Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Derecho Animal Volume 6 Núm 4 |
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| Animal Welfare Institute v. BP America, INC | This complaint is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(2)(A), to bring an immediate halt to defendants’ actions that are killing endangered and threatened sea turtles in the Gulf of Mexico as part of defendants’ efforts to contain the catastrophic oil spill that has occurred at defendants’ Deepwater Horizon facility in the Gulf of Mexico. In this complaint, several animal rights organizations allege, in an effort to contain the oil spill by burning the oil, defendants are also corralling and burning alive endangered and threatened sea turtles without a permit from the Department of Commerce, in violation of Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). A motion for temporary restraining order is also included. | Pleading | ||||||||
| Toledo v. Tellings | 871 N.E.2d 1152 (Ohio, 2007) | 114 Ohio St.3d 278; 2007 -Ohio- 3724 |
In this Ohio case, the defendant, who owned three pit bull type dogs, was convicted in the Municipal Court, Lucas County, of violating the Toledo city ordinance that limited ownership to only one pit bull per household. On appeal by the City, the Supreme Court found the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls. The evidence presented in the trial court supports the conclusion that pit bulls pose a serious danger to the safety of citizens. The statutes and the city ordinance are rationally related to serve the legitimate interests of protecting Ohio and Toledo citizens. |
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| Dyess v. Caraway | 190 So.2d (666 La.App., 1966) |
Plaintiff claimed damages for the death of five pedigreed Norwegian Elkhound puppies resulting from the negligence of defendant, Hugh L. Caraway, a duly licensed veterinarian. Specifically, defendant allegedly failed to make proper diagnostic tests, failed to give proper treatment for coccidia from which the puppy died, although the defendant had professional knowledge that the puppy was suffering from that disease, and failed to exercise the standard of care required by the average prudent veterinarian in the community. The court first noted the difficulty in diagnosing distemper. It also found the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in applicable in the instant case, primarily for the reason that the instant case involves a question of diagnosis and treatment of a professional nature which in itself requires judgment. |
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| TX - Dangerous - Subchapter D: Dangerous Dogs | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.041 - 047 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.041 - 047 | Chapter 822, Subchapter D addresses dangerous dogs and their treatment, including dog attacks, registration, defenses, violations of the statute. | Statute | ||||||
| Volosen v. State | 192 S.W.3d 597(Tex.App.-Fort Worth, 2006) | 2006 WL 349713 (Tx. 2006) |
In this Texas case, the trial court found Appellant Mircea Volosen guilty of animal cruelty for killing a neighbor's dog. The sole issue on appeal is whether the State met its burden of presenting legally sufficient evidence that Volosen was "without legal authority" to kill the dog. By statute, a dog that "is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked ... fowls may be killed by ... any person witnessing the attack." The court found that no rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the dog was not attacking or had not recently attacked chickens in a pen in Volosen's yard; thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that Volosen killed the dog "without legal authority" as required to sustain a conviction for animal cruelty. Judgment Reversed by Volosen v. State , 227 S.W.3d 77 (Tex.Crim.App., 2007). |
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| AL - Restaurant - § 22-20-5.3. Pet dogs permitted in outdoor dining areas | Ala.Code 1975 § 22-20-5.3; Ala.Code 1975 § 22-20-5.4 | AL ST § 22-20-5.3; § 22-20-5.4 | This Alabama law enacted in 2021 states that a pet dog that is under the control of a person shall be permitted in an outdoor dining area of a food service establishment if conditions listed in the law are all met. These include things like the food service facility owner filing a waiver with the State Health Department stating they will adhere to the prescribed rules, a prominent sign that puts the public on notice, a separate entrance for the dogs and owners that does not go through the food establishment, and making sure the pet owners adhere to rules like keeping dogs on leashes or in carriers. | Statute | ||||||
| Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. | 604 F.Supp.2d 288 (D.Mass.,2009) | 2009 WL 678744 (D.Mass.) |
The plaintiff brought this action against Defendants Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. and Wyeth Corporation, seeking economic damages suffered from the purchase and injection of her dog with ProHeart® 6 to prevent heartworm. The complaint alleged products liability/failure to warn, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of state deceptive business practices, among others. In 2004, defendants recalled ProHeart® 6 in response to a request by FDA due to reported adverse reactions. This Court found that Massachusetts law follows the traditional “economic loss rule,” where such losses are not recoverable in in tort and strict liability actions where there has been no personal injury or property damage. Here, the plaintiff was barred from recovering because she has not alleged any personal injury or property damage under her products liability claim. Further, plaintiff failed to show that defendants' deceptive act caused some injury and compsensable loss. Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. |
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| Just Puppies, Inc. v. Frosh | 438 F. Supp. 3d 448 (D. Md. 2020), vacated and remanded, No. 20-1631, 2021 WL 4452349 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2021) | The State of Maryland passed a “No More Puppy-Mill Pups Act” which went into effect January 1, 2020. The Act prohibits retail pet stores in Maryland from offering for sale or otherwise transferring or disposing of cats or dogs. Four pet stores, a dog breeder, and a dog broker filed suit against Brian Frosh, the Attorney General of Maryland, the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (CPD), the Maryland House Economic Matters Committee, and the Maryland State Senate Finance Committee seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Act as well as a declaration that it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Defendants were all entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, unless an exception were to apply. Under the Ex parte Young exception “private citizens may sue state officials in their official capacities in federal court to obtain prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law.” The CPD and Committee Defendants were not State officials and, therefore, they did not fall within the Ex parte Young exception. The Ex parte Young exception, however, applied to Mr. Frosh as he was the Attorney General of Maryland since he had some connection with the enforcement of the Act. In Counts I, II, and III, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the Act discriminated against out-of-state breeders and brokers in its text, in its effect, or in its purpose. Count IV alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act was preempted by the AWA. The Court found that prohibiting Maryland pet stores from selling dogs or cats had no effect on the operation of the AWA. The Puppy-Mill Act's impact on pet stores did not clash with the AWA, because pet stores were explicitly exempt from the AWA. Count V alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to the equal protection of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court found no merit in this argument. Count VI asserted that the Act created a monopoly prohibited by Article 41 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court found that the Puppy-Mill Act did not constitute an exclusive right to sell cats and dog in Maryland. Although the Act prohibited brick and mortar stores from participating in the sale of cats and dogs, consumers still had a plethora of choices when seeking to obtain a pet, including rescue shelters, animal control units, USDA licensed breeders and brokers, and unregulated hobby breeders. The Court ultimately dismissed all claims against the CPD and the Committee Defendants and allowed the claims against Brian Frosh to proceed. | Case | |||||||
| AK - Initiatives - Ballot Measure 9 (wolf trapping) | Ballot Measure 9 (2000) | This bill would have prohibited a person from using a snare with the intent of trapping a wolf and appeared on the 2000 ballot. It would also have prohibited a person from possessing, buying, selling, or offering to sell the skin of a wolf known by the person to have been caught with a snare. Breaking the law would have been a Class A misdemeanor. The measure failed with only 37.3% of the vote. | Statute |