Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Derecho Animal Volume 8 Núm 4 |
|
Policy | ||||||||
| Test Map | Other jurisdictions can be added here in the summary or ... | State map | ||||||||
| BURLINGTON & M.R.R.R. IN NEBRASKA v. CAMPBELL | 59 P. 424 (Colo.App. 1899) | 14 Colo.App. 141 (Colo.App. 1899) |
In Burlington & M.R.R.R. in Nebraska v. Cambell , 14 Colo. App. 141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1899), plaintiff’s horse was killed by a train. Although the court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff for failure to prove defendant’s negligence, the court allowed witness testimony on the market value of the mare. |
Case | ||||||
| Susan, Russell and Mary Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Department of Animal Regulation | In this petition for a rehearing, respondents argued that the appellate court's decision (Phillips v. Department, 183 Cal.App.3d 372 (1986)) misstates crucial facts concerning the operation of the subject ordinance; that hearings required under the Atascadero ordinances apply to all dogs, not just strays; and that the appellate court may have been misled in its decision to conclude that no notice had been required. | Pleading | ||||||||
| Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assoc. Animal Hosp. | 785 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio App. 2 Dist.,2003) | 151 Ohio App.3d 741, 2003 -Ohio- 917 (Ohio App. 2 Dist.,2003) |
This is the story of “Poopi,” a dog who tried to sue for emotional distress and failed. As the court observed, "Whether or not one agrees with the view that pets are more than personal property, it is clear that Ohio does not recognize noneconomic damages for injury to companion animals." While the court noted that one Ohio case has apparently left open the door for recover of distress damages, "the mental anguish in such situations must be ‘so serious and of a nature that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.’ Even conceding the bond between many humans and their pets, the burden is one that would be very difficult to meet." Indeed, the court found that the burden was not met here. |
Case | ||||||
| Reams v. Irvin | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 906005 (N.D.Ga.) | 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25350 |
The plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C 1983 action against police officers she claimed violated her civil rights under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when they impounded 46 of her horses on suspicion of animal abuse. Upon a summary judgement motion by the defendants, the court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims. Responding to the Fourth Amendment claim in particular, the court held that an old dairy barn, which was being used to hide dead horses, was neither within the curtilage of the home nor protected by the Fourth Amendment. After applying the Dunn factors, the court determined that the barns distance of 150 yards from the dwelling on the farm, its use for the commercial production of dairy products, its lacks of enclosure, and its missing doors all militated against it being part of the curtilage of the home and it did not enjoy Fourth Amendment privacy protection. |
Case | ||||||
| Argentina - Cruelty - Ley 2.786 | Ley 2.786 | Ley Sarmiento was the first law in South America enacted for the protection of animals. This criminal law prohibited animal cruelty at the national level and imposed on the police the duty to enforce laws protecting animals in cooperation with the Argentinian Society for the Protection of Animals. It imposed fines instead of prison time. The Sarmiento law paved the way for the Peron law (ley 14.346) that was enacted in 1954, which is valid to this day. | Statute | |||||||
| Turner v. Ferguson | 432 F. Supp. 3d 876 (E.D. Wis. 2020) | On March 5, 2017 Lori turner was attacked by her neighbor’s (“Arndt”) dog which required her to receive 11 staples to close the wound on her scalp. She also suffered bites on her shoulder and wrist that would later require surgery. Pursuant to local regulations, the neighbor’s dog was quarantined for a ten-day period. Lori mentioned to officers that the City of Gelndale had recently enacted an ordinance that allowed for an officer to declare a dog vicious which then required the owner of the dog to adhere to certain requirements like securing the dog in a kennel when it was outdoors and maintaining liability insurance for dog bites. On March 14, 2017, Officer Ruppel issued a citation to Ardnt under a Glendale ordinance for damage caused by dogs, however, he did not declare the dog vicious under the vicious-dog ordinance. Officer Ruppel reasoned during deposition that he chose not to do so because he considered Ardnt grabbing the dog by the neck and Lori walking up and petting the dog (prior to Ardnt’s action) provocation. Lori filed suit against the officers she interacted with over the course of the next year claiming that the officers denied her equal protection of the law by refusing to declare Arndt’s dog vicious and by failing to protect her from loose dogs in the neighborhood. Lori had repeatedly contacted the police department over the course of a year about how she did not like the outcome of her dog bite case and about loose dogs in the neighborhood. Lori specifically alleged that the officers treated her with animus. The Court ultimately found that the evidence in the record did not support a class-of-one equal protection claim. Officer Ruppel’s decision to not declare Ardnt’s dog vicious was supported by a rational basis. Additionally, no evidence existed that suggested that the Glendale police department intentionally and irrationally treated Lori’s complaints about loose dogs in the neighborhood differently than it treated similar complaints by other citizens. The Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted. | Case | |||||||
| United States v. 144,774 Pounds Of Blue King Crab | 410 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. Wash., 2005) | 2005 WL 1355511 (9th Cir. Wash.) |
An importer of 144,774 pounds of cooked, frozen blue king crab was charged with violating the Lacey Act for taking the crab in violation of Russian fishing regulations. The crab is subject to forfeiture under the Lacey Act on a strict liability basis, but the importer asserted an "innocent owner" defense. The trial court denied the owner's defense and the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning if the crab was illegally taken under Russian law then it is considered contraband for Lacey Act purposes regardless of its status under U.S. law. |
Case | ||||||
| Amburgey v. Sauder | 605 N.W.2d 84 (Mich. 1999) |
Plaintiff was bitten by a horse as she walked through a stable. The court determined that Plaintiff was a “participant” for the purposes of the Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA), and thus the Defendant stables owner was insulated from liability arising out of the unanticipated, abnormal behavior of the horse. |
Case |