Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AK - Veterinary - Chapter 98. Veterinarians. | AS § 08.98.010 to 250 | AK ST § 08.98.010 to 250 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| Sarah, Keeli, Ivy, Sheba, Darrell, Harper, Emma, Rain, Ulysses, Henry Melvyn Richardson, Stephany Harris, and Klaree Boose, plai | In this case, plaintiffs are non-human primates and humans interested in their welfare. The primates were formerly part of a research program run at Ohio State University for cognition research (the OSU Chimpanzee Cognition Center). After funding ran out, OSU sold the chimpanzees to Primarily Primates Inc. (“PPI”), who held themselves out to be non-profit that acts a sanctuary for retiring animals. However, plaintiffs allege that the conditions in which the chimpanzees were housed were inadequate and proper care was not provided to the primates (several of the animals died in transit and at the facility). Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract or, in the alternative, a declaratory judgment that would transfer the animals to a new sanctuary because defendants’ actions are unlawful under Texas laws. Plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order that would allow a team of independent caretakers and veterinarians to assess the current conditions at PPI and prevent them from accepting any new primates, among other things. | Pleading | ||
| U.S. v. Lewis | 240 F.3d 866 (10th Cir. 2001) | 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 859; 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 600 |
A jury convicted defendant of one count of violating the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-3378. The jury found that defendant had violated Oklahoma law by capturing wild elk, holding them captive, and organizing at least one commercial elk hunt, without a license for those activities. The court affirmed. Violation of a state hunting law was an adequate basis for a Lacey Act prosecution. There was sufficient evidence to prove that the Oklahoma statute regarding commercial hunting licenses applied to defendant, and that defendant had knowledge of the statute's requirements. |
Case |
| Wells v. Brown | 217 P.2d 995 (Cal.App.4.Dist. 1950) | 97 Cal.App.2d 361 (1950) |
In this California case, damages were assessed beyond the purchase price of a dog involved in a hit and run case where the defendant negligently ran over and killed a 15 month old pure-bred Waeimaraner. After the defendant ran over the dog, he shot the dog and buried it. The next morning he contacted the veterinarian listed on the collar, as well as the owner of the dog. The court upheld the jury verdict of $1,500 since the purchase price was determined to not reflect the market value at the time of the dog’s death. |
Case |
| IN - Cow Slaughter - THE HARYANA GAUVANSH SANRAKSHAN AND GAUMSAMVARDHAN ACT, 2015 | 20 of 2015 | The Act, specific to the North Indian state of Haryana, prohibits cow slaughter. A cow may be slaughtered only under certain conditions, and a person slaughtering a cow under these conditions must obtain a certificate from a registered veterinary practitioner. Cows cannot be exported for slaughter. Persons may not sell, store, keep or transport beef or beef products. The Act provides for the creation of a scheme or project for the conservation of indigenous breeds of cow. The Government must establish and maintain institutions to look after infirm, stray and 'uneconomic' cows. An offence under this Act carried with it imprisonment and fines. | Statute | |
| RI - Domestic Violence - § 15-15-3. Protective orders--Penalty--Jurisdiction | Gen.Laws 1956, § 15-15-3 | RI ST § 15-15-3 | In 2019, Rhode Island added language to its law on protection orders in domestic abuse circumstances that protects household pets. Upon petition, a judge may order that a defendant vacate the household immediately, and "further provid[e] in the order for the safety and welfare of all household animals and pets." | Statute |
| IA - Domestic Violence - Chapter 236. Domestic Abuse | I.C.A. §§ 236.3, 236.4, 236.5 | IA ST §§ 236.3, 236.4, 236.5 | Iowa now allows the court to grant petitioners exclusive care, possession, or control of any pets or companion animals in both temporary and permanent orders. The animals can belong to the petitioner, the abuser, or a minor child of the petitioner or the abuser. The court can also order the abuser to stay away from the animals and not take, hide, bother, attack, threaten, or otherwise get rid of the pet or companion animal. | Statute |
| Canada - B.C. - B.C. Statutes - Vancouver Charter. Part XIV -- Nuisances | S.B.C. 1953, c. 55, s. 323 - 324(A)3 | These British Columbia, Canada laws provide the laws for preventing, abating, and prohibiting nuisances, which include dangerous dogs. The laws describe what constitutes a dangerous dog and what actions may be taken with a dangerous dog. The set also contains provisions that allow for the creation of by-laws to control and impound animals. | Statute | |
| NH - Portsmouth - Chapter 4: Food Licensing and Regulations | City of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Code of Ordinances §§ 4.101 - 4.507 |
These Portsmouth, New Hampshire ordinances provide licensing, inspection, and penalty provisions for milk, slaughterhouses, butchers and restaurants. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Reams v. Irvin | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 906005 (N.D.Ga.) | 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25350 |
The plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C 1983 action against police officers she claimed violated her civil rights under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when they impounded 46 of her horses on suspicion of animal abuse. Upon a summary judgement motion by the defendants, the court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims. Responding to the Fourth Amendment claim in particular, the court held that an old dairy barn, which was being used to hide dead horses, was neither within the curtilage of the home nor protected by the Fourth Amendment. After applying the Dunn factors, the court determined that the barns distance of 150 yards from the dwelling on the farm, its use for the commercial production of dairy products, its lacks of enclosure, and its missing doors all militated against it being part of the curtilage of the home and it did not enjoy Fourth Amendment privacy protection. |
Case |