Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASOCIACION DE FUNCIONARIOS Y ABOGADOS POR LOS DERECHOS DE LOS ANIMALES Y OTROS CONTRA GCBA SOBRE AMPARO | ASOCIACION DE FUNCIONARIOS Y ABOGADOS POR LOS DERECHOS DE LOS ANIMALES Y OTROS CONTRA GCBA SOBRE AMPARO” | Argentina’s Juzgado No. 4 on Contentious Administrative and Tax Matters of the City of Buenos Aires held on October 21, 2015 that Sandra, an orangutan that had lived at the Buenos Aires Zoo for over 20 years, is a non-human person subject to rights, based on the precedent of the Argentina’s Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation of December 18, 2014 and Ley 14.346, 1954. The court ruled that “Sandra has the right to enjoy the highest quality of life possible to her particular and individual situation, tending to avoid any kind of suffering that could be generated by the interference of humans in her life." In its holding, the court also stated that the Buenos Aires government has to guarantee Sandra’s adequate condition of habitat and the activities necessary to preserve her cognitive abilities. The amicus curiae experts Dr. Miguel Rivolta, Héctor Ferrari and Dr. Gabriel Aguado were instructed to prepare a binding report resolving what measures had to be adopted by the government in relationship to Sandra. | Case | |
| Ash v. State | 290 Ark. 278 (1986) | 290 Ark. 278 (1986) |
Police raided defendant's home and found an area converted into an arena for dog fighting. Defendant was found guilty of promoting or engaging in dog fighting or possessing a dog for that purpose. On appeal, the court found that the based on the evidence a jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant was aware that on property owned by her and her husband an arena had been built for the purpose of clandestine dog fighting and that she was aware it was so being used. |
Case |
| Ascencio v. ADRU Corporation | 2014 WL 204212 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) |
A woman, who suffers from a disability that is accompanied by deep depression and anxiety, went to a fast food restaurant with her mother and her two service dogs. Upon entering the establishment, the employees refused to serve them, forced them to leave, and retaliated against them by calling the police and threatening them with arrest. The woman and her mother sued the fast food restaurant for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and related California statutes. When the fast food restaurant failed to file an answer, the court entered a default judgment against the fast food restaurant; awarded the plaintiffs with damages, court costs and attorney fees; and placed a permanent injunction against the fast food restaurant. |
Case | |
| Article 70 of CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley | 49 Misc. 3d 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 4612340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2015) | Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 and under the common law for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees in the custody of respondent State University of New York at Stony Brook. It sought an order directing respondents to demonstrate the basis for detaining Hercules and Leo, and an order directing their release and transfer to a sanctuary in Florida. Respondents opposed the petition and cross moved to change venue. While the Supreme Court of New York County found that neither CPLR 7002(b)(3) nor CPLR 7004(c) required a change of venue to Suffolk County; that the petitioner had standing to bring the case; and that prior proceedings did not bar this case from being heard, the substance of the petition required a finding as to whether a chimpanzee was a legal person entitled to bring a writ of habeas corpus. Since the Court found it was bound by the Third Department in People ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, which ruled that chimpanzees were not “legal persons” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by a writ of habeas corpus, it denied the habeas corpus petition and dismissed the proceeding. | Case |
| Art and Antique Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Seggos | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 3817305 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019) | The plaintiffs are trade organizations representing arts and antique dealers. Plaintiff’s members have an “economic and professional interest in. . .the purchase, sale, distribution or trading of antique elephant ivory.” The Defendant is the Commissioner of DEC which is a state agency tasked with protecting New York’s natural resources and environment. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits the import and export of endangered species and the sale, offering for sale, or movement of endangered species in interstate or foreign commerce. The prohibitions, however, had exceptions for “antique articles” that are 100 years of age or older. Those wishing to import such antique articles needed to first obtain a federal permit. Under the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, trade of African elephant ivory is generally prohibited. Only certain items containing a de minimus quantity of ivory are exempt. The state of New York imposed a ban on elephant ivory with even narrower exceptions than the ESA. The DEC only issued licenses authorizing trade in ivory pursuant to the State Ivory Law’s exceptions. The licenses actually issued by the DEC restricted the advertisement and display of ivory products. Plaintiff’s filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the State Ivory Law on preemption and First Amendment grounds. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Defendants and Intervenors crossed-moved to dismiss. The Court examined the ESA and determined that section 1535(f) did not preempt the State Ivory Law because the ESA prohibitions only applied to interstate or foreign commerce while the State Ivory Law applied to intrastate commerce. As result, the exceptions contained in the State Ivory Law did not prohibit what was authorized by the ESA. The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Count I because it was not “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state laws restricting purely intrastate commerce in ivory.” The Plaintiff’s second count alleged that the State Ivory Law’s permit requirement violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The display restriction in the license prohibited the physical display for sale of any item not authorized for intrastate sale under the State Ivory Law even if the merchant was authorized under the ESA to sell the item in interstate commerce. The Court determined that the in-store display of ivory products constituted commercial speech because the display constituted lawful activity, New York had a substantial interest in regulating the sale of ivory within its borders and the display restriction directly advanced that interest. The Court was unable to determine whether the display restriction burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Ultimately the Court granted the Defendant’s and Intervenor’s cross-motions to dismiss with respect to preemption and denied both the Defendant’s and Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment with respect to the First Amendment Claim. | Case | |
| Arrington v. Arrington | 613 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) |
A divorcing couple agreed to visitation of their dog, which the trial court incorporated into the divorce decree, appointing wife as the dog's managing conservator. Husband appealed because he had not been appointed managing conservator; the appellate court stated that dogs are personal property, and the office of managing conservator had been created for human children. While the court held that dogs are personal property under the law, it also stated that visitation of dogs should be allowed. |
Case | |
| Armstrong v. Riggi | 549 P.2d 753 (Nev. 1976) | 92 Nev. 280 (1976) |
Joe Riggi delivered his two unregistered Pomeranian dogs to the Armstrongs' Poodle Parlor to be bathed and groomed. The dogs died while in the care of the bailee. Riggi commenced this action to recover damages alleging that the dogs were worth more than $10,000. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the state court rule regarding attorney fees. Since the appellate court did in fact determine error, the case was remanded. |
Case |
| Arizona Cattle Growers' Association v. Salazar | 606 F.3d 1160, (C.A.9 (Ariz.),2010) | 2010 WL 2220036; 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7030; 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8233 |
Arizona Cattle Growers’ Association (Plaintiff) challenged Fish and Wildlife Service's (Defendant) designation of critical habitat for Mexican spotted owls under the Endangered Species Act. The issues were whether Defendant impermissibly included unoccupied areas as critical habitat, and whether Defendant impermissibly employed the baseline approach in its economic analysis. The Court held that 1) Defendant did not designate unoccupied areas as critical habitat because “occupied” areas included areas where the species was likely to be present, and 2) that Defendant properly applied the baseline approach because the economic impact of listing a species as endangered was not intended to be included in the economic analysis of the critical habitat designation. |
Case |
| Arguello v. Behmke | 2006 WL 205097 (N.J.Super.Ch.,2006) (not reported in A.2d) |
The adoption of a dog was invalidated and the court ordered its return to the original owner. The shelter's placement of the dog with a new family was invalid because the shelter agreed that it would hold the dog for a certain period of time. |
Case | |
| Argentina, Ley 27233, 2015 | Ley 27233 | This law declared animal and plant health of national interest. Ley 27233 established that the all persons including legal persons that are participants in the agro-food chain (production, obtention, transportation and industrialization of products, by-products, and derivatives of silvo-agricultural and fishing origin), have the responsibility to watch and respond to the health, innocuousness, hygiene, and quality of agricultural production, in accordance with the current regulations. Article 2 declared of public order the national regulations by which the development of actions aim for the preservation of animal health, plant protection, and the hygienic-sanitary condition of food of agricultural origin. This responsibility extends to those who produce, divide, conserve, deposit, concentrate, transport, commercialize, sell, import or export animals, vegetables, food, raw materials, food additives, reproductive material, animal feed and raw materials, fishery products and other products of animal and/or vegetable origin that act individually, jointly or successively, in the agro-food chain. | Statute |