Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Street | 257 F.3d 869 (8th Cir.2001) |
The court held that the "second or subsequent conviction" component of the BGEPA applies to separate convictions charged in a single indictment. For further discussion on the enhanced penalty provision of the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | ||
| Pitts v. State | 918 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App. 1995). |
Right of appeal is only available for orders that the animal be sold at public auction. The statutory language does not extend this right to seizure orders. |
Case | ||
| Reams v. Irvin | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 906005 (N.D.Ga.) | 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25350 |
The plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C 1983 action against police officers she claimed violated her civil rights under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when they impounded 46 of her horses on suspicion of animal abuse. Upon a summary judgement motion by the defendants, the court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims. Responding to the Fourth Amendment claim in particular, the court held that an old dairy barn, which was being used to hide dead horses, was neither within the curtilage of the home nor protected by the Fourth Amendment. After applying the Dunn factors, the court determined that the barns distance of 150 yards from the dwelling on the farm, its use for the commercial production of dairy products, its lacks of enclosure, and its missing doors all militated against it being part of the curtilage of the home and it did not enjoy Fourth Amendment privacy protection. |
Case | |
| Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes | 800 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.App.,2011) | 2011 WL 2982992 (Minn.App.,2011) |
The city council ordered the destruction of a dog after finding it to be a dangerous animal and the owner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that procedural due process required that the owner should have been given a meaningful opportunity to contest the declaration of the dog as a “potentially dangerous animal” before it was declared a “dangerous animal” under the city ordinance. |
Case | |
| WI - Impound - 173.23. Disposition of animals | W. S. A. 173.23 | WI ST 173.23 | This Wisconsin statue provides the necessary elements for an owner needs to retrieve his or her impounded dog. Included are reasonable proof of ownership, licensure if required by statute or ordinance, proof of vaccination as required by ordinance, and payment of charges. If an animal is not claimed, the statute outlines several dispositions, such as adoption, euthanization, and sale of the animal at public auction, including sale at a licensed animal market. | Statute | |
| PA - Exotic Pets - Subchapter D. Permits Relating to Wildlife; Chapter 147. Special Permits. Subchapter N. Exotic Wildlife Posse | 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2961 - 2965; 58 Pa. Code § 147.261 - 262 | PA ST 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2961- 2965; 58 PA ADC §§ 147.261 - 262 | These Pennsylvania statutes represent the state's exotic pet laws. "Exotic wildlife" includes all bears, coyotes, lions, tigers, leopards, jaguars, cheetahs, cougars, wolves and any crossbreed of these animals. The commission may issue a permit to a person to act as an exotic wildlife dealer. No permit shall be granted by the commission until it is satisfied that the provisions for housing and caring for the exotic wildlife and protection for the public are proper and adequate and in accordance with the standards which may be established by regulations. It is unlawful to release any exotic wildlife into the wild, fail to exercise due care in safeguarding the public, or recklessly engage in conduct that places another person in danger of attack from exotic wildlife. | Statute | |
| People v. Meadows | 54 Misc. 3d 697, 46 N.Y.S.3d 843 (N.Y. City Ct. 2016), rev'd, No. 17-AP-002, 2017 WL 4367065 (N.Y. Co. Ct. Aug. 3, 2017) | 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 26405, 2016 WL 7165826 |
Defendant Amber Meadows allegedly neglected to provide dogs Athena, Buddy, and Meeko, with air, food, and water, and confined them in a bedroom where feces was found on the floor and furniture. Meadows was prosecuted for three counts of the unclassified misdemeanor of failure to provide proper food and drink to an impounded animal in violation of § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law (AML). Meadows moved to dismiss the Information as facially insufficient and stated that the Supporting Deposition indicated that the dogs were “in good condition.” The People of the State of New York argued that the allegations in both the Information and Deposition, taken together, provide a sufficient basis to establish the elements of the crime. The Canandaigua City Court, Ontario County, held that: (1) “impounded” as stated in § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law does not apply to individual persons, and (2) even if the statute applied to individual persons, the allegations in the Information were not facially sufficient. The court reasoned § 356 does not apply to individual persons, but instead applies only to “pounds” operated by not-for-profit organizations, or kennels where animals are confined for hire. The court also stated that even if § 356 were to apply to individuals, under no construction of the facts here could the charge be sustained, as it appeared that the animals were properly cared for in the Defendant's apartment up to the point where she was forcibly detained. The conditions observed by law enforcement authorities on the date alleged in the Information were apparently several days after Meadow's incarceration and after which she was unsuccessful in securing assistance for the dogs while incarcerated. The Information was dismissed with prejudice, and the People's application for leave to file an amended or superseding Information was denied. |
Case | |
| Chavez v. Aber | 122 F. Supp. 3d 581 (W.D. Tex. 2015) | 2015 WL 4724807 (W.D. Tex., 2015) | Plaintiffs sought damages stemming from Defendants' refusal to accommodate Plaintiffs’ minor son's mental health disabilities by allowing Plaintiffs to keep a mixed-breed pit bull as an emotional support animal in their rented duplex. Plaintiffs asserted (1) housing discrimination under the Federal Housing Act (“FHA”), (2) unlawful retaliation under the FHA, (3) discrimination under the Texas Fair Housing Act (“TFHA”), and (4) unlawful retaliation under § 92.331 of the Texas Property Code. Defendants filed the Motion, seeking dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court found Plaintiffs had adequately pleaded all claims and denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss. | Case | |
| US - Whales - Whaling Provisions; Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Quotas | FR Doc. 05-2001 | Docket No. 050114009-5009-01; I.D. 011105B |
NMFS announces the aboriginal subsistence whaling quota for bowhead whales, and other limitations deriving from regulations adopted at the 2002 Special Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). For 2005, the quota is 75 bowhead whales struck. This quota and other limitations will govern the harvest of bowhead whales by members of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC). |
Administrative | |
| Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi | [2010] NSWSC 335 |
The defendants entered the plaintiff's land, containing a piggery, with the intention of taking photographs and film footage to establish that the plaintiff failed to meet certain standards. The defendants' argument that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief because of 'unclean hands' was dismissed by the court. The court also found that the defensive argument based on 'implied freedom of political communication' did not have application in the circumstances. |
Case |