Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sierra Club v. Morton | 405 U.S. 727 (U.S.Cal. 1972) | 92 S.Ct. 1361, 3 ERC 2039, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, 1 Envtl. L. Rep. 29,001, 2 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,192 (U.S.Cal. 1972) |
The Petitioner, the Sierra Club, brought this action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction to restrain federal officials from approving an extensive skiing development in the Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club did not allege that the challenged development would affect the club or its members in their activities, but rather argued that the project would adversely change the area's aesthetics and ecology. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the club lacked standing and had not shown irreparable injury. On grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Sierra Club, which asserted a only special interest in conservation of natural game refuges and forests, lacked standing under Administrative Procedure Act to maintain the action because it could not demonstrate that its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the proposed project. |
Case |
| Kuehl v. Sellner | 887 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. Apr. 11, 2018) | 2018 WL 1733841 (8th Cir. Apr. 11, 2018) | Plaintiffs, including advocacy organization Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), brought suit against defendants the Sellners and the Cricket Hollow Zoo to enjoin defendants' mistreatment of their animals in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. Defendants ran a zoo with over 300 animals, including lemurs, tigers, cougars, monkeys and birds, among others. Several of the plaintiffs visited defendants' zoo and witnessed care that raised concerns about the animals' mental and physical well-being, including lemurs kept in isolation with insufficient climbing structures, and tigers kept in feces-filled cages with inadequate care/enrichment. The district court denied plaintiffs' requests for attorney fees and costs and also transferred the animals to a facility that was not proposed by plaintiffs. On appeal, defendants argued that plaintiffs lack standing, and, even if they had standing, defendants contend that they did not violate the ESA. Plaintiffs also appealed, challenging the district court's placement decision for the animals, as well as the court's denial of their request for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals disagreed with defendants that plaintiffs lacked standing because "[they] visited the Cricket Hollow Zoo for the purpose of looking for claimed violations." The court noted that "it is the violation itself" and not the search for it that has caused injury to the plaintiffs. As to defendants' argument that they could not have violated the ESA because the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) provides a "safe harbor" for licensed facilities, the court found that the AWA does not provide a blanket immunity to the ESA. Here, the defendants harassed the lemurs under the ESA by keeping them socially isolated with insufficient enrichment. The defendants also harassed the tigers under the ESA by failing to provide appropriate veterinary care and keeping them in unsanitary conditions. With regard to the placement of the animals at a facility chosen by defendants, this court found no clear error by the district court and, thus, there was no abuse of discretion in the placement decision. Finally, as to denial of plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and costs, the court found that plaintiffs were seeking fees to serve "as a vehicle to close Cricket Hollow." The court was concerned that the use of the ESA as a "weapon" to close small, privately-owned zoos was not envisioned by the Act. Hence, those circumstances justified the district court's decision to deny the motion for attorney fees. The lower court's decision was affirmed. | Case |
| In re: JAMES E. STEPHENS AND WATER WHEEL EXOTICS, INC. | 58 Agric. Dec. 149 (1999) | 1999 WL 288586 (U.S.D.A.) | Ongoing pattern of violations establishes "history of previous violations" for purposes of 7 USCS § 2149(b). | Case |
| VA - Licenses - § 3.2-6524. Unlicensed dogs prohibited; ordinances for licensing cats | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6524 | VA ST § 3.2-6524 | This Virginia statute provides that it is unlawful for any person to own a dog four months old or older in the state unless such dog is licensed. With regard to cats, the governing body of any county, city or town may, by local ordinance, prohibit any person from owning a cat four months or older within such locality unless such cat is licensed. | Statute |
| Zimmerman v. Robertson | 854 P.2d 338 (Mont. 1993) |
Plaintiff horse owner sought review of a judgment by the District Court of Yellowstone County, Thirteenth Judicial District (Montana), which entered a directed verdict in favor of defendant veterinarian on the owner's claims of professional negligence. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the owner was required to prove the veterinarian's negligence by expert testimony, and that he failed to do so. In addition, the court The court found that the "defendant's admissions" exception to the expert testimony requirement did not apply because the veterinarian did not admit that he deviated from the standard of care. |
Case | |
| OH - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 2923. Conspiracy, Attempt, and Complicity; Weapons Control. Corrupt Activity. | R.C. § 2923.31 - 2923.36 | OH ST § 2923.31 - 2923.36 | This Ohio law define "animal or ecological terrorism" as the commission of any felony that involves causing or creating a substantial risk of physical harm to any property of another, the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, or purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causing serious physical harm to property and that involves an intent to obstruct, impede, or deter any person from participating in a lawful animal activity, from mining, foresting, harvesting, gathering, or processing natural resources, or from being lawfully present in or on an animal facility or research facility. | Statute |
| United States v. Kum | 309 F.Supp.2d 1084 (E.D. Wis. 2004) |
Defendant convicted for conspiracy to smuggle endangered wildlife into the United States. Government moved for upward departure from sentencing range. Held: Court would not depart upward to reflect cruel treatment of animals (other holdings generally unrelated). |
Case | |
| Colombia - Marine mammals - LEY 557, 2000, International Program of Dolphin Conservation | LEY 557, 2000 | Through Ley 557, Congress approves and adopts the international Dolphin Conservation Program signed in Washington D.C. This program covers all the area in the Eastern Pacific Ocean and was ratified by Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, European Union, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, United States, and Venezuela. The main goal of this program is to reduce dolphin mortality in the Eastern Pacific due to the tuna purse-seine fishery. | Statute | |
| 907 Whitehead Street, Inc. v. Secretary of U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 701 F.3d 1345 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) | 2012 WL 6061706 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) |
The appellant in this case, the Ernest Hemingway Home and Museum in Key West, Florida ("Museum"), appeals the lower court's determination that it is an animal exhibitor for purposes of the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"). Appellant contends that while admission is charged for the Museum, it does not exhibit the Hemingway cats to the public for compensation; thus, the cats are not distributed through interstate commerce. The court, however, found that since the AWA itself is ambiguous on the question of whether "distribution" includes the fixed-site commercial display of animals, the USDA's broader interpretation of "distribution" and "exhibitor" are entitled to legal deference. While the court sympathized with the museum's frustrations, it affirmed the district court's findings of law and held that Museum is an AWA animal exhibitor subject to USDA regulation |
Case |
| National Meat Ass'n v. Brown | 599 F.3d 1093 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 2010) | 2010 WL 1225477 (C.A.9 (Cal.)) |
This is an interlocutory appeal brought by the State of California and defendant-intervenors The Humane Society, et al., from a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of California Penal Code § 599f, which bans the slaughter and inhumane handling of nonambulatory animals, against federally regulated swine slaughterhouses. The district court granted the preliminary injunction. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) did not expressly preempt California statute banning slaughter of nonambulatory animals. On the humane handling requirement of section 599f, the court did find that Section 599f(e) prohibits dragging of unconscious downer animals which the federal law does not. However, NMA failed to show a likelihood of irreparable injury or that the balance of the equities and the public interest tip in its favor for this provision. This court found that the lower court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction, and the injunction was vacated. This case was later vacated by: National Meat Ass'n v. Harris , 680 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir., 2012). |
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