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Displaying 31 - 40 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T - Ecuador | Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T | Este es el caso de cuatro gatos llamados Luna, Manchas, Sonic y Tiger y dos perros, Pantera y Noah que estaban dentro de las propiedades confiscadas por las autoridades en un caso de tráfico de drogas. El abogado Kevin Prendes Vivar presentó un recurso de habeas corpus en representación de los cuidadores de los animales, alegando que los animales estaban siendo retenidos ilegalmente por el "Secretario Técnico de Gestión Inmobiliaria del Sector Público" o "Inmobiliar", la agencia gubernamental que confiscó las propiedades. El demandante argumentó que los animales, como sujetos de derechos según la decisión de la Corte Constitucional 253-20-JH/22, estaban en un estado de soledad que los ponía en riesgo de problemas de salud y bienestar, ya que estos animales tenían un apego emocional a sus cuidadores. Los animales son seres sensibles diferentes de otros objetos, y su detrimento se refleja en su salud física y emocional, causando condiciones como depresión y ansiedad, condiciones que podrían poner fin potencialmente a su vida. Los animales estaban siendo retenidos por 'Inmobiliar', y los demandantes no habían recibido ninguna información sobre la condición de los animales. Además, los demandantes estaban preocupados por la condicion de los animales ya que no tenian conocimiento acerca de su alimentacion. Especialmente porque 'Inmobiliar' no tenía presupuesto para alimentar a los animales sujetos a confiscaciones. Según loa demandante, los animales eran miembros de su familia, y sus hijos sufrían sin ellos. El tribunal provincial de Guyanas concedió el habeas corpus, sosteniendo que los animales son sujetos de derechos, encontrando que 'Inmobiliar' había violado los derechos de los animales al considerarlos propiedad personal embargable. Por lo tanto, el tribunal determinó que su confiscación era ilegal, arbitraria e ilegítima. Para proteger sus derechos a la vida, la libertad y la integridad, ordenó a 'Inmobiliar' devolver los animales a sus cuidadores. En su análisis, el tribunal afirmó que, según el caso de Estrellita, los animales no deberían ser protegidos únicamente desde una perspectiva del ecosistema o desde la perspectiva de las necesidades humanas, sino más bien desde su individualidad y su valor intrínseco. El tribunal también instruyó a la entidad gubernamental a no considerar más a las "mascotas" como semovientes en futuros procedimientos judiciales, y a distribuir, a través del correo electrónico institucional, a todos sus funcionarios la decisión de la corte constitucional 253-20-JH/22, ordenándoles leerla y analizarla. Esta decisión fue apelada por 'Inmobiliar' y la sala especializada en lo penal de la Corte Provincial de Justicia de Guyanas anuló la decisión que otorgaba el habeas corpus a favor de los animales, afirmando que este mecanismo legal no era apropiado en el caso de animales domésticos. En su fallo, el tribunal ordenó la devolución de los animales a "Inmobiliar". Esta decisión ha sido enviada a la Corte Constitucional para su revisión. Si la corte la selecciona, decidirá si un recurso de habeas corpus es apropiado en casos relacionados específicamente con animales de compañía. | Case | ||
| OR - Primates - 603-011-0381 Importation of Nonhuman Primates | OR ADC 603-011-0381 | OAR 603-011-0381 | This Oregon regulation provides that no person shall ship, move, or import into this state any nonhuman primates (including, but not limited to, monkeys, baboons, gibbons, chimpanzees, and marmosets) without first obtaining a permit from the Department. Further, all nonhuman primates shipped, moved, or imported into this state shall also be accompanied by an official health certificate certifying that said animals are free from the following human pathogenic agents. | Administrative | |
| Sickel v. State | 363 P.3d 115 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 7873714 (Alaska Ct. App., 2015) | Defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals under AS 11.61.140(a) after one of her horses was found starving, without shelter, and frozen to the ground (it later had to be euthanized). On appeal, defendant claims that she did not act with the requisite "criminal negligence" under the statute unless she had a duty of care to prevent the specified harm. The court noted that while the statute does not specify the exact nature of this duty to care for particular animals, common law fills the gap. In looking to similar laws and cases from other states, the court found that AS 11.61.140(a)(2) applies only to people who have assumed responsibility for the care of an animal, either as an owner or otherwise. The jury instructions taken as a whole and the prosecutor's argument and rebuttal demonstrated that Sickel assumed the duty of care with regard to the horses and was the person tending the horses in the last three days before the now-deceased horse collapsed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. | Case | |
| RI - Endangered Species - Chapter 37. Endangered Species of Animals and Plants. | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 20-37-1 to 5 | RI ST § 20-37-1 to 5 | These Rhode Island statutes set out the legislative policy and definitions related to state endangered species law, including the definition of "animal" and what constitutes an "endangered species." By statute commerce is strictly prohibited, as it it illegal to "buy, sell, offer for sale, store, transport, import, export, or otherwise traffic in any animal or plant or any part of any animal or plant whether living, dead, processed, manufactured, preserved, or raw if the animal or plant has been declared to be an endangered species by either the United States secretaries of the interior or commerce or the director of the Rhode Island department of environmental management." Violation of the Act results in fines from $500-5,000 or up to one year imprisonment, or both. | Statute | |
| MT - Ordinance - Chapter 23. Domestic Animal Control and Protection. | MCA 7-23-2108 | MT ST 7-23-2108 | This Montana statute provides that the governing body of the county may regulate, restrain, or prohibit the running at large of dogs by the adoption of an ordinance which substantially complies with state law provisions related to licensing. Violation of an ordinance adopted is a misdemeanor. Additionally, the county governing body is authorized to impound, sell, kill, or otherwise destroy dogs found at large contrary to ordinances. | Statute | |
| Bacon (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ryan | 1995 CarswellSask 540 | [1996] 3 W.W.R. 215, 27 C.C.L.T. (2d) 308, 138 Sask. R. 297 |
The child plaintiff was bitten on the face by a pitbull owned by the defendants, requiring reconstructive surgery and two days hospitalization and causing permanent scarring. The dog had bitten the owner's young son two weeks earlier while he played near the dog's food dish'; they contemplated having the dog euthanized but decided against it. The plaintiff's mother had heard about the bite incident but brought her daughter of the same age as the owner's son to visit, placing her on the floor where the dog bit her shortly after. The judge held that the defendants knew of the dog's propensity to bite young children but kept it ''at their peril" (suggesting strict liability or scienter, which was not however mentioned); such fault was sufficient to make the owners 2/3 liable for the child's $12,000 plastic surgery costs, pain and mental anguish. The plaintiff's mother was held 1/ contributorily liable for letting her child visit and play on the floor near the dog, knowing of its propensity. |
Case | |
| State v. Johnson | 628 P.2d 789 (Or. 1981) | 52 Or.App. 651 (Or. 1981) |
A defendant was convicted in district court of violating a city ordinance by keeping a vicious dog. The Court of Appeals held that the word "trespasser" in the city ordinance was to be used in its ordinary context, that a child who rode his bicycle onto the defendant's driveway was a trespasser, that there were no issues of consent involved, and that the trespasser exception applied even to areas on the defendant's property where the dog was not under the owner's control. |
Case | |
| Matter of S. A. B. | 531 P.3d 718, review denied sub nom. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. T. B., 371 Or. 476, 537 P.3d 939 (2023) | 326 Or.App. 192 (Or.App., 2023) | In this Ohio juvenile dependency case, a father appeals a juvenile court judgment ordering him to transfer the his dog to his child, claiming that the court lacked the authority to transfer possession of the dog. He also claims the dog is his personal property and not the child's. The child, who does not live with the father, suffers from panic attacks and has difficulty sleeping at night. The child's therapist testified that the child's mental health symptoms are exacerbated by "missing and worrying about the dog." The therapist testified that, because of the bond that child shares with the dog, the child's emotional support dog should be this particular dog. In contrast, the father claims the dog is legally his and provides a household benefit for him by keeping raccoons away from his chickens and deterring thieves from entering the property. The lower court found that the child shares a bond with the dog and having the dog as an emotional support animal would benefit the child. On appeal, the father argues that an emotional support animal does not fall within the statutory definition for "counseling" and, thus, the court's order was tantamount to giving away his property. In looking at the statute, the court noted that "counseling" is undefined and so looking at the plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate. As a result, the court found that the dictionary definition read with the policy goals of the chapter on jurisdiction of the juvenile court allowed the court to conclude that the term "counseling" includes the use of emotional support animals. The evidence in this case also shows that this particular dog is necessary as ". . . this particular dog is not just a pet, but rather is an emotional support animal for child, as evidenced by child's strong emotional bond with this particular dog and various testimony demonstrating that this particular dog will contribute to child's well-being by providing child with emotional stability and security." As to the property issue raised by the father, the court observed that courts routinely order parents to provide support for their children and this transfer of property did not abuse the court's discretion. Affirmed. | Case | |
| OR - Initiatives - Measure 100, Save Endangered Animals (2016) | Measure 100 (2016) | Official Summary: Existing Oregon law does not prohibit sale of wildlife parts/products for non native species, except shark fins. Existing federal law does not prohibit intrastate sales of wildlife parts, with exceptions. Measure amends ORS 498.022 to prohibit purchase, sale, or possession with intent to sell of parts/products from elephant, rhinoceros, whale, tiger, lion, leopard, cheetah, jaguar, pangolin, sea turtle, shark, ray. Imposes civil penalties. Creates exceptions: law enforcement activities; activities authorized by federal law; fish managed under federal plan; certain antiques (over l00 years old) and musical instruments with less than 200 grams of parts; noncommercial transfers through estates, trusts, gifts; possession by tribal members. Other exceptions. Fish and Wildlife Commission may adopt rules, including prohibiting purchase/sale of parts "closely" resembling listed species parts. A "Yes" vote prohibits purchase/sale of parts/products from certain wildlife species; exceptions for specified activities, gift/inheritances, and certain antiques/musical instruments; civil penalties. A "No" vote maintains current Oregon law which does not prohibit purchase or sale of parts or products from species not native to Oregon, except for shark fins. | Statute | ||
| Maps of States that have Laws to Protect Animals in Parked Cars |
Thirty-one (31) states and the District of Columbia have laws that concern companion animals left unattended in parked vehicles under dangerous conditions as of 2023. In some states, leaving an animal in an unattended vehicle under dangerous conditions is a crime. Many states also give immunity to law enforcement or other first responders who forcibly enter vehicles to rescue animals. Recently, several states (AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, IN, KS, LA, MA, OH, OR, TN, VT, and WI) enacted laws giving civil immunity to any individuals who break-in to vehicles to remove pets (or vulnerable persons like children or incapacitated individuals) in imminent danger, provided they meet other conditions under these laws. To view these laws, click on the teal states. For more detailed information on these laws, please visit our comparative table on the topic. |
State map |