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Displaying 121 - 130 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, L.L.C. v. Department of Agriculture | 539 F.3d 492 (D.C.Cir., 2008) | 2008 WL 3980533 (C.A.D.C.) | Plaintiff, a supplier of beef products, brought an action against Defendant, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), after the USDA denied Plaintiff’s request to purchase Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) testing kits. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found that the USDA has authority under the Virus Serum Toxin Act (VSTA) to regulate the use of biological products, the USDA’s interpretation of VSTA allowing the USDA to deny an import permit based on the product’s intended use was not inconsistent with the regulation and was therefore entitled to deference by the Court, the USDA’s interpretation of the word “treatment” as including diagnostic activities was entitled to deference, and that BSE testing is a diagnostic activity for purposes of VSTA. | Case | |
| Mexico - Wildlife - La Ley General de Vida Silvestre | La Ley General de Vida Silvestre | The purpose of this law is to preserve wildlife through its protection and sustainable use. Article 4 establishes the duty to protect wildlife and prohibits any act that causes its destruction, damage, or disturbance to the detriment of the interests of the Nation. This article also states that owners or legitimate holders of land where wildlife lives have rights of sustainable use over the species, parts, and their derivatives. Under this law, wildlife is defined as "organisms that subsist and are subject to processes of natural evolution and that develop freely in their habitat, including their minor populations and individuals that are under the control of humans and wild populations as well." The Federal Attorney's Office for Environmental Protection (PROFEPA) is the administrative authority overseeing environmental law compliance. Art 107 establishes that any person can file a report with them for any damages caused to wildlife or its habitat. | Statute | ||
| OH - Lakewood - Breed - 506.03 PIT BULL DOGS OR CANARY DOGS | LAKEWOOD, OH., ORDINANCES § 506.03 (2008) |
No person may keep, harbor or own pit bull dogs or canary dogs in Lakewood, Ohio, with exceptions for dogs in the city on the effective date. A dog may be allowed to stay provided it has a microchip for identification, has been sterilized, the owner has liability insurance of $100,000, and the dog is properly confined or secured. Failure to comply could result in the removal or impoundment of the dog. The owner may also be charged with a misdemeanor. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| CITES - List of Reservations |
Specific reservations entered by Parties in effect from 14 September 2014
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Treaty | |||
| Nigeria - Endangered Species - Endangered Species Act (in English) | Decree No. 11 of 1985 | The hunting or capture of or trade in animal species listed in the First Schedule to this Act is absolutely prohibited. Furthermore, no person shall hunt, capture, trade in or otherwise deal with an animal species specified in the Second Schedule to this Act except if that person is in possession of a license issued under this Act. The act also sets out the conditions of licenses and permits. The Minister may by an order publish in the Federal Gazette alter the list of animals specified in the First or Second Schedule to this Act by way of addition, substitution or deletion or otherwise. Penalties for violations are also provided. | Statute | ||
| UK - Welfare - Protection of Animals (Anaesthetics) Act 1964 | 1964 c. 39 |
For historical purposes only. Law has been repealed and/or replaced. An Act to amend the Protection of Animals (Anaesthetics) Act 1954. |
Statute | ||
| Paquito, the parrot, 2004- get decision | This is the case of Paquito, a parrot that found himself in the middle of a controversy when a divorced couple began a fight for his custody. In this occasion, the ex-husband José Luis Aparicio lived the Paquito, who had been separated from his companion, another parrot that was kept by Carina Navarro (ex-wife) and that died soon after the separation, apparently from sadness. The took Paquito without the husband’s authorization, arguing that the husband mistreated Paquito and her daughter missed him and wanted to live with him. The ex-husband filed a complaint arguing aggravated larceny. The defendant is found not guilty. However, the judge ordered the defendant return Paquito to the plaintiff. In an unprecedented move, the criminal judge established a communication and visitation regimen, recognizing Paquito was also affected by these decisions. | Case | |||
| US - Critical Habitat - Statements by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service Regarding the Designation of Critical Habitat | 2004 WL 2232024 (F.R.) | 69 FR 59996-01 |
This excerpt is from the Designation of Critical Habitat for the Klamath River and Columbia River Populations of Bull Trout, 69 FR 59996-01, 2004 WL 2232024 (F.R.). It apparently expresses the opinion of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service that the current process for designating critical habitat does little for the conservation of listed species. |
Administrative | |
| Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. v. New Mexico Livestock Board | 519 P.3d 74 (N.M.App., 2022) | 2022-NMCA-061, 2022 WL 2901248 (N.M.App., 2022) | This appeal examines the protection afforded to New Mexico's free-roaming horses under NMSA 1978, Section 77-18-5 (2007). The New Mexico Livestock Board (the Board) appeals from a district court order granting declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. (WHOA). WHOA brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board and others regarding the status of horses corralled by a private citizen on private property. The citizen had initially complained to the Board about the free-roaming horses on her property and was told that the Board only takes possession of horses corralled by citizens. The citizen did so and the Board took possession of the herd, where it then posted on its website that the horses would be sold at auction. WHOA filed the instant emergency action, stating that the Board exceeded its authority and unlawfully treated the subject horses as estray livestock. The group sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the Board from impounding or selling the subject horses. The district court granted WHOA's request for a TRO, thereby prohibiting the Board from taking any action with the horses. After a bench trial on the merits, the district court determined that the Board's actions to take possession and sell the subject horses were contrary to the Board's statutory authority, enjoined the Board from “further unlawful possession and selling” of the subject horses, and awarded WHOA costs and attorney fees. The Board appeals here, arguing that the horses were captured on private, rather than public land, and the district court erred in concluding them to be “wild horses." The Board also contends that the district court made findings of fact that are unsupported by substantial evidence, issued a vague injunction, erred in awarding attorney fees, and erred in refusing to impose an injunction bond upon WHOA. This court found no error with the lower court concluding that the horses should be protected as “wild horses” because the definition of that term does not depend on whether, at the moment of their capture, the horses were on land that is private, but instead depends on whether the horses generally roam public land. Therefore, the horses were not estrays. As to whether the Board should have conducted its statutory duties with respect to horses including history and DNA testing, this court held that duty does not extend testing of a wild horse if it is captured on private land. Thus, the district court erred in determining that the Board failed to follow its statutory duties under Section 77-18-5(B). In fact, the Board has no authority to test the conformation, history, and DNA of such horses found on private land any more than it does to take possession of and remove the wild horses from those lands. The court also found the injunction was not vague or impracticable and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order an injunction bond. Ultimately, this court affirmed the district court's order to the extent that it correctly determined that the subject horses are wild horse rather than estray, but reversed the district court's determination that the Board should have acted according to its statutory duties under Section 77-18-5. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion and further consideration of attorney fees. | Case | |
| Journal of Animal Law Table of Contents Volume 4 |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of LawJournal of Animal Law Vol. IV (2008)The table of contents is provided below. |
Policy |