Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NH - Exotic Pets - Chapter 466-A. Wolf Hybrids | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 466-A:1 to 466-A:6 | NH ST § 466-A:1 to 466-A:6 | This section of laws comprises New Hampshire's wolf-dog hybrid act. Under the law, no person shall sell or resell, offer for sale or resale, or release or cause to be released a wolf hybrid in the state of New Hampshire. A person may temporarily import a wolf hybrid provided that he or she shows proof of spaying or neutering and has accurate vaccination records. Each wolf hybrid shall be under the physical control of the owner or confined in an enclosure or structure sufficient to prohibit escape. Any person in violation of this chapter or any rule adopted under this chapter shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| Carl v. Resnick | 714 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1999) |
In this Illinois case, plaintiff Judy Carl was riding her horse on a trail in the Cook County Forest Preserve when the horse upon which defendant was riding pinned its ears back, turned its body toward plaintiff's horse, and kicked plaintiff and her horse. One hoof struck plaintiff's leg, causing her injury. In interpreting the state's Equine Act, the court observed that plaintiff's complaint against defendant was not barred by the Equine Act unless plaintiff's recreational riding of her own horse on a public trail was one of the limited activities sought to be encouraged by the Act. After determining that there was no conflict between the Illinois EALA and Animal Control Act, the court reversed the trial court's order denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and entered summary judgment for plaintiff on Count I as to liability under the Animal Control Act (510 ILCS 5/16 (West 1995)).
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Case | ||
| State v. Kingsbury | 29 S.W.3d 202 (Texas 2004) | 2004 WL 308153 (Texas) |
A cruelty to animals case. The State alleged that the appellees tortured four dogs by leaving them without food and water, resulting in their deaths. Examining section 42.09 of the Texas Penal Code, Cruelty to Animals, the Court found that “torture” did not include failure to provide necessary food, care, or shelter. The Court held that the criminal act of failing provide food, care and shelter does not constitute the felony offense of torture. |
Case | |
| Peklun v. Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc. | Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 8029840 (S.D. Fla., 2015) | On cross-motions, Defendant Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc.'s (“TDM") and Plaintiffs, (Personal Representatives of the Estate of Sergey Peklun) seek Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs assert that denial of Sergey Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation for his dog Julia "resulted in Peklun's increasingly despondent attitude, ultimately culminating in his decision to end his life." As such, plaintiffs’ claim Defendants are liable under theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the Florida and Federal Fair Housing Acts. This conflict over Julia first emerged in 2011 and lasted until Peklun's death in 2015. In 2011, Peklun first acquired Julia the dog, who he claimed was being trained as a cardiac service dog. While the training as a service dog was never substantiated, the Board did approve the dog as an emotional support animal for Peklun in 2011. The composition of the Board changed in coming years and the issue arose after another tenant, Frank Speciale, demanded the dog's removal due to stated allergies. TDM warned Peklun if he did not remove Julia within the period provided, it would initiate arbitration against him in accord. Julia was never removed and, on July 16, 2013, TDM commenced arbitration against Peklun with the Florida Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes. Speciale also moved for an injunction barring Peklun from keeping Julia on the premises, which was granted on March 11, 2014. During this time, the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners Office of Equal Opportunity organized an extensive investigation into TDM's purported discrimination and found "reasonable grounds to believe that [TDM] discriminated against [Peklun] on the basis of his disability.” Following this, on August 11, 2014, TDM approved Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation as an emotional support animal. Despite this, Speciale continued to seek Julia's eviction, filing a motion in state court, seeking contempt and sanctions. Plaintiffs contended that this behavior reflected "a campaign of harassment." As to TDM instant motion for summary judgment, it claims the decision was reasonable because Peklun failed to provide TDM with the requested information necessary to verify his disability and that Julia was not a trained service animal. Also, TDM asserts Peklun was not a “qualified individual” under the FHA. The District Court found that while Peklun's various cardiac and organ problems did not constitute a "handicap" under the FHA, the submissions of Peklun's treating physicians are sufficient to establish that Peklun's sleep apnea interfered with a major life activity. As a result, there was sufficient evidence that Peklun was handicapped within the meaning of the FHA. Further, the absence of any certification or training did not permit TDM to immediately deny the request for Peklun's assistance animal. In fact, the court observed that Peklun was previously granted an accommodation for Julia on the basis that she was an “emotional support animal” in 2011; that knowledge of the 2011 accommodation was imputed to TDM's current board. The court did note that Section 3604(9) states there is no obligation to honor a request that would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other tenants. However, the court noted that determining this threat is a question of fact, not a question of law. The issue of Speciale's allergies "is contentious and the Court declines to grant judgment based on a hotly debated factual dispute." As a result, the cross motions for summary judgment by each party were denied. | Case | ||
| US - AWA - Licensing and Inspection Requirements for Dealers of Dogs Intended for Hunting, Breeding, or Security Purposes | 2003 WL 1092620 (F.R.) | Docket No. 99-087-3 |
The update of the Definition of Dealer, in Section 1.1 of the Regulation is made to reflect the policy that only wholesale dealers of dogs intended for hunting, security purposes, and breeding, and not dealers of retail services, will be controlled by the regulation. Thus, there is only a minor change to the definition of dealer, in that it now explicitly excludes any retail outlets where dogs are sold for hunting, breeding or security purposes. |
Administrative | |
| OK - Wildlife - Part 6. Transportation of Wildlife | 29 Okl.St.Ann. § 7-601 - 602 | Under these Oklahoma statutes, no common carrier may transport any wildlife or endangered or rare species, with exceptions. A violation could result in a fine of $25 to $100. In addition, no person may transport into or out of Oklahoma any wildlife or parts thereof, nests of wildlife, their eggs or their young, or any endangered or threatened species, with exceptions. A violation could result in a fine of $50 to $200, and/or imprisonment of 10 to 60 days. | Statute | ||
| MN - Exhibition - Chapter 97A. Game and Fish. General Provisions. | M. S. A. § 97A.041 | MN ST § 97A.041 | In Minnesota, a person may not possess wildlife in captivity for public exhibition purposes without a permit. The commissioner may issue a permit to an applicant qualified by education or experience in the care and treatment of wildlife. A permit shall include a condition that allows an enforcement officer to enter and inspect the facilities where the wildlife covered by the permit are held in captivity. A violation may result in the attorney general bringing an abatement action. | Statute | |
| State v. Allison | State v. Allison, 90 N.C. 733 (1884). |
The defendant was indicted at spring term, 1883, for a violation of the act of assembly in reference to cruelty to animals. The indictment is substantially as follows: The jurors, &c., present that the defendant, with force and arms, &c., "did unlawfully and wilfully overdrive, torture, torment, cruelly beat and needlessly mutilate a certain cow, the property of, &c., by beating said cow and twisting off her tail," contrary, &c. The jury found the defendant guilty, and on his motion the judgment was arrested and the state appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's descision to arrest the judgment. |
Case | ||
| Columbus v. Kim | 886 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio, 2008) | 2008 WL 1844359 (Ohio), 118 Ohio St.3d 93 |
An Ohio dog owner was convicted in the Municipal Court, Franklin County, of harboring an unreasonably loud or disturbing animal as prohibited by city ordinance. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the owner contended that the term “unreasonable” in the ordinance “does not provide enough explanation to allow the average person to know what behavior is permissible.” The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague on its face, and was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. |
Case | |
| ME - Wildlife possession - Chapter 6. Educational & Scientific Collection Permit Rule | Code Me. R. 09-137 Ch. 6, § 6.01 - 13 | ME ADC 09-137 Ch. 6, § 6.01 - 13 | This section establishes the rules in Maine for educational and scientific collection permits. A scientific collection permit is required by any person who wishes to take, transport or possess wild birds or animals and their parts or products for scientific research or educational purposes at any time of the year; and/or before any person may lawfully salvage, otherwise acquire, transport or possess wild birds and animals for any purpose not specifically covered under any other permit or license. | Administrative |