Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
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| RI - Disaster Planning - Emergency Support Function 11 | ESF 11 | The State of Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency is tasked with the coordination of emergency response and plans. Emergency Support Function 11, "Provides situational awareness and coordinates support for; the protection of the state’s agricultural and natural resources during emergencies; the emergency sheltering of pet animals; animal health issues; provide technical expertise, of animal and agricultural emergency management; ensure the safety and of the state’s meat, poultry, and dairy production facilities within the state." | Administrative | ||
| Padilla v. Stringer | 395 F.Supp. 495 (1974) | 10 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 575, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,196, 19 Fed.R.Serv.2d 832 | Plaintiff employee brought a suit of discrimination against the Albuquerque Rio Grande Zoo under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(4) and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 2000e et seq. | Case | |
| Thompson v. Dover Downs, Inc. | 887 A.2d 458 (Del.Supr.,2005) | 31 NDLR P 135 (Del.Supr.,2005) |
Vernon Thompson appeals from a Superior Court order reversing a decision and order of the Delaware Human Relations Commission (DHRC) after Thompson was denied access to defendant's casino because Thompson insisted that his dog accompany him, but refused to answer the officials' inquiries about what his alleged support animal had been trained to perform. The DHRC determined that by denying access, Dover Downs had unlawfully discriminated against Thompson in violation of the Delaware Equal Accommodations Law. The Supreme Court here agreed with the Superior Court in reversing the DHRC. It found that Dover Downs' personnel were entitled to ask Thompson about his dog's training. Since Thompson refused to answer these questions, there is no rational basis to conclude that Dover Downs' refusal to admit Thompson accompanied was pretextual. |
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| MI - Cruelty - Legislative Analysis | HOUSE BILLS 4550-4552 (legislative analysis) |
This document is the legislative analysis for House Bills 4551 and 4552. The bills (now law) amend the penal laws (MCL 750.50) to revise the penalties for harming animals and allow for consecutive sentencing. Both bills would exempt veterinarians and veterinarian technicians from the prohibitions and penalties when lawfully engaging in the practice of veterinarian medicine. Under the new law, a court could order a term of imprisonment imposed for a violation prohibited under the bills to be served consecutively to a term of imprisonment imposed for any other crime including any other violation of law arising out of the same transaction. |
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| US - Service animals - Part 36. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability | 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 to 109 | This regulation defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment. It also defines service animal as any guide dog, signal dog, or other animal individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including, but not limited to, guiding individuals with impaired vision, alerting individuals with impaired hearing to intruders or sounds, providing minimal protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, or fetching dropped items. | Administrative | ||
| Aversa v. Bartlett | 783 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. 2004) | 783 N.Y.S.2d 174 |
Plaintiff was awarded $100,000 for past pain and suffering and $200,000 for future pain and suffering after she was bitten in the face by Defendant's dog. Defendant appealed on the basis that the jury award for future pain and suffering was unreasonable compensation. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court modified the judgment to be $75,000 for past pain and suffering after Plaintiff stipulated to the decrease. |
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| US - Whales - Whaling Convention Act | 16 U.S.C.A. § 916 - 916l | These federal statutes describe the Whaling Convention Act which granted authority to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce for regulation. The Act makes it unlawful for any person in the United States to engage in whaling, transporting, or selling any whale or whale products, that are taken or processed in violation of the Act. The Act also prohibits other unlawful conduct such as whaling without a license and failing to keep required returns, records, and reports. Finally, the Act provide penalties for violations including a fine of not more than $10,000, imprisonment of not more than one year, or both. In addition the court may prohibit such person from whaling for a period of time. | Statute | ||
| KY - Hunting, Internet - § 150.363, 150.990. Computer- assisted remote hunting unlawful; citizens with disabilities | KRS § 150.363, 150.990 | Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150.363 (West), Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150.990 (West) | This Kentucky statute makes computer assisted hunting within the state unlawful. It specifies that the provisions of the statute should not be construed to limit or prohibit the hunting rights or privileges provided to citizens with disabilities within the state. Any person who violates this provision will be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500). They may also be imprisoned for not more than six (6) months, or be fined and imprisoned. | Statute | |
| Friends of Animals v. Salazar | 690 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.D.C.,2010) | 2010 WL 936222 (D.D.C.) |
Friends of Animals (FOA), an animal advocacy group, brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior, et al, (Defendants) under the Endangered Species Act seeking declaratory and injunctive relief by claiming that the Secretary failed to make statutory 90-day and 12-month findings related to the petition to have 13 species of birds listed as threatened or endangered. The Court found that FOA's claim that Defendants failed to make a 90-day finding on its endangered-species petition was moot, and its claim that Defendants failed to meet the 12-month deadline provided by the ESA had to be dismissed due to FOA's failure to provide Defendants with proper notice. The Court did find, however, that FOA's lawsuit was the catalyst prompting Defendants to ultimately issue a 90-day finding as required. Thus, the Court here considers FOA's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The Court held that FOA could recover fees for work on the notice letter, complaint, and petition for fees to the extent it related to the claim that prompted the 90-day finding. However, the court reduced the amount of time spent on the complaint by fifty percent. |
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