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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
SC - Exotic pets - Chapter 2. Large Wild Cats, Non-Native Bears and Great Apes Code 1976 § 47-2-10 to 70 This South Carolina chapter, effective January 1, 2018, makes it unlawful for a person to possess, keep, purchase, have custody or control of, breed, or sell within this State a large wild cat, non-native bear, or great ape, including transactions conducted via the Internet. A person in possession of such animal before January 1, 2018 who is the legal possessor of the animal may keep possession if he or she complies with seven conditions listed under Section 47-2-30. Authorities may confiscate large wild cats, non-native bears, or great apes held in violation of this chapter. Cities or counties may also adopt more restrictive ordinances than this chapter. A person who violates this chapter must be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 30 days for a first offense, and must be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than 90 days for a second offense. Exempted entities include certain non-profit animal protection organizations, university research labs holding Class R registration under the AWA, any person who possesses a valid USDA Class A, B, or C license in good standing, and circuses that are incorporated and hold a Class C license under the AWA that are temporarily in this State, among others. Statute
RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-3. Prior ordinances preserved Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-3 RI ST § 4-13-3 This Rhode Island statute provides that nothing in the state laws concerning dogs shall be construed as to repeal any ordinance concerning dogs, which has been passed by any town or city council. Statute
NC - Fur/Dealer Licenses - Chapter 113. Conservation and Development. N.C.G.S.A. § 113-273 NC ST § 113-273 Defines "dealer" and all rules applicable to obtaining a dealer license. Defines "fur-dealer license" and "fur dealers" as those involved in the lawful buying and selling of wild animals or their skins, pelts, or fur. Defines "controlled hunting preserve operator licenses," "game bird propagation licenses," "furbearer propagation licenses" and "taxidermy licenses." Statute
Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. their members v. Pennsylvania Game Com'n 03 A.2d 117 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2006) 2006 WL 2009061 (Pa.Cmwlth.)

A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order.

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Fallini v. Hodel 783 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986)

The Wild and Free-Roaming Horse Act does not require that wild horses be prevented from straying onto private land, only that they be removed if they do stray onto private land.  

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Barber v. Pennsylvania Dept. Agriculture Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1816760 (W.D.Pa.)

The plaintiffs in this Pennsylvania case are owners and operators of a non-profit animal rescue and kennel that houses housing about 500 dogs doing business in and throughout Fayette County, Pennsylvania. The current dispute stems from a series of inspections of the kennels that occurred throughout the 2007 calendar year. Plaintiffs allege that defendants conspired in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and that the PSPCA and the Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement (the inspection branch of the Dept. of Agriculture) failed to take reasonable steps to protect them from the conspiratorial activity in violation of 42 U.S .C. § 1986. Plaintiffs also state that the PSPCA and the Bureau violated various of their constitutional rights in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs also seek to hold the Defendants liable for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S .C. § 1983. Finally, other counts allege that Defendant Delenick sexually harassed Plaintiff Rachel Lappe-Biler in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; that plaintiff Pauline Gladys Bryner-Lappe was assaulted and battered in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment; and that the defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims.

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Carter v. Metro North Assocs. 680 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) 255 A.D.2d 251 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) In this case, a tenant sued her landlord for injuries sustained when the tenant was bitten on the face by a pit bull owned by another tenant. The court held that before a pet owner, or the landlord of the building in which the pet lives, may be held strictly liable for an injury inflicted by the animal, the plaintiff must establish both (1) that the animal had vicious propensities and (2) that the defendant knew or should have known of the animal's propensities. In this case, there was no evidence that the pit bull had vicious propensities, nor did any of the evidence support a finding that the landlord had, or should have had, knowledge of any such propensities. The appellate court found the lower court erred when it took "judicial notice of the vicious nature of the breed as a whole." The court noted that there are alternate opinions and evidence that preclude taking judicial notice that pit bulls are inherently vicious as a breed. The trial court order was reversed, judgment for plaintiff vacated, and complaint dismissed. Case
NY - Racing - § 220. Licenses for participants and employees at race meetings McKinney's Racing, Pari Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 220 NY RAC PARI-M § 220 The state racing and wagering board issues licenses to owners, trainers, assistant trainers and jockeys, jockey agents, and stable employees for horse races, including steeplechases. Statute
MI - Cruelty - 712A.18l. Juveniles, guilty of cruelty to animals or arson; court ordered psychiatric or psychological treatment M. C. L. A. 712A.18l MI ST 712A.18l This statute provides that if a juvenile is found to be within the court's jurisdiction for an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a violation of the Michigan penal code relating to either cruelty to animals or arson, the court shall order that the juvenile be evaluated to determine if he or she needs psychiatric or psychological treatment. If the court determines that psychiatric or psychological treatment is appropriate, the court may order that treatment in addition to any other treatments or penalties allowed by law. Statute
Carter v. Metro North Associates 255 A.D.2d 251, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 10266 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,1998) 255 A.D.2d 251, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 10266 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,1998)

In this New York case, a tenant sued his landlords for injuries after he was bitten on face by pit bull owned by another tenant. The lower court denied the landlords' motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment for tenant on issue of liability. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that the trial court erroneously took judicial notice of vicious nature of breed of pit bulls as a whole. In fact, the court found that the IAS court "erred in circumventing the requirement for evidence concerning the particular animal by purporting to take judicial notice of the vicious nature of the breed as a whole." Thus, the landlords were not strictly liable for the tenant's injuries where there was no evidence indicating that the dog had ever attacked any other person or previously displayed any vicious behavior.

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