Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AZ - Ordinances - Lawful presence on private property defined (dogs) | A. R. S. § 11-1026 | AZ ST § 11-1026 | This Arizona statute provides that a person is lawfully on a dog owner's property when he or she is there as an invitee or guest, or when in the performance of a duty imposed upon him by law of the state or United States, or by ordinances of a municipality in which such property is located. | Statute | |
| State v. Butler | 175 N.H. 444, 293 A.3d 191 (2022) | 2022 WL 4488304 (N.H. Sept. 28, 2022) | Defendant Kevin Butler was convicted of criminal negligence after he left his dog inside a parked vehicle for 45 minutes when the temperature was over 90 degrees outside. The charge came after a neighbor noticed a dog in the vehicle that was "scratching at the windows and the door" and appeared to be in distress. After calling the police, an animal control officer removed the animal from the unlocked car and transported the distressed dog to a local veterinary clinic. At trial, the defendant testified that he was out running errands on a "very hot" day, and asked his son to get the dog out of the car as Defendant's hands were full. An important phone call distracted him from following up on the dog's removal and only after the police knocked on his door did he realize the dog must still be in the car. On appeal here, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish the mens rea of criminal negligence for both charges. The State must prove that a defendant “fail[ed] to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct" and that this risk constitutes a gross deviation from conduct performed by a reasonable person. Here, the court found that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the defendant failed to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the dog would overheat in the car and that his failure to perceive this risk constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care. The temperature was high that day, the car was parked in direct sunlight with all the windows up, and the dog was left for around an hour. The fact that Defendant relied upon his 8-year-old son to remove the dog under these circumstances constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care. This was not "mere inattention" as Defendant claimed. The conviction was affirmed. | Case | |
| Maryland General Laws Supplement 1890-1898: Cruelty to Animals | 1890 Md. Laws 142,198,340 | The Maryland General Laws supplement covers the additions to the Cruelty of Animals statutes for Maryland from 1890-1898. The amendments cover court procedure to implementation of specific laws for certain animals. | Statute | ||
| NH - Commercial breeders - art Agr 1704. Operating Standards Relative to Commercial Kennels | NH ADC Agr 1704.01 - 10 | N.H. Code Admin. R. Agr 1704.01 - 10 | These New Hampshire regulations address minimum standards at commercial animal facilities. The regulations cover general aspects (i.e., housing must be structurally sound and maintained in good repair) as well as more specific aspects related to indoor heating/cooling and ventilation requirements. The sizing and construction of primary enclosures and minimal feeding requirements are described. | Administrative | |
| Nichols v. Lowe's Home Center, Inc. | 407 F.Supp.2d 979 (S.D.Ill.,2006) |
A customer brought an action against Lowe's home improvement store to recover for injury sustained when a "wild bird" flew into the back of her head while she was shopping in the gardening area. The plaintiff argued that the defendant did not exercise reasonable care in making the premises safe and that the defendant did not warn customers that the birds were a dangerous condition on the premises. In granting the owner's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the store owner did not owe customer a duty under Illinois law to protect her from wild bird attack since attack was not reasonably foreseeable. Further, the store owner was not the "owner" or "keeper" of a "wild bird" within meaning of Illinois Animal Control Act. |
Case | ||
| Janush v. Charities Housing Development Corp. | 169 F.Supp.2d 1133 (N.D. Ca., 2000) |
Tenant brought action under the Federal Fair Housing Act alleging that her landlord failed to reasonably accommodate her mental disability by refusing to allow her to keep companion animals in her rental unit. Tenant put forth evidence establishing that the animals lessened the effects of her mental disability by providing companionship. The housing authority argued that only service dogs are a reasonable accommodation. The court rejected the housing authority's argument, holding that animals other than service animal can be a reasonable accommodation for a disability. Also, the court noted that whether an accommodation is reasonable is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring an analysis of the burdens imposed on the housing authority and the benefits to the disabled person. |
Case | ||
| Sweden - Cruelty - The Sweden Animal Welfare Act | SFS 1998:56 |
The Swedish Animal Welfare Act applies to the care and treatment of domestic animals, and other animals if they are kept in captivity or are used for any of the purposes referred to in section 19 (generally, scientific uses). It provides that animals shall be treated well and shall be protected from unnecessary suffering and disease, among other things. |
Statute | ||
| ME - Police Animal - § 164-B. Immunity from civil liability for assistance given to law enforcement dogs, search and rescue | 14 M.R.S.A. § 164-B | This Maine law gives immunity from damages to an emergency medical services person, a security services dog handler or a law enforcement officer who voluntarily, without the expectation of monetary or other compensation, renders first aid, emergency treatment or rescue assistance to a law enforcement dog, search and rescue dog or service dog that is unconscious, ill, injured or in need of rescue assistance unless it is established that the injury or the death was caused willfully, wantonly or recklessly or by gross negligence on the part of the emergency medical services person, security services dog handler or law enforcement officer. | Statute | ||
| VIVA! International Voice for Animals, et al v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., et al | In this California case, plaintiffs sued defendants for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that defendants import the kangaroo leather in violation of section Penal Code section 653o—and thus are committing an unlawful business practice (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). Section 653o bans the import of products made from certain animals, including kangaroos into California. Defendants import and sell in California markets athletic shoes made from kangaroo leather. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that section 653o is preempted by federal law under the doctrine of conflict preemption. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The appellate court also agreed, finding that the statute as applied to defendants in this case conflicts with federal law and with substantial federal objectives of persuading Australian federal and state governments to impose kangaroo population management programs, in exchange for allowing the importation of kangaroo products. The accompanying regulations set forth a comprehensive national policy for the protection of endangered species such as the three kangaroo species involved in this case. Application of section 653o would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the objectives of Congress if applied to the defendants. | Pleading | |||
| Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue, Inc v. Bengal | 2011 WL 4867541 (C.A.3 (Pa.),2011) |
Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue rescued three dogs from North Carolina and had them delivered to Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement seized them and turned them over to Appellants PSPCA. The District Court ordered Appellants to return the dogs to Sixth Angel based on a state law conversion claim. The motion was affirmed because PSPCA deprived Sixth Angel of its unique property. Returning the dogs to their owner served the public interest by settling property rights and allowing Sixth Angel to fulfill its mission of finding homes for the dogs. |
Case |