Results
Displaying 21 - 30 of 6754
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quigley v. McClellan | 214 Cal. App. 4th 1276, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719 (2013) | This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought by the owner of two horses, who alleges defendant veterinarian negligently performed pre-purchase examinations of the two horses. These pre-purchase examinations caused the plaintiff to purchase horses with physical problems that impeded their ability to be used as competition horses. The jury found that the veterinarian was negligent in performing the examinations for one of the horses, and the trial court awarded $46,000 in damages for plaintiff. On appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of an applicable standard of care, and reversed the judgment of the lower court. | Case | |
| In re Priv. Crim. Complaint Filed by Animal Outlook | 271 A.3d 516 (2022), appeal granted, order vacated, 298 A.3d 37 (Pa. 2023) | 2022 WL 588181, 2022 PA Super 37 (Feb. 28, 2022) | Animal Outlook (“AO”) appealed from the order that dismissed its petition for review of the disapproval of the Franklin County District Attorney's Office (“DA”) of multiple private criminal complaints. The requested charges stem from information obtained from an undercover agent who was employed at Martin Farms, where she captured video of cruel mistreatment of animals on the farm that AO contends constituted criminal animal cruelty. These data were complied into a table of 327 incidents, a letter of support from a veterinarian, and a legal memorandum that detailed how these incidents violated Pennsylvania law. AO submitted the gathered information to the pertinent authorities in January 2019 and the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) initiated an investigation which concluded more than a year later. Ultimately, the PSP issued a press release in March 2020 that indicated that the District Attorney had declined prosecution. After this, AO drafted private criminal complaints that were submitted to the Magisterial District Judge who concluded that the DA correctly determined that there was not enough evidence for prosecution. AO then filed a petition of review of the disapproval of its private complaints pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(1) before the trial court, which again dismissed AO petition for review. AO filed this appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Superior Court found that the trial court committed multiple errors of law. First, the trial court did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to moving forward with a prosecution and gave too much credit to the evidence from the Martin Farms veterinarian versus the undercover agent's testimony. The trial court went beyond its role of determining whether the evidence proffered supported each element of the crime charged and instead gave impermissible weight and credibility to Martin Farms evidence. Second, the court made a point of noting that Martin Farms voluntarily changed its practices after the investigation, which had no bearing on the legal sufficiency for criminal charges. The trial court also addressed "only a hand-picked few of the alleged instances of abuse," especially with regard to ignoring the non-anesthetized dehorning of calves. Thus, this court found that AO provided sufficient evidence to show prima facie cases of neglect, cruelty, and aggravated cruelty with respect to the incidents. The court then analyzed whether the record supported a defense of "normal agricultural operations" defense that would counter the charges. This court found that incidents like the dehorning of cattle that already had horns fused to the skull and extreme tail twisting and shocking were sufficient to overcome the affirmative defense. The trial court's dismissal of AO's petition for review was reversed and the trial court was ordered to direct the DA to accept and transmit charges for prosecution. | Case |
| Johnson v. District of Columbia | 2014 WL 5316644 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2014) (Only the Westlaw citation is currently available) | Although he has never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the District of Columbia's Animal Control Act, plaintiff, an animal rights activist, challenges a provision that reads: “No person shall knowingly and falsely deny ownership of any animal.” D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff asserts that he desires to give speeches in the District of Columbia about why he opposes treating animals as property, and in such speeches he would like to deny ownership of his dog. However, he alleges that he does not do so because he is deterred by D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff therefore sued the District of Columbia to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the statute violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The District Court, however, found that plaintiff lacked standing because he presented no concrete evidence to substantiate his fears of prosecution, but rather rests his claims on mere conjecture about possible governmental actions. Such hypothetical fears cannot form the basis for standing under Article III of the US Constitution. The defendant's motion to dismiss was therefore granted and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed. | Case | |
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| CA - Dog Fighting - § 597.5. Fighting dogs; felony; punishment; spectators; exceptions | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597.5 | CA PENAL § 597.5 | This California statute provides that it is a felony to own, possess, keep, or train any dog, with the intent that the dog shall be engaged in an exhibition of fighting with another dog, or to cause dogs to fight for the purpose of amusement or gain. Knowingly being a spectator at such an event constitutes a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Canada - Alberta - Dangerous Dogs Act | R.S.A. 2000, c. D-3, s. 1 | This set of laws comprises the Alberta, Canada Dangerous Dog Act. Under the Act, a justice may take a complaint that a dog has bitten or attempted to bite a person, or that a dog is dangerous and not kept under proper control. In either circumstance, if it appears to the justice that the dog ought to be destroyed, the justice shall direct a peace officer to destroy it. Additionally, a person who fails to comply with an order under this section is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of not more than $5 for each day during which the person fails to comply with the order. | Statute | |
| Johnson v. Douglas | 734 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Mem) (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2001) | 289 A.D.2d 202 (2001) |
Plaintiff appealed an order denying her claim to emotional distress damages presumably for the death of her dog. The court held that it is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent killing of a dog. |
Case |
| In re Marriage of Tevis-Bleich | 939 P.2d 966 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) | 23 Kan.App.2d 982 (1997) | A couple had agreed to a divorce settlement where they each had visitation rights with their dog; the trial court approved of the arrangement. The wife later tried to have that section removed from the decree, but the trial court held that they did not have jurisdiction to make such a change. The appellate court affirmed the decision, which left visitation intact | Case |
| NJ - Wildlife - 23:4-62.2. Bounties or premium for killing prohibition | N. J. S. A. 23:4-62.2 | NJ ST 23:4-62.2 | This New Jersey statute states that no county or municipality shall hereafter pay any premium or bounty for the killing of any fox or woodchuck. | Statute |
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