Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Christian v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc. | 54 A.D.3d 707 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2008) | 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 06790, 2008 WL 4170162 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) |
This New York case consists of an action to recover damages for personal injuries. The plaintiffs appeal the granting of the motion of the defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him and the cross motion of the defendants Petco. The infant plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when she was bitten by a dog owned by the defendant Kenneth Coughlin at a Petco store. The court held that the evidence submitted established that the defendants were not aware that this dog had ever bitten anyone or exhibited any aggressive behavior. |
Case | |
| Kindel v. Tennis | 949 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill.App. 5 Dist., 2011) | 2011 WL 2083981 (Ill.App. 5 Dist.); 409 Ill.App.3d 1138 |
Plaintiff was an employee of a dairy farm owned by defendants. In 2007, he was injured by a bull owned and controlled by defendants while working on the defendants' farm . The Appellate Court disagreed with the lower court, finding that the employee's allegations were sufficient to support a claim against the farm owners under the Animal Control Act. The court found it was a question of fact whether it was plaintiff's job to care for the bull, and whether that animal was in the care and/or custody of plaintiff at the time of the injury. |
Case | |
| MI - Hunting, Internet - 750.236a. Engaging in, providing or operating facilities for, or providing or offering to provide equipment | M. C. L. A. 750.236a, 236b, 236c | MI ST 750.236a, 236b, 236c | A person in Michigan is not allowed to: (1) engage in computer-assisted shooting; provide or operate, with or without remuneration, facilities for computer-assisted shooting; or (3) provide or offer to provide, with or without remuneration, equipment specially adapted for computer-assisted shooting. Violation is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both. | Statute | |
| IN RE: LANCELOT KOLLMAN RAMOS | 2015 WL 6561874 (U.S.D.A., 2015) | Respondent Lancelot Kollman Ramos has worked as a circus performer and animal trainer his entire life. Ramos acquired Ned the elephant from William Woodcock, who was retiring from the circus. Ramos was aware of rumors that something was wrong with Ned, and he was aware that the animal was thin, but he did not know that it had any health problems. Despite the animal's emaciated condition, Ramos exhibited him in a circus. An Administrative Law Judge found Ramos willfully violated the Animal Welfare Act. $1,650 in fines were imposed on Ramos for violating a cease and desist order and another $5,000 was imposed on him for wilful failure to handle an animal as carefully as possible. | Case | ||
| US - Dogs at Large - Part 2. Resource Protection, Public Use and Recreation. § 2.15 Pets. | 36 C.F.R. § 2.15 | This rule outlines the prohibitions for pets in designated Park Service areas. Pets or feral animals that are running-at-large and observed by an authorized person in the act of killing, injuring or molesting humans, livestock, or wildlife may be destroyed if necessary for public safety or protection of wildlife, livestock, or other park resources. Pets that do not pose a direct risk to wildlife may be impounded. | Administrative | ||
| IL - Domestic Violence - Article 112A. Domestic Violence | 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 | IL ST CH 725 § 5/112A-14 | This Illinois law allows a court to issue an order of protection if the court finds that petitioner has been abused by a family or household member. It also allows for the protection of animals in domestic violence situations. Under Section (b)(11.5), the court can "[g]rant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either the petitioner or the respondent and order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal." | Statute | |
| Wilson v. City of Eagan | 297 N.W.2d 146 (Minn., 1980) |
At issue is an Eagan, Minnesota ordinance that provides an impounded animal must be held for five days before being destroyed. In direct contravention of the ordinance and statute, Eagan animal warden Cary Larson and police officer Robert O'Brien, in performance of their duties, intentionally killed Timothy Wilson's pet cat on the same day it was properly impounded. By first finding that punitive damages were not precluded by statute against municipal employees, the court then examined whether punitive damages were appropriate in this case. While the court did not find that Larson acted with malice, it did find that his conduct in violating the statute showed a willful disregard for property rights. |
Case | ||
| Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc. | 844 F.Supp. (151 S.D.N.Y., 1994) |
Plaintiff sued American Airlines for emotional distress damages, inter alia , after his dog suffered a fatal heatstroke while being transported in the cargo hold of defendant's airliner (the temperature reached 140 degrees Fahrenheit in violation of the airline's cargo hold guidelines). Plaintiff relied on the state case of Brousseau v. Rosenthal and Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hosp., Inc in support of his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The court observed that none of the decisions cited by plaintiff, including Corso, recognize an independent cause of action for loss of companionship, but rather, they provide a means for assessing the "intrinsic" value of the lost pet when the market value cannot be determined. As a result, the court rejected plaintiff's claim for loss of companionship as well as pain and suffering without any prior authority that established the validity of such claims. |
Case | ||
| Commonwealth v. Waller | 58 N.E.3d 1070 (Mass. App. Ct., 2016), review denied, 476 Mass. 1102, 63 N.E.3d 387 (2016) | 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 2016 WL 4993441 (Mass. App. Ct., 2016) | Tasha Waller was convicted of animal cruelty for starving her dog to death. As a result of this conviction, Waller was placed on probation which prohibited her from owning animals and allowed for random searches of her property. Waller appealed this decision for the following reasons: (1) the animal cruelty statute under which she was convicted was unconstitutionally vague; (2) the expert witness testimony was improper and insufficient to support her conviction; (3) she may not as a condition of her probation be prohibited from owning animals, and the condition of probation allowing suspicions searches should be modified. The court reviewed Waller’s arguments and determined the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because it is common for animal cruelty statutes to only refer to “animals” in general and not specifically mention dogs. The court noted that dogs are commonly understood to fall within the category of animals and therefore the statute was not vague. Also, the court held that the expert witness testimony from the veterinarian was not improper because the veterinarian was capable of examining the dog and making a determination as to how the dog had died. Lastly, the court held that it was not improper to prohibit Waller from owning animals, but did agree that the searches of her property should only be warranted if authorities have reasonable suspicion to search the property. Ultimately, the court upheld Waller’s conviction and probation but modified the terms in which authorities are able to search her property. | Case | |
| Friends of Animals v. Jewell | 115 F. Supp. 3d 107 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 4483956 (D.D.C., 2015) | Friends of Animals (FOA) filed a citizen petition under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to get the Department of Interior to determine whether the spider tortoise and flat-tail tortoise were endangered species. After waiting two years for an answer, FOA filed suit, arguing the Department’s silence had caused the group various injuries. The district court, however, found the supposed harms did not rise to the level of “concrete and particularized” injuries in fact, and granted the Department's motion to dismiss FOA's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. | Case |