Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Horse slaughter - § 597o. Humane transportation of equine to slaughter; vehicle requirements; | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597o | CA PENAL § 597o | This statute outlines the requirements for transporting equine to slaughter, including, but limited to, proper ventilation, sufficient space for equine to stand, and the use of ramps and floors with nonskid surfaces. | Statute |
| Hurd v. State | 988 A.2d 1143 (Md. App., 2010) | 2010 WL 366582 (Md.App.), 190 Md.App. 479 (2010) |
In this Maryland case, Defendant appealed his convictions for two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals and two counts of malicious destruction of property valued under $500 relating to the fatal shooting of two of his neighbor's (Randolph's) dogs. On appeal, Defendant maintains the language of the former text of 10-416(b)(3), a section of the Natural Resources Code dealing with deer hunting, renders the shooting justifiable. The Court found that Section 10-416(b)(3) is ambiguous; as such, based on the rule of lenity, the Court construed section 10-416(b)(3), with one exception, as giving persons in Washington County (prior to the 2009 amendment) a right to kill a dog pursing a deer whether or not the dog was being used for purposes of deer hunting. However, the Court found that Section 10-416 of the Natural Resources Article gave Defendant no privilege to kill a dog pursuing a turkey. |
Case |
| VOLPE VITO, INC. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE | 58 Agric. Dec. 85 (1999) | 1999 WL 33314002 (U.S.D.A.) | Judicial officer is not required to accept ALJ's findings of fact, even when those findings are based on credibility determinations, and judicial officer is authorized to substitute his or her judgment for that of ALJ. | Case |
| Ecuador - Environmental - Organic Procedural Code | Ley 0 Registro Oficial Suplemento 506 de 22-may, 2015 | Ecuador's COGEP | This excerpt is from Ecuador's General Procedural. It contains provisions concerning the representation of nature. These provisions state that any person may file a lawsuit claiming damages on behalf of nature. More specifically, under the articles in Chapter II, nature can be legally represented by any person, entity, collectivity, or by the ombudsperson, who may also act on their initiative. Article 30 establishes who can be a plaintiff and a defendant. Nature is within the definition of these parties. | Statute |
| Smith v. State | 491 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App. 2016), petition for discretionary review refused (Aug. 24, 2016) | 2016 WL 1444143, 14-15-00037-CR, 2016 WL 1444143, (Tex. App.--Hous. [14th Dist.] Apr. 12, 2016) | Defendant Jonas Smith was convicted of aggravated assault and appealed. He argued that the trial court (1) erred by denying his motion to suppress his warrantless arrest; (2) abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial after the Plaintiff referenced the Defendant’s previous incarceration; and (3) abused its discretion by allowing a child witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog. The Court of Appeal of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.)., held that: 1. The police officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed an act of family violence, which justified his warrantless arrest; 2. any prejudice resulting from the Plaintiff’s reference to Defendant's prior incarceration was cured by prompt jury instruction to disregard reference; 3. allowing the child witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog was not likely to prejudice the jury in evaluating the child's testimony; and 4.any error in allowing the witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog was harmless. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant did not present any argument during the trial about the jury being prejudiced by the presence of the service dog. Therefore, there was nothing present for review at the appellate level. Also, the Defendant did not identify any harm from the use of a service dog. The Defendant’s conviction was affirmed. | Case |
| US - AWA - 2008 Public Law 110-246 | 2008 PL 110-246 | 122 Stat 1651 | The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 amends the Animal Welfare Act by strengthening penalties related to animal fighting, including an increase in imprisonment. The 2008 bill also contained language prohibiting imports for resale of dogs unless they are at least six months of age, in good health, and have all necessary vaccinations, with some exemptions defined. Finally, fines for violations of the Animal Welfare Act increased from $2500 to $10,000 per violation, per animal, per day. | Statute |
| US - Importation - CHAPTER 3. ANIMALS, BIRDS, FISH, AND PLANTS | 18 USCS § 42 | Under this federal law, no importation of certain listed animals is permitted. Whoever violates this section, or any regulation issued pursuant thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. | Statute | |
| AL - Wildlife - § 9-2-13. Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources -- Authority to prohibit importation of birds, anim | Ala. Code 1975 § 9-2-13 | AL ST § 9-2-13 | This Alabama law provides that the Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources may, by regulation, prohibit the importation of any animal when such importation is not in the best interest of the state. However, this does not apply to those animals used for display purposes at circuses, carnivals, zoos, and other shows or exhibits. Importing a prohibited animal into the state is a Class C misdemeanor with a fine of $1,000 - 5,000, or jail for 30 days, or both. | Statute |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Dalton | 97 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (2000) |
Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant government official from lifting the embargo against tuna from Mexico's vessels in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Plaintiffs alleged irreparable injury if three stocks of dolphins became extinct. The court found plaintiffs failed to produce evidence showing irreparable injury. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Lewis | 349 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) | 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9802 |
Defendant was convicted of a number of offenses related to his role in a wildlife smuggling operation. If trial did not begin within the requisite time period and defendant moved for dismissal prior to trial, the court had to dismiss the indictment, either with or without prejudice. The court held that the circumstances in the case, where it was clear that the delay in the trial caused the delay in the hearing, rather than the other way around, and where defendant repeatedly asked the court to set the case for trial and was otherwise ready to proceed to trial, plaintiff United States' pending pretrial motion could not serve as a basis for exclusion for a 117 day period. Because the delay violated the Speedy Trial Act, defendant's convictions had to be reversed, his sentences vacated, and his indictments dismissed. |
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