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Displaying 6111 - 6120 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Wolf - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removing the Western Distinct Population Segment of Gray Wolf From th | 2003 WL 1697399 (F.R.) | RIN 1018-AJ04 |
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service or we) announces our intention to conduct rulemaking under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (Act), to remove the Western Distinct Population Segment (DPS) of gray wolf (Canis lupus) from the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife in the near future. Specifically, we intend to propose to delist the gray wolf in the Northern Rocky Mountains and western United States where it is presently listed. If this proposal is finalized, the gray wolf would be delisted in the Western Gray Wolf DPS, existing special regulations established under section 4(d) of the Act for the Western DPS would be abolished, the nonessential experimental designations for reintroduced gray wolves would be removed, and future management of this species would be conducted by the appropriate State and tribal wildlife agencies. |
Administrative | |
| AZ - Ordinances - Lawful presence on private property defined (dogs) | A. R. S. § 11-1026 | AZ ST § 11-1026 | This Arizona statute provides that a person is lawfully on a dog owner's property when he or she is there as an invitee or guest, or when in the performance of a duty imposed upon him by law of the state or United States, or by ordinances of a municipality in which such property is located. | Statute | |
| Maryland General Laws Supplement 1890-1898: Cruelty to Animals | 1890 Md. Laws 142,198,340 | The Maryland General Laws supplement covers the additions to the Cruelty of Animals statutes for Maryland from 1890-1898. The amendments cover court procedure to implementation of specific laws for certain animals. | Statute | ||
| CT- Pet Shops - Sec. 22-344-21a. Prohibited sales | CT ADC § 22-344-32 - 94 | Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 22-344-32 - § 22-344-94 | This Connecticut regulation lists the animals of which the exhibition, sale or offer for sale by a pet shop is prohibited. The condition in which commercial kennel facilities, pet shops, grooming facilities, training facilities, and animal shelters must be kept are described including sanitation, health requirements, ventilation, and other structural requirements. | Administrative | |
| Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior | 397 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) | This case centers on the Trump Administration's new interpretation of incidental takings under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA). In December 2017, the Principal Deputy Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) issued a memorandum that countered almost 50 years of the agency’s interpretation of “takings” and “killings” under the MBTA (the "Jorjani Opinion"). According to the DOI in that opinion, the MBTA does not prohibit incidental takes or kills because the statute applies only to activities specifically aimed at birds. Environmental interest groups and various states brought three now-consolidated actions to vacate the memorandum and subsequent guidance issued in reliance on the memorandum. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In essence, the question before the court is whether DOI’s interpretation of the MBTA must be set aside as contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or upheld as a valid exercise of agency authority. The court first observed that, from the early 1970s until 2017, the DOI interpreted the MBTA to prohibit incidental takes and kills, imposing liability for activities and hazards that led to the deaths of protected birds, irrespective of whether the activities targeted birds or were intended to take or kill birds. To conserve migratory birds and ensure compliance with the MBTA’s prohibition on “incidental take,” the DOI's Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) used a range of strategies: sending companies notice of the risks their facilities and equipment posed to migratory birds; issuing industry guidance; informally negotiating remediation efforts; and issuing permits authorizing takes. In fact, the court noted that the agency prioritized a cooperative approach with industry over enforcement actions. In 2015, the DOI formalized this approach by undergoing a rulemaking process regulating incidental take. In early 2017, the DOI's Solicitor then issued a memorandum that reaffirmed the long-standing interpretation that the MBTA prohibited incidental take that became known as the "Tomkins Opinion." Once presidential administrations changed and Tomkins departed, the new Principal Deputy Solicitor issued a new memorandum that stated any agency comments, recommendations, or actions not be based on the principle that the MBTA prohibited incidental take (the Jorjani Opinion). This triggered the instant lawsuits by conservation organizations and several states. On July 31, 2019, the lower court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated standing and denied the DOI's motion to dismiss. On appeal here, this court first noted that both parties agree with longstanding precedent that the MBTA's misdemeanor provision creates strict liability. In contrast, the Jorjani Opinion contends that the criminal penalty provisions under the MBTA is limited to only acts directed at birds and those activities whose purpose is to "render an animal subject to human control" like hunting or capturing. In reviewing the Jorjani Opinion under the lessened deference standard afforded by administrative law, this court found the DOI overstated the any conflicts in interpretation of the MBTA among circuit courts (a "dramatized representation"). In addition, the court found the Jorjani Opinion "is a recent and sudden departure from long-held agency positions backed by over forty years of consistent enforcement practices." The court found the Jorjani Opinion was an unpersuasive interpretation of the MBTA's unambiguous prohibition on the killing of birds and is contrary to the plain language of the law itself. Such an interpretation runs contrary to legislative history, decades of enforcement practices by the DOI, and caselaw. Because the agency's action was held unlawful under the APA, the court found the only appropriate remedy was vacatur. Thus, Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment were granted, and Interior’s motion was denied. | Case | ||
| Washington v. Olatoye | 173 A.D.3d 467, 103 N.Y.S.3d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) | 2019 WL 2425735 (N.Y. App. Div. June 11, 2019) | This New York case involves an appeal by a public housing tenant after his petition to declare his dog an assistance animal was denied and he was placed on probation with instructions to his dog from the premises. The denial stems from an incident where Petitioner's English Bulldog "Onyx" allegedly bit a NYCHA employee when the employee was delivering a hotplate to petitioner's apartment when petitioner was not home. After the incident, NYCHA notified petitioner that it would seek to terminate his tenancy for non-desirability and breach of its rules and regulations. Petitioner suffered from mental illness as well as a traumatic brain injury and was in the process of trying to register Onyx as an assistance animal, which was validated by a letter from the psychiatric support center where he received services. At a hearing, the NYCHA hearing officer sustained the charges against petitioner, required him to remove the dog from his apartment immediately and placed him on probation for one year. It did not address petitioner's request for an assistance animal as a reasonable accommodation and ignored the mental health records submitted into evidence. On appeal, this court first noted that housing providers are required to allow a person who proves their burden of showing that an animal assists them with aspects of their disability to keep an assistance animal. Here, the hearing officer engaged in no such analysis and relied on the "direct threat" exemption to the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Because there was no initial record that addressed petitioner's reasonable accommodation request, the appellate court was left with an insufficient record that precluded adequate review. Thus, the petition was held in abeyance and this court remanded the proceeding to NYCHA for a determination, on the existing record, in accordance with this decision. | Case | |
| Coyote v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service | (no F.Supp. citation) 1994 E.D. California |
Defendant brought a motion after the USFWS denied his application to obtain eagle feathers for religious use where defendant failed to obtain certification from the Bureau of Indian Affairs that he was a member of a federally-recognized tribe. The court held that this requirement is both contrary to the plain reading of that regulation and arbitrary and capricious. For discussion on formerly recognized tribes and the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion. |
Case | ||
| Great Ape Laws by State |
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| South Africa - Biological Diversity - Regulations | These South African regulations were made relating to listed threatened and protected species of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004. The purpose of these regulations is to further regulate the permit system set out in Chapter 7 of the Biodiversity Act insofar as that system applies to restricted activities involving specimens of listed threatened or protected species; to provide for the registration of captive breeding operations, commercial exhibition facilities, game farms, nurseries, scientific institutions, sanctuaries and rehabilitation facilities and wildlife traders; to provide for the regulation of the carrying out of a specific restricted activity, namely hunting; to provide for the prohibition of specific restricted activities involving specific listed threatened or protected species; to provide for the protection of wild populations of listed threatened species; and to provide for the composition and operating procedure of the Scientific Authority. | Statute | |||
| Sweden - Cruelty - The Sweden Animal Welfare Act | SFS 1998:56 |
The Swedish Animal Welfare Act applies to the care and treatment of domestic animals, and other animals if they are kept in captivity or are used for any of the purposes referred to in section 19 (generally, scientific uses). It provides that animals shall be treated well and shall be protected from unnecessary suffering and disease, among other things. |
Statute |