Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Horse Tripping - Poling or tripping a horse; offenses; exceptions | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597g | CA PENAL § 597g | This section makes it a misdemeanor to pole or trip a horse for entertainment or sport. Poling is a method of training a horse to jump by forcing, persuading, or enticing a horse to lift its legs higher over a jump by hitting its front legs with a pole, rope, stick, etc. Tripping a horse is using a wire, pole, stick, rope, etc. to cause a horse to fall or lose its balance. | Statute | |
| Whittier Terrace Associates v. Hampshire | 532 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1989) |
Defendant was a person with a psychiatric disability and living in public housing. Defendant claimed to have an emotional and psychological dependence on her cat. The court held that the housing authority discriminated against defendant under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to waive the no pets policy as a reasonable accommodation for the mental disability. The court noted that there must be a narrow exception "to the rigid application of a no-pet rule, involving no untoward collateral consequences," because the handicapped person could fully receive the benefits of the program if provided the accommodation. |
Case | ||
| In re: JUDIE HANSEN | 57 Agric. Dec. 1072 (1998) | 1998 WL 872492 (U.S.D.A.) | Recommendations of administrative officials charged with responsibility for achieving congressional purpose of statute are highly relevant to any sanction to be imposed and are entitled to great weight in view of experience gained by administrative officials during their day-to-day supervision of regulated industry; however, recommendation of administrative officials as to sanction is not controlling, and in appropriate circumstances, sanction imposed may be considerably less, or different, than that recommended by administrative officials. | Case | |
| OR - Hunting, Internet - 635-065-0740. Hunting Prohibited | OR ADC 635-065-0740 | OAR 635-065-0740 | It is unlawful in Oregon to engage in computer-assisted hunting (Internet hunting) or provide or operate facilities for computer-assisted hunting in Oregon. As used in this act, “computer-assisted hunting” (Internet hunting) means the use of a computer or any other device, equipment, or software to remotely control the aiming and discharge of a firearm, bow, or any other weapon to hunt any game bird, wildlife, game mammal, or other mammal, and “facilities for computer-assisted remote hunting” means real property and improvements on the property associated with hunting, including hunting blinds, offices and rooms equipped to facilitate computer-assisted remote hunting. Nothing in subsection (8) of this section prohibits the use of computer-assisted hunting by employees or agents of county, state or federal agencies while acting in their official capacities. | Administrative | |
| US - Conservation - Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 | 16 USC 742a - 742k | The Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 (16 U.S.C. 742a-742j, not including 742 d-l; 70 Stat. 1119), establishes a comprehensive national fish, shellfish, and wildlife resources policy with emphasis on the commercial fishing industry but also with a direction to administer the Act with regard to the inherent right of every citizen and resident to fish for pleasure, enjoyment, and betterment and to maintain and increase public opportunities for recreational use of fish and wildlife resources. Among other things, it directs a program of continuing research, extension, and information services on fish and wildlife matters, both domestically and internationally. | Statute | ||
| AL - Sterilization - Chapter 9. Sterilization of Dogs and Cats. | Ala. Code 1975 § 3-9-1 to 4 | AL ST § 3-9-1 to 4 | These statutes require animal shelters, animal control agencies, and humane societies to sterilize dogs and cats acquired from other animal shelters, animal control agencies, and humane societies. For purposes of this statute, the term "sterilization" refers to the surgical removal of the reproductive organs of a dog or cat in order to render the animal unable to reproduce. Adoptive animals must be sterilized by a licensed veterinarian before the animal is released to the new owner, or the new owner must enter into a written agreement with the facility certifying that sterilization will be performed by a licensed veterinarian within 30 days after acquisition of the animal or within 30 days of the sexual maturity of the animal. | Statute | |
| Pless v. State | 648 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 2007) | 286 Ga.App. 235 (2007) |
In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction with the exception of that portion of his sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for his court-appointed attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, reversed the appellate court's holding and ruled that the trial court was authorized to impose the reimbursement of attorney fees as part of the sentence. On remand, the appellate court vacated that portion of its opinion that reversed the imposition of attorney fees and adopted the Supreme Court's opinion as its own; all other respects of the appellate decision, Pless v. State, 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App., 2006), remain undisturbed. |
Case | |
| American Society For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus | 317 F.3d 334 (C.A.D.C.,2003) | 55 ERC 1904, 354 U.S.App.D.C. 432 |
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Animal Welfare Institute, the Fund for Animals, and Thomas Rider sued Ringling Bros. and its owner, Feld Entertainment, Inc., claiming that Asian elephants are an endangered species and that the circus mistreated its elephants in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. The only question was whether, as the district court ruled in dismissing their complaint, plaintiffs (including a former elephant handler) lack standing under Article III of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the former elephant handler demonstrated present or imminent injury and established redressability where the elephant handler alleged enough to show that his injuries will likely be redressed if he is successful on the merits. |
Case | |
| ND - Rabies - 48.1-13-01-01. Importation requirements - Certificate of veterinary inspection | ND ADC 48.1-13-01-01 | N.D. Admin. Code § 48.1-13-01-01 | This North Dakota regulation states that any dog, cat, or ferret over three months of age imported into the state must have a certification of a current rabies vaccination. It also provides other requirements for dog, cat, and ferret importation into the state. | Administrative | |
| Ivory Education Institute v. Department of Fish and Wildlife | 28 Cal. App. 5th 975 (Ct. App. 2018), as modified (Nov. 5, 2018), review denied (Jan. 16, 2019) | 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606 (Ct. App. 2018) | The Legislature passed Assembly Bill 96 which took effect July 1, 2016 as Fish & Game Code section 2022. The bill imposed new restrictions on the sale and importation of ivory and rhinoceros horn. The Ivory Education (the Institute) sued the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (the Department) in order to block implementation of the law. The institute alleged that the statute was unconstitutional on multiple grounds including vagueness, federal preemption, the takings clause, and the commerce clause. The trial court entered judgment for the Department and the intervenor defendants (the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Center for Biological Diversity, the Humane Society of the United States, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, and the Wildlife Conservation Society). The Institute appealed and abandoned all other issues raised and limited its challenge to the void-for-vagueness doctrine. "The Institute contend[ed] that section 2022 [was] unconstitutionally vague for two reasons: 1) while it allows for the sale or import of ivory insofar as it is allowed by federal law, differences in what federal law allows make it nearly impossible to tell what would qualify for the exemption provided by section 2022(c)(c); and 2) there are no guidelines by which to determine the permissible volume of ivory in either musical instruments or antiques." The Court of Appeals stated that a statute is not vague if its meaning can be determined by looking at other sources of information. Those who wish to comply with section 2022 have a duty to locate and examine statutes or whatever else necessary to determine the scope of the exemption provision. "Section 2022 has a single purpose—to prevent the sale or importation of ivory and rhinoceros horn. Both of those terms are defined. The Institute has 'not demonstrated that attempts to give substance and meaning' to the three disputed exceptions 'would be fruitless.'" As for the Institute's second contention, the Court of Appeals stated that because musical instruments and antiques are tangible objects that occupy a verifiable amount of three-dimensional space, the percentage of any such object that has ivory in it can be readily determined. The Court of Appeals held that the statute was not vague. The Court affirmed the holding of the trial court. | Case |