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Displaying 91 - 100 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OR - Police Animal - 682.410. Emergency transportation for treatment of police dogs injured in the line of duty | O.R.S. § 682.410 | OR ST § 682.410 | Under this Oregon law from 2021, an emergency medical services provider may provide emergency transportation for treatment to a police dog that is injured in the line of duty, provided that such transportation for treatment does not delay or otherwise interfere with the emergency transportation for treatment of any human. | Statute |
| Chase v. State | 448 S.W.3d 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) | 2014 WL 6478511 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2014) | Appellant and his wife were walking their two dogs when two neighbor dogs attacked the group. After the attack, appellant slashed the attacking dog's throat with a knife, which resulted in the dog's death. Appellant was then charged with and convicted of cruelty to non-livestock animals under Texas law. The appellant appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals and the case was reversed and remanded. The State filed a petition for discretionary review with the Court of Criminal Appeals. The issue before that court was whether § 822.013(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, a non-penal code, provided a defense to criminal prosecution. The court held that § 822.013(a)—which allows an attacked animal's owner or a person witnessing an attack to kill a dog that is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked a domestic animal—is a defense against cruelty to non-livestock animals. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was therefore affirmed. The dissenting opinion disagreed. The dissent argued the goal of this statute was to protect farmers and ranchers against the loss of their livelihood by allowing them to protect their livestock from attacking dogs without fear of liability to the dog's owner, not to allow individuals in residential neighborhoods to kill a neighbor's dog after an attack with criminal impunity. | Case |
| EU and US Comparative Law | Policy | |||
| CA - Abandonment - § 597.1. Failure to care for animals; misdemeanor; powers and duties | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597.1 | CA PENAL § 597.1 | Every owner, driver, or keeper of any animal who permits the animal to be in any building, enclosure, lane, street, square, or lot of any city, county, city and county, or judicial district without proper care and attention is guilty of a misdemeanor. The statutes also creates a duty in peace officers, humane society officers, and animal control officers to cause the animal to be killed or rehabilitated and placed in a suitable home on information that the animal is stray or abandoned. | Statute |
| Brazil - Dogs and Cats - Sao Paulo State Law n. 12.916 (no kill ordinance) | Sao Paulo State Law n. 12.916, concerning stray dogs and cats |
Sao Paulo state becomes the first Brazilian state to enact a law banning the killing of stray dogs and cat as a population control practice. The law n. 12.916 was enacted in April 16, 2008. The law asserts that animal control agencies shall work together with non-profits and other organizations to reach the law’s objective which is the sterilization of domestic animals as a form of population control, to establish adoption centers, and to put forward adoption programs for stray animals. In addition, the animal control agencies shall promote educational programs about responsible pet ownership. |
Statute | |
| NV - Research - 598.993. Prohibition on import, sale or offer for sale of cosmetic products tested on animals; exceptions; | N.R.S. 598.993 | N. R. S. 598.993, NV ST 598.993 | This Nevada law, enacted in 2020, states that a manufacturer shall not import for profit, sell or offer for sale in this State any cosmetic for which the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that animal testing was conducted or contracted by or on behalf of the manufacturer or any supplier of the manufacturer if the animal testing was conducted on or after January 1, 2020. Limited exceptions exist. A violation of this section constitutes a deceptive trade practice for the purposes of NRS 598.0903 to 598.0999, inclusive. | Statute |
| Hines v. Quillivan | 982 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2020) | This case asks whether a veterinarian in Texas has a right to engage in telemedicine for a pet he has not physically examined. The plaintiff challenged Texas' physical-examination requirement that prohibits veterinarians from offering individualized advice to pet owners unless the vet previously examined the animal. Dr. Ronald Hines, a licensed veterinarian in Texas, stopped practicing in-person veterinary medicine in 2002 due to his age and other ailments. He then transitioned to a practice based remotely through the Internet. In 2012, the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (the Board) investigated Hines and found he had violated state law. The Board ordered him to cease providing veterinary advice electronically without first physically examining the animal. In 2013, Dr. Hines filed suit against the Board members claiming that the physical-examination requirement violated his First Amendment, equal-protection, and substantive-due-process rights. The district court then granted the motion to dismiss by the Board and the Court of Appeals found Hines failed to state a claim on appeal. Since that 2015 opinion, Texas revised its medical doctor laws, allowing them to engage in telemedicine, but did not do the same for veterinary practice laws. In addition to that change, a United States Supreme Court held that statements made by medical doctors could now be deemed "professional speech" (the "NIFLA" case). As a result of these changes, Hines brought the present suit arguing that the changes in Texas' telemedicine laws and the NIFLA case enabled him to pursue a new equal-protection claim and First Amendment claim. With regard to his protected speech claim, this Court found that subsequent caselaw does entitle Hines' claim to greater judicial scrutiny than his previous case allowed. Thus, remand to the district court to make the initial evaluation of whether Hines' conduct or speech is being regulated is required. On the equal-protection argument, the court found that Hines presents an argument slightly different than his previous one. In essence, Hines argued in the prior appeal that the he physical-examination requirement treated veterinarians engaging in telemedicine differently than other veterinarians. Here, Hines argues that changes to the medical doctor licensing laws treats medical doctors differently than veterinarians in the state with respect to telemedicine. Using a rational-basis review, the court held that it is rational to distinguish between human and animal medicine because of the differences in training, schooling, and overall practice of the professions. The court found the state's proffered reason that animals cannot communicate their symptoms as humans can ordinarily was a persuasive rational basis (although both Hines and the Dissent note that some humans like infants are unable to speak similar to animals and yet are allowed to be treated via telemedicine). The court found the services provided by both professions are not interchangeable and thus, the physical-examination requirement is not a protectionist measure for medical doctors. Ultimately, the court left it to the Texas legislature to expand any telemedicine changes to the veterinary practice code. The action was affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. | Case | |
| Let the Animals Live Assiciation;et al. v. Israel Institute of Technology et al. (in Hebrew) | No. 54789-12-11 (Hebrew version) | After pressures from multiple animal rights organizations, an Israeli airline stopped flying monkeys to Israeli research institutions. Multiple Israeli research institutions then filed suit, asking the court to present the airline with a permanent order to fly animals as per their requests, including monkeys, for bio-medical research purposes. In the present case, the question to be decided was whether to allow several animal protection organizations to be added to the claim (whether the airline was bound to fly animals for experiments or not) as defendants or as amicus curiae. The court held that the animal protection organizations should be allowed to join the proceedings as defendants because they could bring before the court a more complete picture of the issue before it was decided; they filed their request at a very early stage; and they spoke and acted for the animals in the face of a verdict that might directly affect the legal rights of the animals. | Case | |
| PROTOCOLO RELATIVO À PROTECÇÃO E AO BEM-ESTAR DOS ANIMAIS |
Tratado de Amsterdão Protocolo anexo ao Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia |
Treaty | ||
| AL - Fur - § 13A-11-241. Cruelty in first and second degrees (dog/cat fur provision) | Ala. Code 1975 § 13A-11-241 | AL ST § 13A-11-241 | In Alabama, a person commits the crime of cruelty to a dog or cat in the first degree if he or she skins a domestic dog or cat or offers for sale or exchange or offers to buy or exchange the fur, hide, or pelt of a domestic dog or cat. Cruelty to a dog or cat in the first degree is a Class C felony. | Statute |