Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PA - Hunting - § 2302. Interference with lawful taking of wildlife or other activities permitted by this title prohibited | 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2302 | PA ST 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2302 | This reflects Pennsylvania's hunter harassment law. It is unlawful for another person at the location where the activity is taking place to intentionally obstruct or interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife or other activities permitted by this title. Violation of this section is a summary offense of the second degree. A person adversely affected by prohibited activities may bring an action to restrain such conduct and to recover damages. | Statute | |
| US - Eagle - Endangered and Threatened Species; Bald Eagle Reclassification; Final Rule | Federal Register: July 12, 1995 (Volume 60, Number 133) | RIN 1018-AC48 |
The Fish and Wildlife Service reclassifies under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (Act), as amended, the bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) from endangered to threatened in the lower 48 States. The bald eagle remains classified as threatened in Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oregon, and Washington where it is currently listed as threatened. The special rule for threatened bald eagles is revised to include all lower 48 States. This action will not alter those conservation measures already in force to protect the species and its habitats. The bald eagle also occurs in Alaska and Canada, where it is not at risk and is not protected under the Act. Bald eagles of Mexico are not listed at this time due to a recently enacted moratorium on listing additional taxa as threatened or endangered. |
Administrative | |
| Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi | [2010] NSWSC 335 |
The defendants entered the plaintiff's land, containing a piggery, with the intention of taking photographs and film footage to establish that the plaintiff failed to meet certain standards. The defendants' argument that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief because of 'unclean hands' was dismissed by the court. The court also found that the defensive argument based on 'implied freedom of political communication' did not have application in the circumstances. |
Case | ||
| State v. Branstetter | 29 P.3d 1121 (Or. 2001) | 332 Or. 389 (Or. 2001) |
In a state prosecution for animal neglect, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the animals to a humane agency. An appeal by the owner of the animals was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that the statutes controlling appealable judgments allowed the animal owner to appeal the forfeiture of the animals. |
Case | |
| Lunon v. Botsford | 946 F.3d 425 (8th Cir. 2019) | Lunon had a German Shephard as a breed dog, named Bibi, which had gotten loose and was turned into the local animal shelter. The animal control officer failed to scan the dog for a microchip. After five days at the animal shelter, Bibi was sterilized and adopted out. Lunon was able to recover his dog through a replevin action, however, Lunon claimed that his fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process was violated when Bibi was spayed and adopted out without providing pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity for Lunon to be heard. Lunon filed suit against the animal control officer, two directors of the animal shelter in Pulaski County, the city of North Little Rock, Pulaski County, the Pulaski County Animal Shelter, and the North Little Rock Animal Shelter. The defendants removed the case to federal court and sought summary judgment. The district court did not grant summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The Court found that the animal control officer picking up Bibi and delivering her to the animal shelter did not deprive Lunon of a protected property interest. There is no constitutional duty for an animal control officer to scan a stray dog for a microchip. Therefore, the animal control officer was not liable. The public officials that participated in this action were all protected under governmental immunity because Lunon failed to demonstrate that each individual defendant violated his constitutional right to due process. The Court ultimately reversed the order of the district court and remanded with directions to enter judgment dismissing those claims with prejudice. | Case | ||
| Smith v. Meyring Cattle Co., L.L.C. | 921 N.W.2d 820 (Neb., 2019) | 302 Neb. 116 (2019) | Harley Smith worked for Meyring Cattle Company. Smith was injured when a herd dog allegedly nipped at the hoof of one of the cows and the cow charged forward trampling Smith. Smith sustained substantive injuries. Smith sued Meyring under negligence theories and under strict liability as set forth under Nebraska law. The district court found for Meyring. Smith appealed asserting that the district court erred by finding as a matter of law that strict liability did not apply to the facts of the case and for granting Meyring’s motion for partial directed verdict. as matter of first impression, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that the element that a dog be vicious or have dangerous propensities is implicitly part of the strict liability statute. The Court concluded that there was no evidence that the herd dog bit, worried, or chased Smith. There was also no evidence that the herd dog’s actions were directed toward Smith. The language of the strict liability statute was never understood as encompassing bodily hurt to a person by way of a dog worrying or chasing “any sheep or other domestic animals” that collided with that person. The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. | Case | |
| UT - Assistance animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | U.C.A. 1953 § 26B-6-801 - 805; § 41-6a-1007; § 18-1-3; § 76-9-307; § 78B-3-701 - 703; § 10-8-65; § 17-50-336; § 53G-9-211 | UT ST § 26B-6-801 - 805; § 41-6a-1007; § 18-1-3; § 76-9-307; § 78B-3-701 - 703; § 10-8-65; § 17-50-336; § 53G-9-211 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute | |
| NY - Enforcement - Agriculture and Markets Law - Article 3. Investigation; Practice and Procedure; Violations; Penalties. | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 32 - 45-c | NY AGRI & MKTS § 32 - 45-c | This article outlines the procedures and penalties for violations of New York's Agriculture and Markets Law. | Statute | |
| Graham v. Notti | 196 P.3d 1070 (Wash.,2008) |
The court held that the adoption of a dog from an animal shelter was invalid unless the dog was found in "the city" pursuant to the shelter's contract with the local government. |
Case | ||
| Faraci v. Urban | 101 A.D.3d 1753 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.) | 2012 WL 6720938 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.); 957 N.Y.S.2d 792 |
In this New York case, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries his son sustained after the child was bitten by a dog in a house owned by defendant Urban, but occupied by Defendant Buil (the dog's owner). Defendant Urban appeals an order denying her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant Urban failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that the dog did not have vicious tendencies because defendant's own submissions showed that the dog had previously growled at people coming to the door. However, summary judgment was appropriate here because the evidence failed to show that defendant knew or should have known of the dog's alleged vicious propensities. |
Case |