Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FL - Palm Beach County - Chapter 4: Animals (§ 4-24: Animal Care) | Code of Laws and Ordinances Relating to Palm Beach County Government § 4-24 |
This Palm Beach County, Florida ordinance prohibits the act of humane slaughter, as defined by §§ F.S.A. 828.22 and/or 828.23, within earshot or view of the public. A violation of this provision constitutes a civil infraction and is punishable by a fine not to exceed $500. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| South America |
|
Basic page | |||
| People v. Larson | 885 N.E.2d 363 (Ill.App. 2008) | 379 Ill.App.3d 642 (Ill.App. 2008) | In December 2005, defendant Alan J. Larson was found guilty of possession of a firearm without a firearm owner's identification card and committing aggravated cruelty to an animal when he shot and killed the Larsons’ family dog Sinai in October 2004. Evidence included conflicting testimony among family members as to the disposition of the dog and whether he had a history of biting people, and a veterinarian who concluded that a gunshot to the brain was a conditionally acceptable method of euthanasia. Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the aggravated-cruelty-to-an-animal statute was unconstitutionally vague because it fails to address how an owner could legally euthanize their own animal. The appellate court rejected this argument and affirmed defendant’s conviction. | Case | |
| Wales - Fur, mink - The Mink Keeping (Prohibition) (Wales) Order 2012 | 2012 No. (W. ) | An Order imposing an absolute prohibition upon the keeping of mink in Wales. | Statute | ||
| NJ - Disaster - App. A:9-43.15. Emergency evacuation; boarding of public transportation or public transportation service with domestic companion animal | N.J.S.A. App. A:9-43.15 | NJ ST App. A:9-43.15 | This New Jersey law states that in the event that a state of emergency has been declared and an evacuation of any region of the State is in progress, the owner of a domestic companion animal shall be permitted to board any public transportation or public transportation service with the domestic companion animal so long as that animal is under the owner's control by use of a leash or tether, or is properly confined in an appropriate container or by other suitable means, provided that such boarding is authorized by and consistent with the provisions of the State Emergency Operations Plan. Additionally, all passengers with service animals shall be given priority seating on all means of transportation. | Statute | |
| Nelson v. Lewis | 344 N.E.2d 268 (Ill.App. 1976) | 36 Ill.App.3d 130 (1976) |
Toddler accidentally stepped on the tail of the owner's dog, and the dog responded by scratching her eye, causing permanent damage to the tear duct. The toddler sought damages under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, para. 366 (1973), arguing that her unintentional act did not constitute provocation. The court held that provocation under the statute referred to both intentional or unintentional acts. Because the dog was provoked by the unintentional act, he did not react viciously. |
Case | |
| PA - Furtaking - Subchapter D. Furtaking Regulations | 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2361 - 2364 | PA ST 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2361 - 2364 | These Pennsylvania statutes make it unlawful to take, kill, wound, capture or possess any furbearers except during open season and without a permit. It is also illegal to set traps closer than five feet from a den, use a pole trap, deadfall, poison, explosive, chemical, leg-hold trap with teeth on the jaws, to smoke out or dig out any den, to set or place a cage or box trap in the water, or use any trap unless tended every 36 hours and all animals are released or removed. A violation relating to bobcat or otter is a summary offense of the fourth degree; other violations are a summary offense of the fifth degree. | Statute | |
| Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Engineers | 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir., 2005) | 2005 WL 525269 (9th Cir.) |
An environmental group brought an action against the U.S. Army Corps Engineers and BP for violating both the National Environmental Policy Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Defendants counter-claimed that the environmental group lacked standing and that the claim was barred by laches. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment, reversed summary judgment against the environmental group, and remanded the case for consideration of the environmental group's request for injunctive relief. |
Case | |
| US - Eagles - § 83.7 Mandatory criteria for Federal acknowledgment. | 67 FR 44347 |
[Regulation removed 2010. Summary of former text provided.] This provision describes the mandatory criteria for establishing the existence of an American Indian tribe for purposes of recognition by the federal government. These criteria implicate federal status for purposes of acquiring eagle parts for use in Indian religious ceremonies under the BGEPA. |
Administrative | ||
| U.S. v. Apollo Energies, Inc. | 611 F.3d 679 (C.A.10 (Kan.), 2010) | 2010 WL 2600502 (C.A.10 (Kan.)) |
Appellants, Apollo Energies, Inc. and Dale Walker, were charged with violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act after an agent with the USFWS discovered dead migratory birds lodged in each appellant's "heater-treater," a piece of equipment used in the course of appellants' Kansas oil drilling businesses, on several occasions. At trial, both Apollo and Walker were convicted of misdemeanor violations for "taking" or "possessing" migratory birds. On appeal, Apollo and Walker contested that (1) the MBTA is not a strict liability crime or, (2) if it is a strict liability crime, the MBTA is unconstitutional as applied to their conduct. Bound by a previous holding that found misdemeanor violations of the MBTA are strict liability crimes, the court concluded that the MBTA includes no mens rea requirement. As to Appellants' second contention challenging the constitutionality of the Act, the court concluded that while the Act is not unconstitutionally vague, "the MBTA requires a defendant to proximately cause the statute's violation for the statute to pass constitutional muster. |
Case |