Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jones v. Butz | 374 F.Supp. 1284 (D.C.N.Y. 1974) |
This action involves a challenge, under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, to the Humane Slaughter Act and in particular to the provisions relating to ritual slaughter as defined in the Act and which plaintiffs suggest involve the Government in the dietary preferences of a particular religious (e.g., Orthodox Jews) group. The court held that there is no violation of Establishment Clause because no excessive governmental entanglement and by making it possible for those who wish to eat ritually acceptable meat to slaughter the animal in accordance with the tenets of their faith, Congress neither established the tenets of that faith nor interfered with the exercise of any other. |
Case | |
| PA - Euthanasia - The Animal Destruction Method Authorization Law | 3 P.S. § 328.101 - 3 P.S. § 328.1102 | This Pennsylvania statute provides the prohibited and authorized methods to kill or "destroy" animals within the state. The statute provides a different method for small domestic animals and also specifies which state operations and entities are excluded from following the methods as described under the statute. The statute also specifies the fines and civil penalties for violation of the statute. | Statute | |
| State v. Smith | 54 A.3d 638 (Conn.App.) | 139 Conn.App. 107 |
A defendant was charged and convicted of one count of permitting a dog to roam at large. Upon appeal, the defendant argued the statute he was convicted under was unconstitutionally vague and that he was convicted under insufficient evidence. Defendant contended that simply having his dog off-leash did not mean that it was roaming at large and not under his control where the dog responded to verbal commands. The court rejected both of defendant's arguments, finding that the plain language of the statute clearly prohibits an owner allowing a dog to move freely on another's property unrestrained and not under the owner's direct influence. |
Case |
| R (on the application of Countryside Alliance and others) v Attorney General and another | [2007] UKHL 52 | An appeal was brought against a decision that the Hunting Act 2004 was not inconsistent with the EC Treaty, or incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, the appellants argued that the Act was incompatible with the right to a private and family life; and the right of freedom of assembly and association (Articles 8 and 11 of the Human Rights Act); along with Articles 1 and 14 of the Act (the right to peaceful enjoyment of property rights, and prohibition on discrimination). The appeal was rejected by the House of Lords. Findings included that Articles 8 and 11 were not engaged, and that even if they were, the hunting ban was proportionate to the end it sought to achieve and necessary in a democratic society. | Case | |
| MA - Hunting, Internet - § 65A. Online Shooting or Spearing | M.G.L.A. 131 § 65A | Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 131, § 65A (West) | This statute prohibits hunting via the Internet and the operation of online hunting businesses within the state of Massachusetts. Violation is punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 2 1/2 years or by a fine of not more than $2,500, or by both a fine and imprisonment. | Statute |
| LA - Dog Dangerous - Chapter 1. Criminal Code. | LA R.S. 14:102.14 | This Louisiana statute defines a "dangerous dog" as any dog which when unprovoked, on two separate occasions within the prior thirty-six-month period, engages in any behavior that requires a defensive action by any person to prevent bodily injury when the person and the dog are off the property of the owner of the dog; or any dog which, when unprovoked, bites a person causing an injury; or any dog which, when unprovoked, on two separate occasions within the prior thirty-six-month period, has killed, seriously bitten, inflicted injury, or otherwise caused injury to a domestic animal off the property of the owner of the dog. It is unlawful for any person to own a dangerous dog without properly restraining or confining the dog. | Statute | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar | 729 F.Supp.2d 1207 (D.Mont.,2010) | 2010 WL 3084194 (D.Mont.,) |
In February of 2008, Defendant, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (the "Service"), issued a final ruling to delist the Rocky Mountain gray wolf species, removing the ESA’s protections throughout the northern Rocky Mountain distinct population segment ("DPS"), except in Wyoming. Twelve parties challenged the final ruling, arguing, foremost, that the decision violates the ESA by only partially protecting a listed population. The United States District Court for the District of Montana issued two findings: (1) the ESA does not allow the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to list only part of a species as endangered, or to protect a listed distinct population segment only in part; and (2) the legislative history of the ESA does not support the Service’s interpretation of the phrase "significant portion of its range," but instead supports the long-standing view that the ESA does not allow a distinct population to be subdivided. Accordingly, the Service’s ruling to delist the Rocky Mountain gray wolf was vacated as invalid and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was granted. |
Case |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States Department of Agriculture | 2016 WL 7235624 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2016) |
Foie gras is a food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. To create it, the duck or goose is force-fed a special mix of food which causes a large buildup of fat in the bird's liver. This gives the product its signature taste. Plaintiffs, Animal Legal Defense Fund, comprised of four animal rights organizations and three individuals. The Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture, comprised of the Food Safety and Inspection Services (FSIS), and two individuals. Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund asked Defendant (FSIS) to initiate rulemaking under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) “to exclude Foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased product.” They argued that the force-feeding process could cause infections and illnesses for the animals and the consumption of the birds could trigger the onset of illness and disease in humans. FSIS denied the petition to ban the food product. The Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund then filed this action for judicial review. Defendant FSIS argued that the Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that the PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and that in any event, FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. The United States District Court, C.D. California concluded that the Plaintiff, Animal Legal Defense Fund had standing to bring this action and that their interests fell within the “zone” of interests protected by the PPIA. However, the Court also held that Defendants, United States Department of Agriculture, did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the petition. Accordingly, the Court Granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Jim | 888 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Or. 1995) |
Court considered defendant's claim based on newly enacted RFRA. Court finds defendant's asserted need to kill 12 eagles a year would decimate eagle population in Oregon. While not perfect, court finds the eagle permit system the least restrictive means to achieve the compelling need of protecting eagles. For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by Native Americans, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| Romero v. Bexar County | 993 F.Supp.2d 658 (W.D. Tex. 2014) | Several reports to the police were made that a man had threatened several individuals with a firearm. In responding to the calls, the police identified the plaintiff pet owner as the allegedly armed man. Officers then proceeded to the plaintiff’s home and acknowledged that they saw a “Beware of Dogs” sign, but still entered the fenced-in premises. Upon entering the yard, four dogs approached and one of the officers shot and killed one of the dogs. The plaintiff brought suit against the officer and municipality and alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In evaluating the officer’s claim of qualified immunity, the court held that the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable, considering he had reason to believe the plaintiff may be armed and dangerous and claimed “several large dogs ran out aggressively charging, barking and growling.” The officer’s relation of events was backed up by his fellow officer on the scene. | Case |