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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sanzaro v. Ardiente Homeowners Association, LLC | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 1049380 (D. Nev. Mar. 5, 2019) | 2019 WL 1049380 (D. Nev. Mar. 5, 2019) | Deborah Sanzaro and Michael Sanzaro are the plaintiffs in this action. Plaintiffs are homeowners and members of a homeowners association ("HOA"). Three incidents occurred at the HOA clubhouse in which Deborah Sanzaro attempted to enter with her Chihuahua, which she claimed was a service animal. In each of these three incidents, Deborah was denied access to the clubhouse. The first incident occurred on March 11, 2009. Deborah entered the club house with her dog and the manager of the HOA asked her why she brought the dog into the clubhouse with her. Deborah explained that her dog assisted her with her disability and was a service animal, however, she could not provide any documentation to the manager as to that effect. She was then asked to leave the clubhouse to which she refused. Only after security was called did Deborah leave. Later, on that same day, Deborah entered the clubhouse with her service dog without any incident. The HOA sent a letter to the plaintiffs after the first incident notifying them that that Deborah had violated the HOA’s governing documents and that a hearing before the HOA board would take place on March 30, 2009. Plaintiffs never showed for this hearing which ultimately resulted in the Board finding that Deborah violated HOA rules and regulations by entering the clubhouse with her dog and not providing documentation. Deborah was assessed multiple fines. Prior to the hearing, the HOA sent out letters to the other residents letting them know that they would accommodate any legitimate service animal if their staff is properly advised of such. They also mailed out a letter regarding the incident with the plaintiffs to all of the other residents. The plaintiffs began to receive hate mail and verbal harassment regarding their dispute with the HOA board. The plaintiffs received many threats and had their property defaced by an anonymous homeowner who spray painted their garage door telling them to get out of the neighborhood. The HOA did nothing to stop this harassment. Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Nevada Real Estate Division and their claim was submitted to a non-binding arbitrator. Deborah provided a doctor’s statement requesting that her dog be registered as a service dog, a notice of entitlement to disability benefits from the SSA, a doctor’s statement regarding Deborah’s disability, and a statement from Deborah explaining how her dog had been trained to assist her. The Arbitrator found for the Ardiente Homeowners Association because she did not find Deborah’s explanation as to why she needed the dog as being persuasive. The arbitration decision was upheld by the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada as well as by the Nevada Supreme Court. On July 26, 2010, Plaintiffs entered the clubhouse again with the dog. They were told that they could not come in unless they provided more documentation despite the documentation that the Deborah had provided during the arbitration proceeding. On January 29, 2011 the plaintiffs entered the clubhouse again with the dog and they were again denied entry until the plaintiffs could provide documentation that the dog was a registered service animal. The HOA eventually foreclosed on the plaintiff’s home in order to recover the fines and attorney’s fees that were owed. Plaintiffs then brought 102 causes of action in federal court under the ADA and FHA which were pared down to two questions: (1) whether the HOA clubhouse was a place of public accommodation under the ADA and NRS § 651.075, and (2) whether Plaintiffs requested, and were ultimately refused, a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. For the plaintiff ADA claims, the District Court found that Deborah is disabled as a matter of law and that the HOA and other defendants were aware of her disability at least as of July 27, 2009 (the date of the arbitration). The Court also found that the clubhouse was not a place of public accommodation and that the entire community including the clubhouse was a private establishment. As a result the plaintiffs were not able to establish a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA. For the plaintiff’s FHA claims, the Court found the following: Deborah was qualified as handicapped under the FHA; the defendants were reasonably expected to know about her handicap; an accommodation was necessary for Deborah to use the clubhouse; the dog qualified as a service animal and permitting the dog to accompany Deborah was a reasonable accommodation; and the defendants refused to make the requested accommodation which makes them liable. For the Nevada law claim, it failed because the community and clubhouse are a private establishment and were not considered public accommodations. Plaintiffs were entitled to damages for their FHA claims only. The Court ultimately found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages, $285,000 in punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation. | Case |
| Sentencia C-041, 2017 | Sentencia C-041, 2017 | Sentencia C-041 is one of the most important court decisions on bullfighting. On this occasion, the court held unconstitutional Article 5 of Ley 1774 of 2016 that referred to the Article 7 of the Statute of Animal Protection. Article 7 contains the seven activities that involve animals for entertainment that are exempted from the duty of animal protection. The practices permitted correspond to rejoneo, coleo, bullfighting, novilladas, corralejas, becerradas and tientas (all variations of bullfighting), cockfighting and all the related practices. Even though the court held that the legislature had fallen into a lack of constitutional protection towards animals, and stated that bullfighting was cruel and inhumane, it deferred the effects of its sentence and gave Congress a two-year period to decide whether bullfighting and the other exception established in Article 7 of the Statute of Animal Protection will continue to be legally allowed. If after this period, the Congress has not legislated on the matter, decision C-041, 2017 will take full effect and bullfighting along with all the practices established in Article 7 will be considered illegal. | Case | |
| UK - Welfare - Protection of Animals (Anaesthetics) Act 1954 | 1954 c. 46 |
For historical purposes only. Law has been repealed and/or replaced. An Act to extend the provisions of the Protection of Animals Acts in relation to the performance of operations on animals. The statute provides a list of operations that may only be performed with the use of anaesthetic. |
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| ID - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | I.C. § 25-3501 - 3521; I.C. § 18-6602 | ID ST § 25-3501 - 3521; § 18-6602 | These Idaho statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. Every person who is cruel to any animal and whoever having the charge or custody of any animal subjects any animal to cruelty is guilty of a misdemeanor. "Animal" means any vertebrate member of the animal kingdom, except humans. "Cruelty" is defined as the intentional and malicious infliction of pain, physical suffering, injury or death upon an animal as well as the negligent deprivation of necessary sustenance, among other things. Dogfighting and cockfighting exhibitions are also prohibited, but the rearing of gamecocks regardless of their later intended use is not prohibited. | Statute |
| South America |
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| People v. Larson | 885 N.E.2d 363 (Ill.App. 2008) | 379 Ill.App.3d 642 (Ill.App. 2008) | In December 2005, defendant Alan J. Larson was found guilty of possession of a firearm without a firearm owner's identification card and committing aggravated cruelty to an animal when he shot and killed the Larsons’ family dog Sinai in October 2004. Evidence included conflicting testimony among family members as to the disposition of the dog and whether he had a history of biting people, and a veterinarian who concluded that a gunshot to the brain was a conditionally acceptable method of euthanasia. Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the aggravated-cruelty-to-an-animal statute was unconstitutionally vague because it fails to address how an owner could legally euthanize their own animal. The appellate court rejected this argument and affirmed defendant’s conviction. | Case |
| AU - Cruelty - Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) | Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 | The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (POCTAA) is the primary piece of legislation that aims to protect animals from cruelty in New South Wales, Australia. POCTAA establishes certain acts or omissions as offences and also provides defences to a charge under the Act in certain circumstances. POCTAA prohibits cruelty and aggravated cruelty generally, as well as a number of other types of activities, including neglect, confinement, abandonment, failure to act in certain circumstances, some transport-related activities, inappropriate use, mutilation, poisoning, torture, fighting and baiting, certain hunting and trapping related activities, selling severely injured animals and failing to take action where an animal is injured by a vehicle. | Statute | |
| US - Grazing - Taylor Grazing Act | 43 USC 315 - 315r | Statute empowers Secretary of the Interior to establish and oversee grazing districts on federal land via a system of permits. | Statute | |
| VOLPE VITO, INC. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE | 58 Agric. Dec. 85 (1999) | 1999 WL 33314002 (U.S.D.A.) | Judicial officer is not required to accept ALJ's findings of fact, even when those findings are based on credibility determinations, and judicial officer is authorized to substitute his or her judgment for that of ALJ. | Case |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency | 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005) | 2005 WL 2001100 (9th Cir.), 60 ERC 2025, 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,172, 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7480, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,216 |
Several public interest groups brought actions challenging Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to transfer Clean Water Act (CWA) pollution permitting program for Arizona to that State. Under federal law, a state may take over the Clean Water Act pollution permitting program in its state from the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) if it applies to do so and meets the applicable standards. When deciding whether to transfer permitting authority, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued, and the EPA relied on, a Biological Opinion premised on the proposition that the EPA lacked the authority to take into account the impact of that decision on endangered species and their habitat. The plaintiffs in this case challenge the EPA's transfer decision, particularly its reliance on the Biological Opinion's proposition regarding the EPA's limited authority. The court held that the EPA did have the authority to consider jeopardy to listed species in making the transfer decision, and erred in determining otherwise. For that reason among others, the EPA's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and remanded to the EPA. |
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