Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| In Defense of Animals v. Salazar | 675 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C., 2009) | 2009 WL 4981172 (D.D.C.) | In this case, the Plaintiffs, In Defense of Animals, Craig C. Downer, and Terri Farley, attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction that would stop the defendants, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar and representatives of the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management (“the Bureau”), from implementing a plan to capture or gather approximately 2,700 wild horses located in western Nevada (“gather plan”). The plaintiffs contended that the gather plan had to be set aside pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., because the Bureau did not have the statutory authority to carry out the gather plan, and because the plan did not comply with the terms of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“Wild Horse Act”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. The Court denied the Plaintiffs request for an injunction. | Case |
| MT - Bear - Chapter 5. Wildlife Protection. Part 3. Grizzly Bear | MCA 87-5-301 to 87-5-303 | MT ST 87-5-301 to 87-5-303 | These Montana statutes state that state policy is to manage grizzly bears to avoid conflicts with humans and livestock, and control distribution by trapping and lethal measures. The commission may regulate the hunting of grizzlies and establish requirements for their transportation, exportation, and importation. | Statute |
| Wilkerson v. State | 401 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1981) |
Appellant was charged with violating Florida's Cruelty to Animals statute, Fla. Stat. ch. 828.12 (1979). He pleaded nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal the trial court's order, which denied his motion to dismiss and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The supreme court affirmed. Appellant argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because the statute failed to provide guidance as to what animals were included and what acts were unnecessary. The supreme court concluded that people of common intelligence would have been able to discern what were and were not animals under the statute and that the legislature clearly intended that a raccoon be included. Additionally, just because the statute did not enumerate every instance in which conduct against an animal was unnecessary or excessive did not render the statute void for vagueness. The conduct prohibited was described in general language. Finally, because appellant's conduct was clearly proscribed by the statute, he did not have standing to make an overbreadth attack. |
Case | |
| Prasad v. Wepruk | 2004CarswellBC946 | 2004 BCSC 578 |
Plaintiff Prasad, an elderly newpaper-deliverer, was attacked in the street by defendant owner Wepruk's usually chained guard-dog, which escaped due to a rusted chain. The court found the defendant strictly liable under the doctrine of scienter's subjective test: he knew the dog was aggressive, but kept it anyway and it harmed Prasad. He was also liable under the objective test for negligence, for not taking reasonable precautions to ensure the dog's chain was in good repair, in order to prevent foreseeable harm to others. damages of $35,000 were awarded for Prasad's injuries and lost future earnings. |
Case |
| Animal Rights and Advocacy Issues | Policy | |||
| Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke | 868 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2017) | 17 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8478 (9th Cir. 2017) | In this case, the Center for Biological Diversity and Maricopa Audubon Society (collectively “CBD”) challenged the determination of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) that the Sonoran Desert Area bald eagle (“desert eagle”) is not a distinct population segment (“DPS”) eligible for listing under the Endangered Species Act. There are two requirements for DPS status: (1) the discreteness of the population segment in relation to the remainder of the species to which it belongs, and (2) the significance of the population segment to the species to which it belongs. Here, the parties agreed that the desert eagle population is discrete, but they disputed whether the population is significant. CBD argued that if FWS found that a population segment satisfies any of the four listed significance factors, it is required to conclude that the population segment is significant. The court held that FWS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that the desert eagle did not satisfy significance requirement for being a DPS, even though it found that the desert eagle satisfied the persistence requirement and one significance factors. The district court's grant of summary judgment to FWS was affirmed. | Case |
| NY - Wildlife, Exotics - Title 1. Short Title; Definitions; General Provisions | McKinney's E. C. L. § 11-0101 to 11-0113 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0101 to 11-0113 | This set of statutes represents the definitional portion of New York's Fish and Wildlife Law. Among the provisions include definitions for game and non-game, a definition for "wild animal," which includes big cats, non-domesticated dogs, bears, and venomous reptiles, and the state's hunter harassment law. The section also provides that the State of New York owns all fish, game, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea and protected insects in the state, except those legally acquired and held in private ownership. | Statute |
| FRITTS v. NEW YORK & N. E. R. CO. | 62 Conn. 503, 26 A. 347 (1893) |
Plaintiff's action results from defendant's alleged negligence in blowing the train whistle in a excessive manner such that it cause plaintiff's horses to run away with the plaintiff's carriage. There was judgment for plaintiff in a less sum than he thought he was entitled to, and both parties appeal. In reversing the lower court's decision, this court found that the lessened market value of the horses in consequence of the runaway was a proximate and legitimate element of damage. |
Case | |
| MI - Hunting - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M.C.L.A. 324.43301 - 43303 | MI ST 324.43301 - 43303 | These sections place limitations on acreage held for sporting purposes and on acreage within 2 miles of other lands held for sporting purposes. | Statute |
| State v. Criswell | 305 P.3d 760 (Mont.,2013) | 2013 MT 177, 370 Mont. 511, 2013 WL 3324365 |
Defendants were convicted of aggravated animal cruelty for subjecting ten or more animals (cats) to mistreatment or neglect by confining them in a cruel manner and/or failing to provide adequate food and water. On appeal, defendants raise two main issues: (1) whether the State presented sufficient evidence and (2) whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying their motions for mistrial. As to the sufficiency argument, the Supreme Court held that the testimony from veterinary experts as well as the individuals involved in the rescue of the 400-plus cats removed from the three travel trailers was sufficient. On the mistrial issue, the Supreme Court agreed with the District Court that the remarks were improper. However, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court's ruling that the comments were not so egregious to render the jury incapable of weighing the evidence fairly. |
Case |