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Displaying 111 - 120 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PA - Permits - Chapter 133. Wildlife Classification. | 58 PA ADC § 133.1 - .6; 58 PA ADC § 133.21; 58 PA ADC § 133.41 | 58 Pa. Code § 133.1 to .6; 58 Pa. Code § 133.21; 58 Pa. Code § 133.41 | This set of Pennsylvania regulations defines terms used such as protected mammals, protected birds, endangered species, threatened species, and furbearers. | Administrative | |
| Coffey v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. | 249 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) | 2017 WL 1411465 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) | As the court here states, "Plaintiff Debbie Coffey knows a great deal about wild horses and burros—and how those animals are treated by the federal Bureau of Land Management—but she wants to learn more." As such, Plaintiff, a hose welfare advocate, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the BLM to obtain communications between its officials and private citizens, namely those with long-term holding contracts, involved in the Wild Horse and Burro Program. In conjunction with her request, the BLM charged plaintiff $1,680 in processing fees, but ultimately refunded her the fees a year and half later because it failed to meet FOIA statutory response deadlines. On appeal, Coffey filed a FOIA suit and both sides moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff first argues that the BLM violated FOIA when it failed to give her interest on her processing fees. The court, however, found that awarding interest here would violate the longstanding "no-interest rule," where there was no congressional intent to award interest in such cases. As to plaintiff's argument that BLM's search for records was inadequate, the court agreed with plaintiff that the words and phrases used by BLM were too limiting to meet plaintiff's request and were thus unreasonable. The court held that BLM must choose a different set of search terms (including those suggested by plaintiff) and conduct the FOIA search again. However, the court found that plaintiff's additional contentions that: (1) the search terms were too vague; (2) the database and software needed to be identified; and (3) BLM needed to also include phone records in its search to be without merit. The parties' motions for summary judgment were granted in part and denied in part. | Case | |
| TX - Breeder - Chapter 802. Dog or Cat Breeders. | V. T. C. A., Occupations Code § 802.001 - 251 | Under the Texas Dog or Cat Breeders Act, a person may not act as a dog or cat breeder without a license. Facilities must be inspected at least once every 18-months, and inspectors must notify the law enforcement if they discover evidence of animal cruelty or neglect. This Act also establishes a dog or cat breeder training and enforcement account that can be used for promoting consumer awareness of this chapter, and supporting education, training, and enforcement efforts. | Statute | ||
| Johnson v. Douglas | 734 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Mem) (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2001) | 289 A.D.2d 202 (2001) |
Plaintiff appealed an order denying her claim to emotional distress damages presumably for the death of her dog. The court held that it is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent killing of a dog. |
Case | |
| NV - Dangerous Dog - Chapter 202. Crimes Against Public Health and Safety. | N. R. S. 202.500 | NV ST 202.500 | This Nevada statute defines a "dangerous dog," as a dog, that without provocation, on two separate occasions within 18 months, behaved menacingly to a degree that would lead a reasonable person to defend him or herself against substantial bodily harm, when the dog is either off the premises of its owner or keeper or not confined in a cage or pen. A dog then becomes "vicious" when, without being provoked, it killed or inflicted substantial bodily harm upon a human being. If substantial bodily harm results from an attack by a dog known to be vicious, its owner or keeper is guilty of a category D felony. Under the statute, a dog may not be declared dangerous if it attacks as a defensive act against a person who was committing or attempting to commit a crime or who provoked the dog. | Statute | |
| CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL | CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL | Animal cruelty against any animal has been considered a crime Under the Criminal Code of Mexico City since 2014. Chapter IV contains the provisions regarding the crimes committed by acts of cruelty or mistreatment against non-human animals. Article 350 BIS establishes that "whoever intentionally mistreats or cruelly acts against any specimen of any animal species causing injury, damage, or alteration in their health will be punished with one to up to three years of imprisonment and three hundred to five hundred times the Units of Measure and Update. In addition, intentional acts of cruelty or mistreatment that cause the death of an animal will be punished with imprisonment from two years to up to six years and six hundred to twelve hundred times the Units of Measure and Update. The penalties will be increased by up to two-thirds in those cases where methods that cause serious suffering to the animal are used prior to the death. Methods that cause serious suffering are understood as all those that lead to non-immediate death and prolong the animal's agony. Using an animal for sexual purposes is punishable with one to three years in prison and five hundred to a thousand times the Units of Measure and Update. Enhanced Penalties: The sanctions stipulated in this article shall be subject to a one-half increase if, in addition to the acts mentioned above, the individual responsible or any other person captures visual evidence with the purpose of publicly disseminating these acts through any means. The same increase applies to the killing of a companion animal for purposes of human consumption." Other articles in this code concerning animals include Article 54. 76, 226 BIS, and 226 TER. | Statute | ||
| Animal Law Index Volume 16, Part 2 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 (Spring 2010)
INTRODUCTIONINCORPORATING ANIMAL LAW INTO PRIVATE PRACTICE
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Policy | |||
| People for Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife | 57 F.Supp.3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014) | Plaintiff People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners (“PETPO”) filed the instant lawsuit against United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Daniel M. Ashe, in his official capacity as Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Noreen Walsh, in her official capacity as Regional Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's Mountain Prairie Region, the United States Department of the Interior, and Sally Jewell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior (collectively “Defendants”), challenging the constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate take of the Utah prairie dog on non-federal land under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Friends of Animals (“FoA”) intervened as a Defendant. The case before the District Court rests on the parties' opposing motions for summary judgment. The District Court found that although the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to do many things, it did not authorize Congress to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. Congress similarly lacked authority through the Necessary and Proper Clause because the regulation of takes of Utah prairie dogs was not essential or necessary to the ESA's economic scheme. Therefore PETPO's Motion for Summary Judgment was GRANTED, with prejudice; Defendants' Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment was DENIED, with prejudice. Held 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g) Unconstitutional | Case | ||
| RI - Dangerous Dog - § 4-13.1-9. Penalties for violation--Licensing ordinances and fees | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13.1-9 | RI ST § 4-13.1-9 | This Rhode Island statute provides that a vicious dog may be confiscated by a dog officer and destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner after the expiration of a five day waiting period if an owner does not secure liability insurance, have his or her dog properly identified, or properly enclose/restrain the dog. If any dog declared vicious under Sec. 4-13.1-11, when unprovoked, kills, wounds, or worries or assists in killing or wounding any described animal, the owner shall pay a five hundred fifty dollar fine. The dog officer is empowered to confiscate the dog. The statute further provides that municipalities may enact vicious dog licensing ordinances and provide for impoundment of dogs that violate such ordinances. It also outlines other actions owners of vicious dogs must take, including the posting of vicious dog signs and the maintenance of proper insurance. | Statute | |
| NC - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Article 47) | N.C.G.S.A.§ 14-360 to 14-369; § 19A-1 - 70; § 114-8.7; § 160A-182, § 14-177; § 153A-127 | NC ST § 14-360 to 14-369; § 19A-1 - 70; § 114-8.7; § 160A-182, § 14-177; § 153A-127 | This section comprises the relevant North Carolina animal cruelty statutes. The anti-cruelty statute provides that if any person shall maliciously kill, or cause or procure to be killed, any animal by intentional deprivation of necessary sustenance, that person shall be guilty of a Class H felony. If any person shall maliciously torture, mutilate, maim, cruelly beat, disfigure, poison, or kill, or cause or procure to be tortured, mutilated, maimed, cruelly beaten, disfigured, poisoned, or killed any animal, every such offender shall for every such offense be guilty of a Class H felony. This section also makes promoting or conducting a cock fight a misdemeanor and promoting or conducting a dogfight a felony. Other prohibited acts include abandoning an animal, conveying any animal in a cruel manner, and restraining a dog in a cruel manner. This section also includes the civil remedy provisions. | Statute |