Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NY - Trusts - Chapter 17-B. Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's E. P. T. L. § 7-8.1 | NY EST POW & TRST § 7-8.1 | This New York statute provides that a trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid. Such trust shall terminate when the living animal beneficiary or beneficiaries of such trust are no longer alive. Upon termination, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended trust property as directed in the trust instrument or, if there are no such directions in the trust instrument, the property shall pass to the estate of the grantor. A court may reduce the amount of the property transferred if it determines that amount substantially exceeds the amount required for the intended use. | Statute | ||||||||
| Expte. N° HC-656/21 - Habeas Corpus en favor del Tortugo Jorge | Expte. N° HC-656/21 | Jorge is an 80-year-old turtle living in the Municipal Aquarium of Medoza, Argentina. In 2021, three animal lawyers filed a habeas corpus on behalf of Jorge, arguing a violation of the turtle’s right to his locomotive freedom and a violation of Mendoza’s law 7.887, 2018, which prohibits the exhibit of animals in circuses or other events. The lawyers stated that Jorge had to be relocated to a more natural environment where he could live the last years of his life, raising concerns for his age and health. After learning that the government is turning the aquarium into a biodiversity center and after consulting with several experts, the tribunal denied the Habeas Corpus as it found the controversy was moot. It also rejected the idea of releasing Jorge into the wild. However, it is important to mention that the tribunal did not oppose his relocation into a sanctuary so long as his physical integrity was protected. | Case | |||||||||
| Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo | 387 P.3d 690 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017) | 2017 WL 121589, 187 Wash. 2d 509, 92846-1, 2017 WL 121589, at *1–11 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017) |
To address the Zoo's growing size and complexity, Defendant Woodland Park Zoo Society (WPZS) entered into an “Operations and Management Agreement” (Agreement) with the City of Seattle. The Agreement gave WPZS exclusive rights and responsibilities regarding many areas such as the care, sale, and purchase of the Zoo's animals. The Agreement also contained several provisions addressing public oversight of the Zoo. Plaintiff Alyne Fortgang requested several categories of records, all pertaining to the Zoo's elephants. She filed the request under the Public Records Act (PRA), which requires every government agency to make records available for public inspection and copying. The Zoo's director of Communications and Public Affairs responded to Fortgang's request by asserting that the PRA did not apply because WPZS was a private company. Fortgang filed a lawsuit and alleged that WPZS violated the PRA by refusing to disclose certain records. The trial court granted WPZS's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action on the ground that WPZS was not an agency subject to PRA disclosure requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the Telford test was the proper analytical framework for evaluating the private entity’s disclosure requirement. The Supreme Court reasoned that under the Telford analysis, WPZS was not the functional equivalent of a government agency. The court stated that although the second Telford factor was inconclusive, all the other factors weighed against PRA coverage: (1) WPZS did not perform an inherently governmental function by operating the Zoo; (2) the City did not exercise sufficient control over the Zoo's daily operations to implicate PRA concerns; (3) WPZS was created solely by private individuals and not government action and (4) because operating a zoo is not a nondelegable, “core” government function, the case did not involve the privatization of fundamentally public services. The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed. |
Case | ||||||||
| Hopson v. Kreps | 622 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) |
Action brought on behalf of Alaskan Eskimos which challenged the validity of the Department of Commerce regulations adopted pursuant to IWC Act. Plaintiffs claim is the the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction under the Convention when it eliminated the native subsistence exemption for Alaskan Eskimos. The Court reverses and remands the districts courts dismissal of the action. |
Case | |||||||||
| Taiwan - Cruelty - Taiwan Animal Protection Law | Taiwan Animal Protection Law |
This law sets out the umbrella of animal issues for Taiwan. Much of it is so general that additional regulations are going to be required. |
Statute | |||||||||
| KS - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty and Animal Fighting Laws | K. S. A. 21-6411 - 6418; 21-5504; 60-5401 | KS ST 21-6411 - 6418; 21-5504; 60-5401 | The Kansas anti-cruelty statutes define cruelty to animals as knowingly killing, injuring, maiming, torturing, burning or mutilating any animal. Also included as cruelty are abandoning any animal, failing to provide food, horse-tripping, and poisoning any domestic animal, unlawful disposition of animals, dog and cock-fighting. Cruelty to animals may be a misdemeanor or a felony. Exceptions are made for such things as veterinary practices, research experiments, rodeo and farming practices, euthanasia, and pest control. It is also illegal to allow a dangerous animal to run at large or to engage in sodomy with an animal. | Statute | ||||||||
| ND - Veterinary - Chapter 43-29. Veterinarians | NDCC 43-29-01 to 19; 43-29.1-01 - 08 | ND ST 43-29-01 to 19; 43-29.1-01 - 08 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | ||||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 2 Núm 3 |
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Policy | ||||||||||
| GA - Ecoterrorism - Article 2. Georgia Farm Animal, Crop, and Research Facilities Protection Act | Ga. Code Ann., § 4-11-30 to 35 | GA ST § 4-11-30 to 35 | This article is known as the Georgia Farm Animal, Crop, and Research Facilities Protection Act. A person commits an offense if, without the consent of the owner, the person acquires or otherwise exercises control over an animal facility, an animal from an animal facility, or other property from an animal facility with the intent to deprive the owner of such facility, animal, or property and to disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. Other prohibited actions also include gaining entry where a person knows entry is forbidden. In the definition of "consent," the act states that the term does not include assent that is induced by force, threat, false pretenses or fraud. It also excludes assent given by a person that the actor knows is not authorized by the owner, or given by a person who the actor knows is unable to make reasonable decisions (e.g., because of youth, intoxication, or mental disease or defect). Violations that involve exercising control over a facility are felonies; those that involve illegal entry or damage less than $500 are misdemeanors. | Statute | ||||||||
| RESOLUCIÓN NÚMERO 0119 DE 2024- Colombia- Don't publish yet |
"Por medio de la cual se adiciona al artículo 2° de la Resolución 380 del 5 de marzo de 2021, algunas especies de tiburones y rayas marinas, como recursos pesqueros y se prohíbe la pesca dirigida de tiburones y rayas marinas en todo el territorio nacional." |
Statute |