Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips | 325 Conn. 394, 397, 158 A.3d 772 (2017) | 158 A.3d 772 | In this case, a landlord brought a summary process action against a tenant who lived in the federally subsidized apartment, based on tenant's keeping of “emotional support dog” in violation of a pet restriction clause in the tenant's lease. The trial court entered judgment in favor of tenant, based on equity, and the landlord appealed. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Court held that: 1) appeal was not rendered moot by landlord's commencement of second summary process action against tenant, which was dismissed; 2) trial court could not rely on “spirit” of Department of Housing and Urban Development in exercising equitable discretion to enter judgment in favor of tenant; 3) trial court abused its discretion in applying doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture; and 4) summary process action was “civil action” to which medical treatment report exception to hearsay rule could be applied to allow for admission of letter from physician and social worker of tenant's niece concerning dog's benefit to niece. Reversed and remanded. | Case |
| OK - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | 11 Okl.St.Ann. § 22-115.1; 21 Okl.St.Ann. § 649.1 - 649.3; 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 1717 - 1718; 4 Okl.St.Ann. § 41 - 47; 391 - 402; 499 - 499.10; 501 - 602; 29 Okl. St. Ann. § 7-304; 70 Okl.St.Ann. § 5-117.6 | These statutes comprise Oklahoma's dog laws. Among the provisions include dog control laws, sterilization provisions for adopted animals, and the use of unclaimed animals in scientific research or experimentation. | Statute | |
| Altman v. City of High Point | 330 F.3d 194 C.A.4 (N.C. 2003) |
This case arises out of several shooting incidents in the City of High Point, North Carolina. In each incident, a High Point animal control officer shot and killed one or more dogs that were running at large in the city. Plaintiffs, the owners of the animals, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers' actions violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals concluded that the dogs at issue in this case do qualify as property protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the officers seized that property. However, because in each instance the seizure involved was reasonable, it concluded that the officers did not violate the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. |
Case | |
| CT - Transport, poultry - § 53-249. Cruelty to poultry | C. G. S. A. § 53-249 | CT ST § 53-249 | This statute makes it illegal to transport poultry in any manner that is not sanitary, warm, and ventilated. Poultry must receive "reasonable care" to "prevent unnecessary suffering." Violation of this provision is a class D misdemeanor. | Statute |
| MO - Breeding - Proposition B | 2010 Proposition B |
The official ballot title asks voters if Missouri law be amended to (1) require large-scale dog breeding operations to provide each dog under their care with sufficient food, clean water, housing and space; necessary veterinary care; regular exercise and adequate rest between breeding cycles; (2) prohibit any breeder from having more than 50 breeding dogs for the purpose of selling their puppies as pets; and (3) create a misdemeanor crime of “puppy mill cruelty” for any violations. |
Statute | |
| Davison v. Berg | 243 So.3d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018) | 44 Fla. L. Weekly D641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018); 2018 WL 1415485 | Deborah Davison volunteered at her local Humane Society to help take care of a dog park. Three years later, Rebecca Berg’s dog who was chasing other dogs collided with Davison. Davison suffered a broken leg that required extensive medical care. Davison then filed an action against Berg under a Florida statute that “imposes liability on dog owners for damage their dogs cause to other persons and animals.” The trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of Berg for two reasons. The first reason was that the signs outside of the park sufficiently warned Davison of the risks of injury inside. The second reason was that Davison essentially consented to the risk of potential injuries by being a volunteer for the dog park. On appeal, this court stated that the Florida statute was a strict liability statute that makes an owner the insurer of their dog’s conduct. The only defense to the statute is for an owner to display in a prominent place on his or her premises a sign that includes the words “Bad Dog.” Berg presented evidence that the park had two signs prominently displayed at the entrance to the park with the title “Dog Park Rules.” The two signs listed rules for entrance to the dog park. One of these rules stated that park use is at the dog owner’s risk. Another rule stated that rough play and chasing were not allowed if any dogs or owners were uncomfortable with that behavior. The last rule stated that visitors enter at their own risk. Even though Davison entered the park at her own risk, the purpose of the sign requirement in the statute was to give notice that a bad dog is on the premises. The Court found that the trial court erred in finding that the signs at the dog park were sufficiently equivalent to “Bad Dog” signs to preclude liability under the Florida statute. The trial court also found that by virtue of Davison volunteering at the dog park, she was aware that she could be injured during the course of her work and that she signed a volunteer application form that acknowledged that she could be exposed to “bites, scratches, and other injuries.” Davison had also witnessed a prior collision between a dog and an individual that resulted in a broken leg. After witnessing that, Davison began to warn others at the Humane Society about the dangers of being inside the dog park with dogs chasing each other. The Court held that even though there may be evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Davison consented to the risk of injury, “an actual consent or assumption of the risk defense cannot bar liability.” The Court reversed the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of Berg. | Case |
| Nikolic v. Seidenberg | 610 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) |
When the pet owner adopted a dog, she signed a contract agreeing to have her dog spayed at the vet's facility and to return the dog to the vet if it was sick. For days after the surgery the dog was ill so the other vet performed exploratory surgery and repaired a cut in the dog's intestine. The pet owner filed an action to recover the medical expenses and the lower court granted the vet's motion to dismiss. The reviewing court held that the language in the contract was not sufficiently clear and explicit to exculpate the vet from negligence because the vet was not a party to the contract and thus not a direct beneficiary of the contract. |
Case | |
| Justice for Animals, Inc. v. Lenoir County SPCA, Inc. | 168 N.C. App. 298, 607 S.E.2d 317 aff'd on other grounds, 360 N.C. 48, 619 S.E.2d 494 (2005) | 2005 WL 221226 (N.C. 2005) |
An animal control facility's practice of euthanizing feral cats without holding them for 72 hours was challenged by a non-profit organization. The animal control facility's method for determining if a cat is feral consisted only of poking the animal and gaging its reaction. The trial court dismissed the claim, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. |
Case |
| NJ - Fur - Chapter 14. Fur Products. | NJSA 56:14-1 to 56:14-3 | NJ ST 56:14-1 to 56:14-3 | This law represents New Jersey's fur labeling law. Under the 2009 law, no person shall sell or offer to sell any new coat, jacket, garment or other clothing apparel made wholly or in part of fur, regardless of the price or value of the fur, without the name of the animal(s) used to produce the fur and the name of the country of origin of any imported fur. A person who violates this act shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $500 for the first offense and not more than $1,000 for each subsequent offense, to be collected in a civil action by a summary proceeding. | Statute |
| CA - Mountain Lions - Chapter 10. Mountain Lions | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4800 - 4810 | CA FISH & G § 4800 - 4810 | California statutes make mountain lions specially protected mammals. These sections make it unlawful to take, injure, possess, transport, import, or sell any mountain lion or any part or product thereof. Specific exceptions to these prohibitions include instances where a mountain lion is perceived to be an imminent threat to public health or safety or when it is perceived by to be an imminent threat to the survival of any threatened, endangered, candidate, or fully protected sheep species. | Statute |