Results
Displaying 101 - 110 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UK - Dog - Breeding of Dogs Act 1991 | 1991 c. 64 |
This Act extends the powers of inspection for the purposes of the Breeding of Dogs Act 1973 to premises not covered by a licence under that Act, thereby enabling local authorities to investigate suspicions that a dog breeding establishment is operating without the necessary license |
Statute | ||
| Animal & Natural Resource Law Review Volume XIX |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of LawAnimal & Natural Resource Law ReviewVol. |
Policy | |||
| AR - Hunting, remote - 002.00.1-05.08. Prohibited Methods for Hunting Wildlife | AR ADC 002.00.1-05.08 | Ark. Admin. Code 002.00.1-05.08 | This Arkansas regulation prohibits computer-assisted hunting, among other activities. | Administrative | |
| Policing Wildlife |
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Policy | |||
| Research/Animal Testing | Policy | ||||
| CA - Fighting - § 598.1. Dogfighting; forfeiture proceedings | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 598.1 | CA PENAL § 598.1 | This California law allows the prosecuting attorney to file a petition for forfeiture in animal fighting cases under Section 597.5 or subdivision (b) of Section 597b. Any property interest, whether tangible or intangible, that was acquired through the commission of any of the crimes listed in subdivision (a) of Section 597.5 or subdivision (b) of Section 597b shall be subject to forfeiture, including both personal and real property, profits, proceeds, and the instrumentalities acquired, accumulated, or used by cockfighting or dogfighting participants, organizers, transporters of animals and equipment, breeders and trainers of fighting birds or fighting dogs, and persons who steal or illegally obtain dogs or other animals for fighting, including bait and sparring animals. | Statute | |
| Adams v. Vance | 187 U.S. App. D.C. 41; 570 F.2d 950 (1977) |
An American Eskimo group had hunted bowhead whales as a form of subsistence for generations and gained an exemption from the commission to hunt the potentially endangered species. An injunction was initially granted, but the Court of Appeals vacated the injunction because the interests of the United States would likely have been compromised by requiring the filing of the objection and such an objection would have interfered with the goal of furthering international regulation and protection in whaling matters. |
Case | ||
| AU - Wildlife - Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1977 (NT) | Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1977 |
An Act to make provision for and in relation to the establishment of Territory Parks and other Parks and Reserves and the study, protection, conservation and sustainable utilisation of wildlife. |
Statute | ||
| AUTO 1928 de 2022 | AUTO 1928 de 2022 | In Colombia, municipalities are not allowed to prohibit bullfighting. It is a power reserved for Congress. Bogota attempted to regulate the practice through ordinance 767 in 2020. Since the city was not allowed to prohibit bullfights, it regulated them by prohibiting the use of sharp objects and killing of the bulls in the ring. In addition, they required that 30% of the publicity of the event be focused on educating the public on the suffering of bulls. It imposed a 20% tax and decreased the number of annual bullfights allowed from 8 to 4. During this time, no bids were sent to use "Plaza Santamaria" (Bogota's bullfighting stadium) because owners and sponsors of this practice did not agree with such requirements. Thus, Plaza Santamaria did not hold any bullfights since 2020. In December 2022, the Constitutional Court ordered the city to refrain from taking any action conducing to the violation of decision T-296 of 2013 and ordered the opening of Plaza Santamaria “to allow bullfights to take place in the usual conditions as an expression of cultural diversity and social pluralism,” effectively ordering the city to do what’s necessary for the comeback of bullfighting to the capital. | Case | ||
| Riverbrook v. Fabode | 963 N.W.2d 415 (2020), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 981 N.W.2d 468 (Mich. 2022) | 333 Mich. App. 645, 2020 WL 5580152 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2020) | This Michigan case centers on the adequacy of the evidence supporting a request for an assistance animal. Antony Fabode lived in a mobile home on property that was leased to his sister by Riverbrook. In the spring of 2018, Antony obtained a puppy, King, which he claims is a Labrador Retriever mix, but was suspected by Riverbrook as being a banned pit bull type dog. Riverbrook consequently notified Antony's sister of the violation and ordered the dog removed from the premises. To that order, Antony first responded to Riverbrook with a certificate claiming that King was an emotional support animal (ESA) and, after that was rejected as insufficient, came back with a letter by limited license professional counselor, Anne Venet. After again denying the request, Riverbrook sought to enforce the consent judgment with an order of eviction. The district court granted the motion and ordered Antony's removal. Antony sought a stay of eviction on the grounds that he and his sister were authorized to possess King as an ESA. At the district court hearing, Venet testified in support of her letter explaining that she determined Antonuy's need for an ESA after a brief phone call. The court then declined to permit questioning by Riverbrook into the credibility of the determination that Antony was disabled and needed King as a therapeutic aid. Ultimately, the district court denied the writ for eviction. The circuit court affirmed that ruling based on the FHA and the caselaw that supports an unobtrusive line of questioning. The crux of this appeals centers on whether the lower court's order denying Riverbrook's writ of eviction was erroneous after the court disallowed Riverbrook's attorney from questioning the reliability of the evidence of disability and need for an assistance animal. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that "the district and circuit courts avoided their gatekeeper role under MRE 702 despite Riverbrook's repeated objections to the reliability and admissibility of the Fabodes’ evidence." This hampered Riverbrook's ability to discover whether the information presented was reliable and supported Antony's disability-related request and whether Riverbrook refused to make a reasonable accommodation for a tenant based on disability or handicap. The circuit court order was vacated the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. | Case |
