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Displaying 81 - 90 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hines v. Quillivan | 982 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2020) | This case asks whether a veterinarian in Texas has a right to engage in telemedicine for a pet he has not physically examined. The plaintiff challenged Texas' physical-examination requirement that prohibits veterinarians from offering individualized advice to pet owners unless the vet previously examined the animal. Dr. Ronald Hines, a licensed veterinarian in Texas, stopped practicing in-person veterinary medicine in 2002 due to his age and other ailments. He then transitioned to a practice based remotely through the Internet. In 2012, the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (the Board) investigated Hines and found he had violated state law. The Board ordered him to cease providing veterinary advice electronically without first physically examining the animal. In 2013, Dr. Hines filed suit against the Board members claiming that the physical-examination requirement violated his First Amendment, equal-protection, and substantive-due-process rights. The district court then granted the motion to dismiss by the Board and the Court of Appeals found Hines failed to state a claim on appeal. Since that 2015 opinion, Texas revised its medical doctor laws, allowing them to engage in telemedicine, but did not do the same for veterinary practice laws. In addition to that change, a United States Supreme Court held that statements made by medical doctors could now be deemed "professional speech" (the "NIFLA" case). As a result of these changes, Hines brought the present suit arguing that the changes in Texas' telemedicine laws and the NIFLA case enabled him to pursue a new equal-protection claim and First Amendment claim. With regard to his protected speech claim, this Court found that subsequent caselaw does entitle Hines' claim to greater judicial scrutiny than his previous case allowed. Thus, remand to the district court to make the initial evaluation of whether Hines' conduct or speech is being regulated is required. On the equal-protection argument, the court found that Hines presents an argument slightly different than his previous one. In essence, Hines argued in the prior appeal that the he physical-examination requirement treated veterinarians engaging in telemedicine differently than other veterinarians. Here, Hines argues that changes to the medical doctor licensing laws treats medical doctors differently than veterinarians in the state with respect to telemedicine. Using a rational-basis review, the court held that it is rational to distinguish between human and animal medicine because of the differences in training, schooling, and overall practice of the professions. The court found the state's proffered reason that animals cannot communicate their symptoms as humans can ordinarily was a persuasive rational basis (although both Hines and the Dissent note that some humans like infants are unable to speak similar to animals and yet are allowed to be treated via telemedicine). The court found the services provided by both professions are not interchangeable and thus, the physical-examination requirement is not a protectionist measure for medical doctors. Ultimately, the court left it to the Texas legislature to expand any telemedicine changes to the veterinary practice code. The action was affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. | Case | ||
| Let the Animals Live Assiciation;et al. v. Israel Institute of Technology et al. (in Hebrew) | No. 54789-12-11 (Hebrew version) | After pressures from multiple animal rights organizations, an Israeli airline stopped flying monkeys to Israeli research institutions. Multiple Israeli research institutions then filed suit, asking the court to present the airline with a permanent order to fly animals as per their requests, including monkeys, for bio-medical research purposes. In the present case, the question to be decided was whether to allow several animal protection organizations to be added to the claim (whether the airline was bound to fly animals for experiments or not) as defendants or as amicus curiae. The court held that the animal protection organizations should be allowed to join the proceedings as defendants because they could bring before the court a more complete picture of the issue before it was decided; they filed their request at a very early stage; and they spoke and acted for the animals in the face of a verdict that might directly affect the legal rights of the animals. | Case | ||
| PROTOCOLO RELATIVO À PROTECÇÃO E AO BEM-ESTAR DOS ANIMAIS |
Tratado de Amsterdão Protocolo anexo ao Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia |
Treaty | |||
| AL - Fur - § 13A-11-241. Cruelty in first and second degrees (dog/cat fur provision) | Ala. Code 1975 § 13A-11-241 | AL ST § 13A-11-241 | In Alabama, a person commits the crime of cruelty to a dog or cat in the first degree if he or she skins a domestic dog or cat or offers for sale or exchange or offers to buy or exchange the fur, hide, or pelt of a domestic dog or cat. Cruelty to a dog or cat in the first degree is a Class C felony. | Statute | |
| 2014 International Animal Law Conference |
2014 II Global Animal Law Conference |
Policy | |||
| AK - Exotic Animals - Title 5. Fish and Game. Article 3. Permits. | 5 AAC 92.029 - 035 | 5 AK ADC 92.029 to .035 | These Alaska regulation provides that, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no person may possess, import, release, export, or assist in those actions, live game, unless the person holds a possession permit issued by the department. The regulations also list species that may be possessed without a permit, but may not be released into the wild which includes dogs,cats, chimpanzees, white rats, and many others. The department may not issue a permit for the capture, possession, import, or export of any game animal, including a hybrid species of a game animal, for use as a pet. Any of the listed species of bird, mammal, or reptile that is endangered may not be held in private ownership without a permit from the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. | Administrative | |
| Brazil - Animal Cruelty - Decreto-lei nº 24645, |
Art. 1º - Todos os animais existentes no País sno tutelados do Estado. |
Administrative | |||
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE HIMACHAL PRADESH PROHIBITION OF COW SLAUGHTER ACT, 1979 | 11 OF 1979 | The law, specific to the state of Himachal Pradesh, prohibits the slaughter of cows. No person may export cows for the purpose of slaughter. The law bans the sale of beef. Committing an offence under this Act may lead to imprisonment or fines. | Statute | ||
| ASSOCIACAO SANTUARIO DE ELEFANTES BRASIL | 1001993-45.2019.8.11.0024 | This case from Brazil concerns the elephant named "Ramba." Ramba is a former circus elephant who spent more than 30 years at circuses in Chile and Argentina. On October 18, 2019, she arrived at Santuário de Elefantes do Brasil (Brazil Elephants Sanctuary) after a 73 hour trip all the way from Chile. Before Ramba was transferred, Judge Leonísio Salles de Abreu Junior, from the 1st Civil Court at Chapada dos Guimarães, the region where the sanctuary is located in Mato Grosso , Brazil, made a ruling changing her status from a mere "good." The judge prohibited the local Government from charging the sanctuary R$ 50.000 (approximately US $ 13.00) in a tax on movement of goods finding that Ramba is not a thing, and is not a subject to importation good tax. According to an article at https://www.ambientesecom.net/2019/10/24/groundbreaking-decision-of-brazilian-judge-for-captive-elephant, the judge said further, "Her position, far from being a commodity (as she was in the life of exploitation to what she was submitted to by her former owners), is now that of a guest, who seeks for a new destination on the margins of what human evil has already caused her." Attached case is in Portuguese. | Case | ||
| Institute of Marine Mammal Studies v. National Marine Fisheries Service | 23 F. Supp. 3d 705 (S.D. Miss. 2014), appeal dismissed (Feb. 27, 2015) | 2014 WL 2154348 | The Institute of Marine Mammal Studies (IMMS) brought action against the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and others, alleging that NMFS regulations did not properly implement the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and that the NMFS was improperly administering placement list for rehabilitated sea lions that could not be reintroduced into the wild. Parties cross-moved for summary judgment. After considering the parties' arguments, the administrative record, and the relevant law, the District Court found that the IMMS lacked standing to bring its claim that NMFS regulations did not properly implement the Marine Mammal Protect Act ("MMPA"). Further, the Court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction of IMMS' claims that the NMFS was improperly administering a placement list for non-releasable sea lions. However, the Court found it may review the claims concerning the permit allowing IMMS to "take" sea lions. The Court found that a term included in IMMS' permit improperly delegated federal authority to third parties. The permit was therefore remanded to the agency for reconsideration. Each summary judgment motion was granted in part and denied in part. | Case |