned for this special action. This court accepted jurisdiction because " the State has no adequate remedy on appeal and the petition presents a legal issue of statewide importance." This court first examined the statutory definition for a "dangerous" felony offense: "an offense involving the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury on another person.” The State's contention is that the "or" in the definition is disjunctive and, thus, the phrase "on another person" only applies to the second independent clause. Hu counters that such an interpretation would cover harm to anything and lead to absurd results. This court first noted that the statutory definitions are silent as to whether they only apply to humans. Applying principles of secondary interpretation and sensible construction, the court held that legislature's purpose in drafting the dangerous offense definition and the related statutes was to enhance crimes to “dangerous offenses” to protect human life. The State cannot charge a crime as a dangerous offense unless the target is against another person. In reaching this conclusion, the court contemplated extreme examples involving felony damage to vegetation as well as comparison to a recent decision in Texas where a deadly weapon finding was limited to human victims only. | Case | |
| Celinski v. State | 911 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App. 1995). |
Criminal conviction of defendant who tortured cats by poisoning them and burning them in microwave oven. Conviction was sustained by circumstantial evidence of cruelty and torture. |
Case | ||
| TX - Dangerous - Subchapter D: Dangerous Dogs | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.041 - 047 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.041 - 047 | Chapter 822, Subchapter D addresses dangerous dogs and their treatment, including dog attacks, registration, defenses, violations of the statute. | Statute | |
| US - Endangered Species - Part 402 - Interagency Cooperation | 69 FR 4557 | 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 to .34 | These ESA (Endangered Species Act) regulations outline the rules for joint or interagency actions under the Act. Specifically, the regulations state that each federal agency shall confer with the Service (USFWS) on any action which is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any proposed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of proposed critical habitat; confer on the coordination of biological assessments and consultations; and confer regarding Fire Plan Project rules, among other things. | Administrative | |
| AL - Racing - § 11-65-1 to § 11-65-47. Horse Racing and Greyhound Racing in Class 1 Municipalities | Ala.Code 1975 § 11-65-1 to § 11-65-47 | AL ST § 11-65-1 to § 11-65-47 | This set of statutes allows for municipalities in Alabama to vote on whether or not they wish to authorize horse and greyhound racing and pari-mutuel wagering. Each municipality that authorizes it must create a commission which must be incorporated in order for a municipality to conduct horse and greyhound racing. The commissions each regulate horse and greyhound racing only in their respective municipalities. A license must be obtained by the commission of the respective municipality in which one desires to operate or construct a racing facility. | Statute | |
| Larobina v R | [2009] NSWDC 79 |
The appellant appeal against a conviction for animal cruelty sustained in a lower court. After an examination of the elements of the statutory offense, it was found that the charge upon which the conviction was sustained was unknown to law. |
Case | ||
| Sentencia T-608, 2011 | Sentencia T-608/11 | The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary created for the purpose of protection of fundamental rights) acting as the legal guardian of her husband, who had spastic quadriplegia and mixed aphasia as a result of a severe cranioencephalic trauma, against Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas ‘CORPOCALDAS’. The Plaintiff argued that Corpocaldas had violated the rights to health and dignified life of her husband when the Defendant confiscated a parrot that was part of the Plaintiff’s rehabilitation treatment. The Plaintiff sought immediate restitution of the parrot by the Defendant. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court to deny the Plaintiff’s petition. The court determined that the confiscation of the parrot by Corpocaldas was reasonable and according to the law, therefore there was not a violation of the rights of the Plaintiff. The court stated that as wild animals belong to the nation and they can only be reduced to property when the are obtained through legal hunting or from legal breeders. In this particular case, the Plaintiff obtained the parrot as a present from her cousin, and she did not present evidence of title. The court concluded that the bird belonged to the nation, and therefore the environmental authority had acted in accordance to its duties. The court stated that even though there was a narrow relationship between the rights to health and life with the right to environment, the protection of the environment did not only aim to the protection of humans. The court indicated that the environment should be protected whether or not it offered a benefit to the human species. The rest of the beings that are part of the environment are dignified beings that are not at the absolute and unlimited disposition of the human beings. Humans are just another element of nature, and not a superior entity that has the environment at their disposition. Therefore, the use of natural resources should not cause damage or deterioration that could threaten diversity and environmental integrity, the court stated in its reasoning. | Case | ||
| GREEN v. LECKINGTON | 236 P.2d 335 (Or. 1951) | 192 Or. 601 (Or. 1951) |
In this Oregon case, defendant appeals a judgment of $700 in damages obtained against him after he shot plaintiff’s dog. The dog had gone onto to defendant’s property and was chasing his chickens. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that because it was a general verdict, there was no way to determine a basis for the jury’s verdict; specifically, whether erroneous instructions on exemplary damages and the proper measure of damages influenced the verdict. Because the Court had the whole record before it (and in the interest of “harmony between neighbors”), the Court fixed the damages at the true market value of the dog ($250). |
Case | |
| WI - Impound - 173.23. Disposition of animals | W. S. A. 173.23 | WI ST 173.23 | This Wisconsin statue provides the necessary elements for an owner needs to retrieve his or her impounded dog. Included are reasonable proof of ownership, licensure if required by statute or ordinance, proof of vaccination as required by ordinance, and payment of charges. If an animal is not claimed, the statute outlines several dispositions, such as adoption, euthanization, and sale of the animal at public auction, including sale at a licensed animal market. | Statute |