Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
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| Historical Materials |
Historical Collection
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| Cotton v. Ben Hill County | 208 F. Supp. 3d 1353 (M.D. Ga. 2016) | 2016 WL 5387627 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2016) | In this case, Cotton filed suit against Ben Hill County after Cotton’s cattle was seized for alleged animal cruelty and roaming at large. Cotton filed suit against Ben Hill County and the Sheriff’s Department arguing that he had been deprived of his property in violation of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the violation of the Constitution of Georgia. The court reviewed the issue and granted summary judgment in favor of Ben Hill County and the Sheriff's Department. The court granted summary judgment because Cotton was unable to establish that his rights were violated under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cotton was unable to establish that his Due Process rights were violated because he was unable to provide any evidence that the allegations against Ben Hill County and the Sheriff’s Department were “the result of an official policy, custom or practice of the county or that the County acted with deliberate indifference to these rights.” Also, the court found that there was not a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause because under state law, Georgia provided for a “post deprivation remedy for the loss.” Lastly, the court found that Cotton’s claims against the Sheriff's Department failed as a matter of law because Cotton was unable to establish that anyone from the Sheriff’s Department actually participated in the seizure and impoundment of the cattle. For those reasons, the court held in favor of Ben Hill County and granted summary judgment. | Case | |
| OH - Equine Liability Act - Chapter 2305. Jurisdiction; Limitation of Actions. Miscellaneous Provisions. | R.C. § 2305.321 | OH ST § 2305.321 | This act stipulates that an equine sponsor, equine activity participant, equine professional, veterinarian, farrier, or any other person is not liable in damages in a tort or other civil action for harm that an equine activity participant allegedly sustains during an equine activity, which resulted from the inherent risks of equine activities. However, there are exceptions to this rule: an equine sponsor, equine activity participant, equine professional, veterinarian, farrier, or any other person will be held liable for injuries of an equine activity participant if he or she displays a willful and wanton or intentional disregard for the safety of the participant and if he or she fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts in ensuring the safety of the participant. In addition, an equine sponsor, equine activity participant, equine professional, veterinarian, farrier, or any other person will also be held liable for the injury of an equine activity participant if he or she is injured on the land or at a facility due to a dangerous latent condition of which was known to the equine sponsor, professional or other person. | Statute | |
| MI - Cruelty - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. The Michigan Penal Code. | M.C.L.A. 750.52 (Repealed by P.A.2015, No. 210, § 1(f), Eff. March 14, 2016) | MI ST 750.52 | Note: Repealed by P.A.2015, No. 210, § 1(f), Eff. March 14, 2016. This statute provides that it is the duty of the officials involved in animal cruelty investigations to arrest and prosecute those committing the offenses where there is knowledge or reasonable notice of the acts. The failure or neglect by an officer involved to do so may result in a misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| Johnson v. Douglas | 734 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Mem) (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2001) | 289 A.D.2d 202 (2001) |
Plaintiff appealed an order denying her claim to emotional distress damages presumably for the death of her dog. The court held that it is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent killing of a dog. |
Case | |
| In re Marriage of Tevis-Bleich | 939 P.2d 966 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) | 23 Kan.App.2d 982 (1997) | A couple had agreed to a divorce settlement where they each had visitation rights with their dog; the trial court approved of the arrangement. The wife later tried to have that section removed from the decree, but the trial court held that they did not have jurisdiction to make such a change. The appellate court affirmed the decision, which left visitation intact | Case | |
| US - Exotic Pets - Injurious Wildlife Species; Listing the Boa Constrictor, Four Python Species | 2010 WL 836553 (F.R.) |
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) proposes to amend its regulations to add Indian python (Python molurus, including Burmese python Python molurus bivittatus), reticulated python (Broghammerus reticulatus or Python reticulatus), Northern African python (Python sebae), Southern African python (Python natalensis), boa constrictor (Boa constrictor), yellow anaconda (Eunectes notaeus), DeSchauensee's anaconda (Eunectes deschauenseei), green anaconda (Eunectes murinus), and Beni anaconda (Eunectes beniensis) to the list of injurious reptiles. This listing would prohibit the importation of any live animal, gamete, viable egg, or hybrid of these nine constrictor snakes into the United States, except as specifically authorized. |
Administrative | ||
| State of Ohio v. Jane Smith | 83 N.E.3d 302 (Ohio Ct. App., 2017) | 2017 WL 422315 (Ohio Ct. App., 2017) |
Jane Smith was charged with 47 counts of animal cruelty after 47 dogs and other animals were seized from her property where she operated a private dog rescue. Smith was ultimately sentenced to jail time and required to compensate the Humane Society for the money that was spent to care for the 47 dogs that were seized from Smith’s property. Smith appealed her sentence, arguing that the lower court had made five errors in coming to its decision. The Court of Appeals only addressed four of the five arguments made by Smith. First, the Smith argued that the court erred in not suppressing evidence on the basis that her 4th Amendment rights had been violated. The Court of Appeals dismissed this argument, holding that Smith’s 4th Amendment rights had not been violated because the information that led to the seizure of Smith’s dogs was provided by a private citizen and therefore not applicable to the 4th Amendment protections. Secondly, Smith argued that the court violated her due process rights when it made multiple, erroneous evidentiary rulings that deprived her of her ability to meaningfully defend herself at trial. The Court of Appeals found that Smith had not provided enough evidence to establish that her due process rights had been violated, so the Court of Appeals dismissed the argument. Thirdly, Smith made a number of arguments related to constitutional violations but the Court of Appeals found that there was not evidence to support these arguments and dismissed the claim. Lastly, Smith argued that she had made a pre-indictment, non-prosecution agreement that was not followed by the court. The Court of Appeals also dismissed this argument for a lack of evidence. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision and sentencing. |
Case | |
| KY - Liens - § 257.105. Sale of unclaimed animals held by veterinarian | KRS § 257.105 | Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 257.105 | This statute deals with the sale of unclaimed animals after an animal is left with a licensed veterinarian after providing care to the animal. Under the statute, the veterinarian is able to sell the animal for reasonable value if the animal is left unclaimed for ten days or more. Once the veterinarian determines that he or she will be selling the animal, he or she must provide notice to the owner prior to the sale. | Statute | |
| NE - Hunting - Chapter 37. Game and Parks. | Neb. Rev. St. § 37-564 to 37-570 | NE ST § 37-564 to 37-570 | This set of laws represents Nebraska's hunter harassment provisions. The section provides that no person shall knowingly and intentionally interfere or attempt to interfere with another person who is not trespassing and who is lawfully hunting, trapping, or fishing or engaged in activity associated with hunting, trapping, or fishing. A court may enjoin conduct described under the section. The section states that it is an affirmative defense where the alleged violator was not trespassing at the time of the interference and was engaged in lawful activity in conflict with the hunting, trapping, or fishing activity. Any person violating section 37-564 shall be guilty of a Class III misdemeanor. | Statute |