Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN - Cruelty - THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT, 1960 | 59 OF 1960 |
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 prohibits any person from inflicting, causing, or if it is the owner, permitting, unnecessary pain or suffering to be inflicted on any animal. The Act makes it a crime to beat, kick, torture, mutilate, administer an injurious substance, or cruelly kill an animal. It is also illegal to over-ride, over-drive, over-load, or work an unfit animal. It is an offense to cruelly transport, confine, chain or tether an animal. It is a violation to engage in animal fighting or shooting competitions in which animals are released from captivity to be shot. An owner commits an offense if he or she fails to provide sufficient food, drink or shelter, unreasonably abandons any animal, or permits any diseased or disabled animal to roam or die in any street.
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Statute | |
| Faraci v. Urban | 101 A.D.3d 1753 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.) | 2012 WL 6720938 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.); 957 N.Y.S.2d 792 |
In this New York case, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries his son sustained after the child was bitten by a dog in a house owned by defendant Urban, but occupied by Defendant Buil (the dog's owner). Defendant Urban appeals an order denying her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant Urban failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that the dog did not have vicious tendencies because defendant's own submissions showed that the dog had previously growled at people coming to the door. However, summary judgment was appropriate here because the evidence failed to show that defendant knew or should have known of the dog's alleged vicious propensities. |
Case |
| Missouri Primate Foundation v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | Slip Copy, 2018 WL 1420239 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 22, 2018) | This matter is a motion of counterclaim by defendants Missouri Primate Foundation to dismiss PETA's (the counterclaim plaintiff) assertion that two chimpanzees were being held in conditions that deprived the chimpanzees of adequate social groups, space, and psychological stimulation, putting them at risk of and causing physical and psychological injury, such as deteriorated cardiovascular and musculoskeletal health, stress, anxiety and depression. PETA also alleges that the chimpanzees were denied a sanitary environment, proper ventilation, a healthy diet, and adequate veterinary care. PETA claimed that the Missouri Primate Foundation (MPF) (the counterclaim defendants) were holding the two chimpanzees in conditions that “harm” and “harass” the chimpanzees, thus violating the “take” prohibition of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). MPF's motion contends that PETA’s counterclaim is based on allegations that they failed to comply with the Animal Welfare Act, not the ESA. MPF further contends that because the chimpanzees at its facility were lawfully in captivity and under the auspices of the AWA as administered by the USDA–APHIS, so the chimpanzees cannot be subject to a “take” under the ESA. They further argued that PETA lacked standing as the AWA preempts or supersedes the ESA as to animals held at USDA licensed facilities. Because the AWA does not allow citizen suits, MPF argued, the case must be dismissed. After examining similar cases, this court concluded that claims under the AWA and ESA are complementary and do not conflict, and that the ESA protects captive animals regardless of whether the alleged violator is an AWA licensed entity. The court found that the allegations by PETA are sufficient at this stage of the case and issues of proof are reserved for trial. As such, the court denied the motions of the counterclaim defendants. | Case | |
| CA - Circus - § 25989.1. Notice to animal control services agency of performances to be conducted | West's Ann. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25989.1 | CA HLTH & S § 25989.1 | This California section provides that any traveling circus or carnival must notify entity that provides animal control services for a city, county, or city and county in which the traveling circus or carnival intends to perform of its intent to perform within that jurisdiction at least 14 days prior to the first performance in that city, county, or city and county. Violation results in a fine of $500 - 2,000 for a first violation, and $1,500 - 5,000 for any subsequent violation. | Statute |
| New York Penal Law 1866: Chapter 682: Section 2 | N.Y. Rev. Stat. 682.2 (1866) | Chapter 682 from New York Penal Law of 1866 covers cruelty to animals. Section 2 from this chapter describes the offense entitled neglect of disabled animals. The law states the penalty for leaving a disabled or diseased animal to die on any state or city land. | Statute | |
| Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey | 201 F.3d 680 (C.A.5 (Tex.),2000) | 45 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1370, 28 Media L. Rep. 1481 |
Cattle ranchers in Texas sued the
The Oprah Winfrey Show
and one of its guests for knowingly and falsely depicting American beef as unsafe in the wake of the British panic over “Mad Cow Disease.” The matter was removed from state court to federal court. The federal district court granted summary judgment as a matter of law on all claims presented except the business disparagement cause of action, which was eventually rejected by a jury. The court alternately held that no knowingly false statements were made by the appellees. This court affirmed on this latter ground only, finding that the guest's statement and the producers' editing of the show did not violate the Texas False Disparagement of Perishable Food Products Act.
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Case |
| Missouri Veterinary Medical Bd. v. Gray | 397 S.W.3d 479 (Mo.App. W.D., 2013) | 2013 WL 600201 (Mo.App. W.D., 2013) |
An unlicensed Missouri equine dentist (Brooke Rene Gray) appeals an order from the circuit court enjoining and prohibiting her from doing business as "B & B Equine Dentistry," where she performed equine tooth floating and other acts. In 2007, the Missouri Veterinary Medical Board informed Ms. Gray that she was violating Missouri law by practicing veterinary medicine without a license. After she did not cease her activities, the Board referred the matter to the Attorney General, who then filed a petition on behalf of the Board to enjoin Ms. Gray's activities. On appeal, Ms. Gray contends that the court order violates the Missouri Constitution, which guarantees all citizens the right to enjoy the "gains of their own industry." The court disagreed, finding that the State has a strong interest in regulating practices that involve public safety as is the case with veterinary medicine. |
Case |
| Reece v. Edmonton (City) | 335 DLR (4th) 600; 513 AR 199; [2011] CarswellAlta 1349; 530 WAC 199 | This case dealt with the procedure the applicants used to get their claim heard by the court. The respondent City holds a licence under the Wildlife Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W‑10 to operate a zoo, which houses a lone Asian elephant named Lucy. The appellants commenced this action by originating notice for an order. The chambers judge concluded that the proceedings were an abuse of process because a private litigant cannot seek a declaration that the respondent is in breach of a penal provision in a statute, namely that the elephant was kept in distress because of health concerns. Alternatively, he concluded that the application should have been brought by way of statement of claim, not originating notice. Further, the chambers judge concluded that the appellants had no private interest standing, and that there were barriers to them being awarded public interest standing. On appeal, the parties raised two issues: (1) whether the chambers judge erred in denying the appellants standing to seek a declaration; and (2) whether the chambers judge erred in concluding that the proceedings were an abuse of process. This court held that the chambers judge came to the correct conclusion that these proceedings are an abuse of process. APPEAL DISMISSED. | Case | |
| UK - Dangerous Dogs - Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 | 1991 CHAPTER 65 |
An Act to prohibit persons from having in their possession or custody dogs belonging to types bred for fighting; to impose restrictions in respect of such dogs pending the coming into force of the prohibition; to enable restrictions to be imposed in relation to other types of dog which present a serious danger to the public; to make further provision for securing that dogs are kept under proper control; and for connected purposes. |
Statute | |
| DR. ELLEN LEVINE et al., Plaintiffs, v. MIKE JOHANNS, Defendants | This action challenges the exclusion of chickens, turkeys, and other birds from the protections of the federal Humane Slaughter Act (HSA). The Levine plaintiffs’ complaint challenges a USDA Notice issued on September 28, 2005, titled “Treatment of Live Poultry Before Slaughter.” The Notice states that there is no federal statute governing the humane slaughter of poultry, but recommends that the poultry industry adopt voluntary measures to improve slaughter practices. Plaintiffs all contend that by excluding these animals from the protections of the Act exposes them to greater risk of food-borne illness. The inhumane methods of slaughtering the birds have been linked in scientific studies to greater incidence of food-borne pathogens in the meat. In their complaint, Plaintiffs request an order finding the act of excluding poultry from the HSA is arbitrary and capricious, and enjoining the USDA from excluding poultry species from the HSA. In its order regarding defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found that plaintiffs credibly alleged that they face an imminent exposure to heightened risk that they will become ill from consuming inhumanely slaughtered animals. Thus, defendant’s motion to dismiss the consumer claims was denied. | Pleading |