Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| In re: Jennifer Caudill | 2013 WL 604009 (U.S.D.A. Feb. 1, 2013) | Although the Complaint alleged that Caudill made false or fraudulent statements and/or provided false or fraudulent records to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the emphasis in the Complaint suggested that primary reliance was being placed upon the more general determination of unfitness. The Complaint alleged that Respondents (collectively, including Caudill) engaged in activities designed to circumvent an order of the Secretary of Agriculture in revoking the Animal Welfare Act exhibitor's license previously held by Lancelot Kollman Ramos, and have acted as surrogates for Ramos. Caudill and Kalmanson were alleged to continue to act as Ramos's surrogates, and to facilitate the circumvention of his license revocation order. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found factual support for termination on the grounds of false statements and providing false documents to be lacking. The AJL also found little support for the conclusion that Caudill in any way was operating as a surrogate for Ramos. The ALJ did find that although Caudill had initiated discussions with Ramos concerning the purchase of his animals prior to the effective date of his license revocation, her subsequent consummation of the transaction after his license had been revoked constitutes a violation of 9 C.F.R. § 2.132. In the end, however, the evidence was insufficient to find that Respondent Caudill was unfit to hold an AWA license or that maintenance of a license by her would in any way be contrary to the purposes of the Act | Case | ||||||||||
| AU - Exhibited Animals Protection Act 1986 (NSW) | Exhibited Animals Protection Act 1986 |
This Act deals with the exhibition of animals at marine or zoological parks, circuses and other places. It regulates the exhibition of all vertebrate animals in zoos, circuses or mobile displays regardless of whether they are native, exotic or domestic.
A person must have an approval to keep and exhibit an animal, and this is subject to qualifications, experience or any other term or condition that may be considered necessary |
Statute | ||||||||||
| IL - Naperville - Title 6: Zoning Regulations (Chapter 2: General Zoning Provisions) | Naperville, Illinois, Code of Ordinances § 6-2-5 |
This Naperville, Illinois ordinance provides the standards to determine whether a business is a veterinary office or a pet care establishment. For a veterinary office, pets are only allowed outside between the hours of 7 AM to 10PM if they are on a leash and handled by a single employee; excrement must be picked up daily and noise levels generated by the animals cannot exceed the city’s noise performance standards. For a pet care establishment, pets are allowed to be outside without a lease or direct employee supervision, but the outside area must be fenced and cleared of excrement daily; pet care establishments are also permitted to provide emergency medical treatment or nonprofessional care associated with an existing medical problem. The zoning provisions associated with either establishment are also included. |
Local Ordinance | ||||||||||
| US - Wolf - Regulation for Nonessential Experimental Populations of the Western Distinct Population Segment of the Gray Wolf; Fi | 2005 WL 20189 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 05-136 |
We, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) establish a rule for the nonessential experimental populations (NEPs) of the Western Distinct Population Segment (DPS) of the gray wolf (Canis lupus), so that in States and on Tribal reservations with Service-approved wolf management plans, we can better address the concerns of affected landowners and the impacts of a biologically recovered wolf population. In addition, States and Tribes with Service accepted wolf management plans can petition the Service for lead management authority for experimental wolves consistent with this rule. |
Administrative | |||||||||
| IL - Service Animal - Chapter 740. Civil Liabilities. | 740 I.L.C.S. 13/1 - 10 | IL ST CH 740 § 13/1 - 10 | Under this Illinois statute, a physically impaired person may bring an action for both economic and noneconomic damages against a person who steals, injures, or attacks his or her assistance animal with hazardous chemicals (provided he or she reasonably knew the guide dog was present and the chemical was hazardous). The economic damages recoverable include veterinary medical expenses, replacement costs, and temporary replacement assistance (provided by person or animal). No cause of action lies where the physically impaired person was committing a civil or criminal trespass at the time of the attack or theft. | Statute | |||||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 2 Núm 3 |
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Policy | |||||||||||
| New England Anti-Vivisection Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service and Yerkes National Primate Research Center | 208 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D.D.C. 2016) | 2016 WL 4919871 (D.D.C., 2016) | New England Anti-Vivisection Society (NEAVS), a non-profit organization that dedicates itself to animal-welfare, brought suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for issuing an export permit to Yerkes National Primate Research Center (Yerkes). NEAVS filed suit against FWS arguing that FWS had violated the Endangered Species Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. NEAVS argued that FWS had violated the acts by allowing Yerkes to export chimpanzees in exchange for making a financial donation that would be put towards a program to help with “habitat destruction and disease, which face wild chimpanzees in East Africa.” The court reviewed the case and determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to address the claims made by NEAVS. The court found that NEAVS was not able to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution because NEAVS had not “suffered an injury in fact.” Ultimately, the court held that NEAVS was unable to show that it had a “concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent” and that is “traceable” to FWS’ actions. As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of FWS. | Case | |||||||||
| Amos v. State | 478 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App. 2015), petition for discretionary review refused (Nov. 18, 2015) | 2015 WL 4043302 (Tex. App., 2015) | A jury found appellant guilty of the offense of cruelty to a nonlivestock animal after he beat a Shih Tzu to death with a broom. After finding an enhancement paragraph true, the jury assessed Appellant's punishment at thirty-one months’ confinement. Appellant asserted five issues on this appeal: (1) the admission of a State's witness's recorded statement to the police, which the court overruled because the evidence was received without objection; (2) the denial of his motion to quash the indictment for failing to allege an offense, which the court overruled because the indictment tracked the statutory language; (3) the denial of six of his challenges for cause, which the court overruled because the venire members gave the defense counsel contradictory answers meaning the trial court could not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse a juror; (4) the denial of his objection to the charge, which the court overruled because the jury charge tracked the statute’s language; and (5) the denial of his motion to suppress the dog’s necropsy, which the court overruled because the appellant had no intention of reclaiming the dog's body or her ashes and thereby relinquished his interest in them such that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy and lacked standing to contest the reasonableness of any search. The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed. | Case | |||||||||
| CITY OF TOLEDO, Appellant, v. Paul TELLINGS, Appellee. |
This is the City of Toldeo's Appellant Brief filed in the Supreme Court case of Toledo v. Tellings (871 N.E.2d 1152 (2007)). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls. |
Pleading | |||||||||||
| Rogers v. Teignbridge District Council |
A planned event called "The Creepy Crawly Show" was to have been held at a racecourse and to have involved the display and sale of small exotic animals by a number of different breeders, dealers and enthusiasts. The event's organizer applied to the local council for a pet shop licence under the Pet Animals Act 1951. The application was refused on the ground that the event was prohibited by section 2 of the Act which states that a person is guilty of an offence if he "carries on a business of selling animals as pets in any part of a street or public place, [or] at a stall or barrow in a market". The organizer's appeal to the local magistrates court was dismissed. Held: the holding of the event would have involved the carrying on a business of selling pets in a "public place". It would also have involved the selling of animals in a market. The event was therefore prohibited by section 2 and that it would have been unlawful for the local authority to have licensed it. |
Case |