Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TX - Ordinances - § 826.034. Restraint; Criminal Penalty. | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 826.034 | TX HEALTH & S § 826.034 | This Texas statute provides that a person commits an offense (Class C misdemeanor) if the person fails or refuses to restrain a dog or cat owned by the person and the animal is required to be restrained under the ordinances or rules adopted under this chapter. | Statute | |
| NV - Endangered Species - Protection and Propagation of Native Fauna (Chapter 503) | N. R. S. 503.584 - 503.589 | NV ST 503.584 - 503.589 | These statutes provide that the Legislature of Nevada has an interest in protecting native species from extinction and sets forth the authority to establish programs to protect designated species. However, if a native species is found to be destructive under the statute, the statute provides for removal if appropriate. Under statute, the ultimate responsibility for management rests with the governor for reviewing state programs and entering into interstate and federal agreements. | Statute | |
| AZ - Tucson - Chapter 4: Animals and Fowl (Article 1: In General § 4-3) | Tucson Code § 4-3 |
This Tucson ordinance makes it a misdemeanor to commit a crime of cruelty or neglect on an animal. Anyone found guilty of committing a crime of neglect of cruelty faces fines between $100 to $2,500, up to 6 months in jail or 3 years on probation, restitution for the victim, and may not be able to own or control an animal for up to 3 years. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Settle v. Commonwealth | 55 Va.App. 212, 685 S.E.2d 182 (Va.,2009) | 2009 WL 4030930 (Va.App.) |
The defendant-appellant, Charles E. Settle, Jr., was convicted of two counts of inadequate care by owner of companion animals and one count of dog at large under a county ordinance, after Fauquier County Sherriff's officers were dispatched to his home on multiple occasions over the course of one calendar year in response to animal noise and health and safety complaints from his neighbors. Consequently, all of the affected dogs were seized from Settle and relocated to local animal shelters. The trial court also declared three of the animals to be dangerous dogs pursuant to another county ordinance. The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that: (1) because the forfeiture of dogs was a civil matter the Court of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction and was not the proper forum to decide the case; (2) that Settle failed to join the County as an indispensible party in the notice of appeal from conviction for the county ordinance violation; and (3) that the evidence was sufficient to identify Settle as the owner of the neglected companion animals. |
Case | |
| CO - Rehabilitation, wildlife - Chapter 14. Wildlife Rehabilitation. | 2 CO ADC 406-14 | 2 CCR 406-14:1400 to 1407 | This set of Colorado rules concerns wildlife rehabilitation licensing. Requirements for wildlife holding enclosures are outlined. The care, treatment, and disposition of wildlife requirements are detailed as well as provisions for releasing wildlife. | Administrative | |
| Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T - Ecuador | Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T | Este es el caso de cuatro gatos llamados Luna, Manchas, Sonic y Tiger y dos perros, Pantera y Noah que estaban dentro de las propiedades confiscadas por las autoridades en un caso de tráfico de drogas. El abogado Kevin Prendes Vivar presentó un recurso de habeas corpus en representación de los cuidadores de los animales, alegando que los animales estaban siendo retenidos ilegalmente por el "Secretario Técnico de Gestión Inmobiliaria del Sector Público" o "Inmobiliar", la agencia gubernamental que confiscó las propiedades. El demandante argumentó que los animales, como sujetos de derechos según la decisión de la Corte Constitucional 253-20-JH/22, estaban en un estado de soledad que los ponía en riesgo de problemas de salud y bienestar, ya que estos animales tenían un apego emocional a sus cuidadores. Los animales son seres sensibles diferentes de otros objetos, y su detrimento se refleja en su salud física y emocional, causando condiciones como depresión y ansiedad, condiciones que podrían poner fin potencialmente a su vida. Los animales estaban siendo retenidos por 'Inmobiliar', y los demandantes no habían recibido ninguna información sobre la condición de los animales. Además, los demandantes estaban preocupados por la condicion de los animales ya que no tenian conocimiento acerca de su alimentacion. Especialmente porque 'Inmobiliar' no tenía presupuesto para alimentar a los animales sujetos a confiscaciones. Según loa demandante, los animales eran miembros de su familia, y sus hijos sufrían sin ellos. El tribunal provincial de Guyanas concedió el habeas corpus, sosteniendo que los animales son sujetos de derechos, encontrando que 'Inmobiliar' había violado los derechos de los animales al considerarlos propiedad personal embargable. Por lo tanto, el tribunal determinó que su confiscación era ilegal, arbitraria e ilegítima. Para proteger sus derechos a la vida, la libertad y la integridad, ordenó a 'Inmobiliar' devolver los animales a sus cuidadores. En su análisis, el tribunal afirmó que, según el caso de Estrellita, los animales no deberían ser protegidos únicamente desde una perspectiva del ecosistema o desde la perspectiva de las necesidades humanas, sino más bien desde su individualidad y su valor intrínseco. El tribunal también instruyó a la entidad gubernamental a no considerar más a las "mascotas" como semovientes en futuros procedimientos judiciales, y a distribuir, a través del correo electrónico institucional, a todos sus funcionarios la decisión de la corte constitucional 253-20-JH/22, ordenándoles leerla y analizarla. Esta decisión fue apelada por 'Inmobiliar' y la sala especializada en lo penal de la Corte Provincial de Justicia de Guyanas anuló la decisión que otorgaba el habeas corpus a favor de los animales, afirmando que este mecanismo legal no era apropiado en el caso de animales domésticos. En su fallo, el tribunal ordenó la devolución de los animales a "Inmobiliar". Esta decisión ha sido enviada a la Corte Constitucional para su revisión. Si la corte la selecciona, decidirá si un recurso de habeas corpus es apropiado en casos relacionados específicamente con animales de compañía. | Case | ||
| Sickel v. State | 363 P.3d 115 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 7873714 (Alaska Ct. App., 2015) | Defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals under AS 11.61.140(a) after one of her horses was found starving, without shelter, and frozen to the ground (it later had to be euthanized). On appeal, defendant claims that she did not act with the requisite "criminal negligence" under the statute unless she had a duty of care to prevent the specified harm. The court noted that while the statute does not specify the exact nature of this duty to care for particular animals, common law fills the gap. In looking to similar laws and cases from other states, the court found that AS 11.61.140(a)(2) applies only to people who have assumed responsibility for the care of an animal, either as an owner or otherwise. The jury instructions taken as a whole and the prosecutor's argument and rebuttal demonstrated that Sickel assumed the duty of care with regard to the horses and was the person tending the horses in the last three days before the now-deceased horse collapsed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. | Case | |
| RI - Hunting - § 20-13-16. Harassment of hunters, trappers, and fishers prohibited | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 20-13-16 | RI ST § 20-13-16 | This law reflects Rhode Island's hunter harassment law. The law provides that no person shall obstruct or interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person at the location where the activity is taking place with intent to prevent the lawful taking. The language states that the listed actions must be done intentionally or knowingly. Violation results in a "civil violation" with a forfeiture of not less than $100 nor more $500. | Statute | |
| MT - Horse Slaughter - Chapter 9. Slaughter. | MCA 81-9-240, 241 | MT ST 81-9-240, 241 | This Montana statute limits the ability of a court to issue an injunction aimed at delaying or stopping the construction of an equine slaughter or processing facility. Additionally, the law provides that if a person files an action against the operation of an equine slaughter or processing facility and does not prevail, the person is liable for all financial losses the facility suffers if the court issues an injunction that halts operations while the action is pending. | Statute | |
| Tulloch v. Melnychuk | 1998 CarswellAlta 573 |
In this case, the Plaintiff seeks damages from the Defendants for trespass to chattels. She alleged that the Defendants shot her valuable dog. The Defendants countered that they were justified in shooting the dog since it was on their land chasing and worrying their cattle contrary to the Stray Animals Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-23, Part 3. Here, the court found credible the testimony from the defendant cow-operator that the dog was chasing a lame cow to the point where the cow was exhausted. The action by plaintiff was dismissed. |
Case |