Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Rights and Advocacy Issues | Policy | |||
| TX - Horse - Sale of Horsemeat (Chapter 149. Sale of Horsemeat for Human Consumption) | V. T. C. A., Agriculture Code § 149.001 - 007 | TX AGRIC § 149.001 - 007 | These statutes prohibit the sale of horsemeat, the possession of horsemeat with the intent to sell, and the knowing transfer of horsemeat to a person who intends to sell it for human consumption. Horsemeat is defined as the flesh of an animal of the genus equus. Prima facie evidence of an offense is prescribed by these statues and includes, for example, the presence of horsemeat in a restaurant or cafe. The penalty for an offense may be a fine of up to a $1,000, confinement for not less than 30 days and not more than two years, or both a fine and confinement. | Statute |
| Kush v. Wentworth | 790 N.E.2d 912 (Ill.App. 2003) | 2003 WL 21290824, 339 Ill.App.3d 157 (2003) |
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for violation of the Animal Control Act and alleged negligence due to the broken leg that the Plaintiff suffered after she was kicked by Defendant’s horse while trying to pass the horse on a group ride. At the time of the accident, the defendant was neither an “equine activity sponsor” nor an “equine professional” according to the Act. The issue was whether the Act applied only to those two groups of people, and the court held that the Act does not preclude negligence liability for persons other than equine activity sponsors and equine professionals. |
Case |
| Zeid v. Pearce | 953 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.App.-El Paso, 1997) |
Richard and Susan Zeid appeal from the trial court's order dismissing their lawsuit against Dr. William Pearce, d/b/a Coronado Animal Clinic, for veterinary malpractice after the dog suffered from allergic reactions resulting from alleged negligent vaccinations. The court observed that, in Texas, the recovery for the death of a dog is the dog's market value, if any, or some special or pecuniary value to the owner that may be ascertained by reference to the dog's usefulness or services. Consequently, the court found this longstanding Texas rule to be inconsistent with the Zeids' claim for pain and suffering and mental anguish. Because the Zeids did not plead for damages for the loss of their dog that are recoverable in Texas, the trial court did not err in sustaining Dr. Pearce's special exception and dismissing their cause of action. |
Case | |
| Jason v. Parks | 638 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 1996) | 224 A.D.2d 494 (1996) |
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for veterinary malpractice, the plaintiffs appeal. The court reaffirmed that it is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent destruction of a dog. |
Case |
| Council of the State, Sentencia 22.592 of May 23, 2012 | Sentencia 22.592 of May 23, 2012 | Appeal, brought by the Plaintiff, who sought compensation for negligence on the part of the municipality of Anserma for the wrongful death of her husband, who died in the corrals of the slaughterhouse of Anserma when a bull charged him, causing him to fall and hit his head. The Plaintiff alleged that the slaughterhouse facilities were in poor condition, which was the cause of her husband’s death. If the facilities have been in good condition, he would not have had the accident. The court analyzed whether the damage was a result of the municipality's negligence as it did not maintained the facilities in a safe condition, or, if alternatively, it was an unfortunate accident not imputable to the Defendant. The court concluded that the Plaintiff did not present enough evidence to prove that the conditions of the facilities were the cause of the death of her husband. The court also found that the municipality was not in charge of the cattle in the slaughterhouse. Therefore, the damages were not imputable to the municipality. Furthermore, the court found the deceased was not an employee of the municipality, he was an independent employee that was hired by the slaughterhouse workers to assist them during the slaughter of cattle. The Court affirms the decision of the lower court and declares an exception of unconstitutionality of the expression “and if he alleges that he was not able to avoid the damage, he will not be heard.” of the Article 2354 of the Civil Code In its reasoning, the court determined that the accident was a result of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk on the part of the deceased, and not a result of the behavior of the animal. The court addressed Article 2354 of the Civil Code, that established that the caretaker of a fierce animal that does not report any benefit for the owner will be responsible for the damages the animal may cause, but if he alleges that if the damages were unavoidable, he will not be heard. The court declared unconstitutional the line “ and if he alleges that he was not able to avoid the damage, he will not be heard.” The court stated that it was inappropriate to address this scenario that involves responsibility derived from the behavior of animals under the parameters in the Civil Code that treated animals as goods. As today, it was of common acceptance that animals are sentient beings. Animals just as disabled people and other beings had dignity in themselves. They have a vital purpose, so much that they can enter a direct and permanent relationship with humans. The court continues to say that without this idea, the notion of legal capacity and the recognition of fundamental rights for legal persons could not exist. Animals should not be compared to objects or things, as they have dignity. The court recognized that animals and other living beings have their own value, and that even if it is acceptable that they are used for the human’s own benefit, it does not prevent us from recognizing that they are living beings, endowed with own value, and therefore subject to some rights. | Case | |
| WI - Dog, licenses - Dogs. 174.07. Dog licenses and collar tags | W. S. A. 174.07 | WI ST 174.07 | This Wisconsin statute provides for collection of delinquent dog license fees. | Statute |
| PA - Immunity - § 8331.1. Veterinary good Samaritan civil immunity | 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8331.1 | PA ST 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8331.1 | In Pennsylvania, any licensed veterinarian who, in good faith, renders emergency care to any animal which such individual has discovered at the scene of an accident or emergency situation is not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care. This immunity does not, however, apply to acts or omissions intentionally designed to cause harm, or any grossly negligent acts or omissions that cause harm to the animal. It also does not apply where the owner of the animal is present and can be consulted as to the proposed action by the veterinarian. | Statute |
| Suica - Habeas Corpus | Official Diary for October 4th 2005 |
First case to consider that a chimpanzee might be a legal person to come before the court under a petition for Habeas Corpus. |
Case | |
| Oregon Game Fowl Breeders Ass'n v. Smith | 516 P.2d 499 (Or. 1973) |
This is an appeal of an action by a fowl breeder's association to declare Oregon laws against cockfighting unconstitutional. Game fowl breeders brought an action against a district attorney and State Attorney General seeking judgment that statutes prohibiting cruelty to animals were unconstitutional and seeking an injunction against enforcement of statutes against breeders for cockfighting. The Court of Appeals held that the practice of breeding birds suitable for cockfighting did not qualify as 'good livestock husbandry' and that cockfighting was prohibited by statute. |
Case |