Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - AWA - Subpart E. Marine Mammal Regulations | 9 C.F.R. § 3.100 to .118 | This subpart concerns the Specifications for the Humane Handling, Care, Treatment, and Transportation of Marine Mammals. | Administrative | ||
| Giaconia v. Delaware County Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4442632 (E.D.Pa.) |
Plaintiff brought various claims against Defendants after Plaintiff’s cat was euthanized prior to the standard 72 hour waiting period. On Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania found that Defendants were not acting under color of law. Because any and all claims for which the Court had original jurisdiction were being dismissed, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State law claims. |
Case | ||
| Argentina - Environmental - Ley 25.335, 2000 | Ley 25.335 | This Ley approved the amendments to the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially the Waterbird Habitat, Ramsar 1971, adopted by the Extraordinary Conference of the Contracting Parties in the city of Regina, Canada. It also approved the ordered text of the Convention on Wetlands. | Statute | ||
| Whittier Terrace Associates v. Hampshire | 532 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1989) |
Defendant was a person with a psychiatric disability and living in public housing. Defendant claimed to have an emotional and psychological dependence on her cat. The court held that the housing authority discriminated against defendant under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to waive the no pets policy as a reasonable accommodation for the mental disability. The court noted that there must be a narrow exception "to the rigid application of a no-pet rule, involving no untoward collateral consequences," because the handicapped person could fully receive the benefits of the program if provided the accommodation. |
Case | ||
| TN - Ordinances - § 44-17-401. Use of electronic locating collars on dogs | T. C. A. § 44-17-401 | TN ST § 44-17-401 | This Tennessee statute provides that no agency or entity of state or local government shall enact, adopt, promulgate, or enforce any law, ordinance, rule, regulation, or other policy which restricts or prevents the owner of any dog from using an electronic locating collar to protect such dog from loss. | Statute | |
| NJ - Pet Trusts - Trusts for care of domesticated animals | N.J.S.A. 3B:31-24 | NJ ST 3B:31-24 | A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. Note: this section replaces the original law (3B:11-38) enacted in 2001 and repealed in 2016. | Statute | |
| City of Houston v. Levingston | 221 S.W.3d 204 (Tx.App.-Hous.(1 Dist.) 2006) |
This opinion substitutes City of Houston v. Levingston, 2006 WL 241127 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.)), which is withdrawn. |
Case | ||
| DeRobertis by DeRobertis v. Randazzo | 462 A.2d 1260 (N.J. 1983) | 94 N.J. 144 (1983) |
The principal issue in this New Jersey case is the liability of a dog owner to an infant plaintiff bitten by the owner's dog. At trial the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the Appellate Division, in an unreported opinion, affirmed. A factual issue existed at the trial, however, as to whether the infant plaintiff was lawfully on the property of the owner, but the trial court did not submit that question to the jury. The omission is important because the "dog-bite" statute, N.J.S.A. 4:19-16, imposes absolute liability on an owner whose dog bites someone who is "lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog." If the plaintiff was a trespasser, he was not lawfully on the property, and liability should not be determined under the statute but according to common-law principles. It was necessary to find that the invitation to infant plaintiff to be on defendant's property extended to the area where the dog was chained. |
Case | |
| Colombia - Cruelty - LEY 84, 1989, Statue of Animal Protection | LEY 84, 1989 | Ley 84 is the National Statute of Animal Protection in Colombia. Ley 84 establishes the general duties of humans towards animals. Among these duties includes the duty to provide animals with enough food, water and medicine to guarantee their well-being; the duty to provide animals with appropriate space so they can move adequately; and the duty to provide appropriate shelter. Article 7 contains the exceptions to the duty to protect animals, meaning that the practices listed in this section are legal under the current legal system even though they might be inherently cruel. These exceptions correspond to the different variations and forms of bullfighting rejoneo, coleo, las corridas de toros, novilladas, corralejas, becerradas y tientas, and cockfighting. Ley 84 also regulates the slaughter of animals for non-consumption, animals in experiments and research, animal transportation, as well as hunting and fishing, resources, penalties, legal competency, and procedures to follow in regard to this law. | Statute | ||
| Pless v. State | 648 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 2007) | 286 Ga.App. 235 (2007) |
In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction with the exception of that portion of his sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for his court-appointed attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, reversed the appellate court's holding and ruled that the trial court was authorized to impose the reimbursement of attorney fees as part of the sentence. On remand, the appellate court vacated that portion of its opinion that reversed the imposition of attorney fees and adopted the Supreme Court's opinion as its own; all other respects of the appellate decision, Pless v. State, 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App., 2006), remain undisturbed. |
Case |