Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Colombia - Wildlife - Decreto 1608, 1978 | DECRETO 1608 de 1978 | Decreto 1608 regulates the Code of Natural Renewable Resources and environmental protection regarding terrestrial wildlife, as well as all the activities and products relating to this resource. Even though Decreto 1608, lays out general dispositions for the conservation and protection of terrestrial wildlife, Article 5 establishes that Decreto 1608 applies to “the management of cetaceans, sirenians, pinnipeds, marine and semi-aquatic birds, sea turtles and fresh or brackish water, anuran batrachians and all other species that do not complete their life cycle in the aquatic environment, but that depend on it for their subsistence.” In order to guarantee the efficient use of wildlife and its products, Decreto 1608, requires specific licenses for the exploitation of wildlife and its products. It establishes the parameters and limitations for the activity of hunting and the granting of licenses for this purpose. | Statute | |
| Animal Law Index Volume 17, Part 1 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 17, Issue 1 (Fall 2010)
INTRODUCTIONLEGAL PERSONHOOD AND THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
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Policy | ||
| OR - Sharks - 498.257. Possession, sale, etc. of shark fins prohibited; exceptions | O. R. S. § 498.257, O. R. S. § 509.160 | OR ST § 498.257, OR ST § 509.160 | Under these Oregon statutes, a person may not possess, sell or offer for sale, trade or distribute a shark fin. However, there are exceptions for shark fins from spiny dogfish, for people who have a shark license, and for fish processors who have a license. | Statute |
| State v. Cloutier | 2003 ME 7 (Sup.Ct. Maine Jan. 21, 2003) |
Defendant appealed from his conviction for "driving deer" under Maine statute § 7458(10) (among other convictions), contending that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The Court rejected defendant's argument, finding the version at issue here plainly tells people that if they participate in a group hunt and they organize or plan the hunt so that several people move in a coordinated fashion toward other members of the hunting party who by predesign are standing or moving toward the first group, in a planned effort to flush out the deer, they are hunting illegally. With regard to the entrapment defense for the illegal transporting of deer, the Court found that although another hunter may have created the opportunity for Cloutier to commit the illegal transportation violation, "more is required for the entrapment defense than providing the opportunity to commit the crime." |
Case | |
| MO - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | V. A. M. S. 578.005 - 188; 566.111 | MO ST 578.005 - 188; MO ST 566.111 | These Missouri statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty laws. The term "animal" means every living vertebrate except a human being. The provisions of sections 578.005 to 578.023 do not apply to the care or treatment performed by a licensed veterinarian, bona fide scientific experiments, hunting, fishing, or trapping, publicly funded zoological parks, rodeo practices, and several other listed activities as described in 578.007. A person is guilty of animal neglect when he or she has custody or ownership or an animal and fails to provide adequate care, or when that person knowingly abandons an animal in any place without making provisions for its adequate care. Animal neglect and abandonment is a class C misdemeanor upon first conviction with enhancement to a class B misdemeanor for subsequent convictions. A person is guilty of animal abuse when a person intentionally or purposely kills an animal in any manner not allowed by law, purposely or intentionally causes injury or suffering to an animal, or, having ownership or custody of an animal, knowingly fails to provide adequate care or control which results in substantial harm to the animal. Animal abuse is a class A misdemeanor unless the defendant has previously been found guilty of animal abuse or the suffering involved is the result of torture or mutilation consciously inflicted while the animal was alive, in which case it is a class E felony. | Statute |
| Edmondson v. Oklahoma | 91 P.3d 605 (Okla. 2004) | 2004 OK 23 (2004) |
Petitioners sought relief from a temporary injunction for the Respondents, which prevented petitioners from enforcing the statute banning cockfighting. The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and held that the statute did not violate the Oklahoma State Constitution, and was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Relief granted for petitioners. |
Case |
| Stennette v. Miller | 316 Ga.App. 425, 729 S.E.2d 559 (Ga.App., 2012) | 2012 WL 2384423 (Ga.App.) |
Plaintiff Stennette was providing in-home nursing care while she was bitten multiple times by Defendant Miller's dog. Stennette appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Miller in Stennette's personal injury action. This Court affirmed that decision because Stennette failed to provide adequate evidence showing triable issues on whether the dog had a vicious propensity and whether Miller knew of that propensity. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to Miller on Stennette's claim that Miller negligently performed a voluntarily-undertaken duty to keep the dog away from her when she was at the house, because the evidence created genuine issues of material fact as to this claim. |
Case |
| MD - Vehicle - § 20-106. Duty of driver upon striking domestic animal with vehicle | MD Code, Transportation, § 20-106 | MD TRANS § 20-106 | Under this Maryland statute, if a motor vehicle strikes and injures a domestic animal, the driver of the motor vehicle immediately shall notify the appropriate State or local police of the accident. Once notified, the police shall notify the local organization or governmental agency designated by the appropriate local government to give the injured animals medical care. | Statute |
| Connecticut v. Devon D. | 321 Conn. 656, 138 A.3d 849 (2016) | 321 Conn. 656 (2016), 2016 WL 3194779 (Conn.,2016) | Devon D. was convicted of four counts sexual assault and three counts of risk of injury to a child upon allegations made by three of Devon D.’s biological children, C1, C2, and C3. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court had abused its discretion by having the three cases to be tried jointly and by permitting C1 to testify with a dog at her feet. The appellate court had accepted these arguments and reversed and remanded for a new trial, but the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the appellate court. The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that “the trial court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the cases to be tried together because the evidence in all three cases was cross admissible,” and reversed on that issue. As to the appellate court’s determination that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting a dog to sit near C1 during her testimony to provide comfort and support,” the Supreme Court also reversed, reinstating the verdict and judgment of the trial court. | Case |
| NM - Dangerous Animal - Chapter 77. Animals and Livestock. | NMSA 1978, § 77-1-10 | NM ST § 77-1-10 | This New Mexico statute provides that it is unlawful for any person to keep any animal known to be vicious and liable to attack or injure human beings unless such animal is securely kept to prevent injury to any person. It is also unlawful to keep any unvaccinated dog or cat or any animal with any symptom of rabies or to fail or to refuse to destroy vicious animals or unvaccinated dogs or cats with symptoms of rabies. | Statute |