Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| In re Marriage of Tevis-Bleich | 939 P.2d 966 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) | 23 Kan.App.2d 982 (1997) | A couple had agreed to a divorce settlement where they each had visitation rights with their dog; the trial court approved of the arrangement. The wife later tried to have that section removed from the decree, but the trial court held that they did not have jurisdiction to make such a change. The appellate court affirmed the decision, which left visitation intact | Case |
| Morawek v. City of Bonney Lake | 184 Wash. App. 487, 337 P.3d 1097 (2014) | 2014 WL 6061489 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2014) | A woman filed a complaint with the Bonney Lake animal control authority after her neighbor’s dog killed her cat. The animal control officer served plaintiff with paperwork stating that his dog satisfied the definition of a dangerous dog under the Bonney Lake Municipal Code because the dog had killed a domestic animal without provocation while off his owner's property. Plaintiff appealed the designation to the police chief, the city hearing examiner, and the superior court; all of which affirmed the designation. The Washington Court of Appeals, however, held that the hearing examiner's finding that the owner's dog killed the neighbor's cat without provocation was not supported by substantial evidence, as required to uphold a dangerous dog designation, even though the “location” element of the dangerous dog designation was satisfied. The dangerous dog designation was therefore reversed. | Case |
| Concerned Dog Owners of California v. City of Los Angeles | 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 774 (Cal.App.2 Dist., 2011) | 194 Cal.App.4th 1219 (2011); 2011 WL 1601919 (Cal.App.2 Dist., 2011) |
Dog owners mounted a constitutional challenge to a Los Angeles municipal ordinance that required all dogs and cats within the city to be sterilized. The Court of Appeal held that the ordinance did not violate the owners’ freedom of association rights, free speech rights. or equal protection rights. The court held that it was not unconstitutionally vague, was not outside of the city's police powers, did not vest unfettered discretion in city officials, did not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint or an unconstitutional taking. Finally, the law did not violate individual liberties under the California Constitution. |
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| Federal Laws | Policy | |||
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne | 607 F.Supp.2d 1078 (D.Ariz.,2009) | 2009 WL 942862 (D.Ariz.) |
Cross motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendants, the Secretary of the Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, alleging that the Secretary’s failure to designate critical habitat and prepare a recovery plan for the jaguar was unlawful under the ESA. The United States District Court, D. Arizona granted Plaintiffs’ motion in part and denied Plaintiffs’ motion in part, finding that Defendants’ determination that designation of a critical habitat would not be prudent must be set aside because it did not appear to be based on the best scientific evidence available as required by the ESA, and that Defendants’ determination not to prepare a recovery plan must also be set aside and remanded for further consideration because the determination was inconsistent with Defendants’ own policy guidance and long-standing practice concerning the distinction between foreign and domestic species. |
Case |
| CA - Slaughter - § 597.3. Live animal markets | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597.3 | CA PENAL § 597.3 | This California statute regulates live animal markets. Operators must ensure that no animal (frogs, turtles, and birds, but not poultry) sold for the purpose of human consumption) is cut, dismembered, butchered, or de-feathered while still alive. Operators must also provide that no animals are confined in such a way that could case injury, starvation, dehydration, or suffocation. Violation may result in a warning for the first offense and an infraction for a second offense. | Statute |
| Canada - Alberta - Alberta Statutes. Animal Protection Act | R.S.A. 2000, c. A-41, s. 1 | This set of laws from Alberta, Canada comprises the Animal Protection Act. The Act states that no person shall permit or cause an animal to be in distress. Specifically, a person who owns or is in charge of an animal must ensure that the animal has adequate food and water, must provide the animal with adequate care when the animal is wounded or ill, and must provide the animal with reasonable protection from injurious heat or cold as well as adequate shelter, ventilation and space. A person who contravenes this Act is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of not more than $20,000 in addition to restrictions on owning animals for a specified period of time. The Act also outlines the power of both peace officers to take animals in distress into their custody and humane societies to provide care for seized animals. | Statute | |
| Hopson v. Kreps | 622 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) |
Action brought on behalf of Alaskan Eskimos which challenged the validity of the Department of Commerce regulations adopted pursuant to IWC Act. Plaintiffs claim is the the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction under the Convention when it eliminated the native subsistence exemption for Alaskan Eskimos. The Court reverses and remands the districts courts dismissal of the action. |
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| State v. Fay | 248 A.3d 1191 (N.H. Dec. 2, 2020) | 173 N.H. 740, 2020 WL 7051326 (N.H. Dec. 2, 2020) | In this New Hampshire case, Christina Fay appeals her convictions on seventeen counts of cruelty to animals. In 2017, a search warrant executed at her residence resulted in the seizure of over 70 Great Danes. Police learned of the conditions at defendant's residence from defendant's prior employees, who gave accounts of floors covered in layers of feces, dogs being fed maggot-infested raw chicken, and dogs present with injuries/illness. After conducting an investigation, the investigating Wolfeboro's police officer (Strauch) partnered with HSUS because the department did not have the resources to handle a large-scale animal law seizure. Strauch did not include in his affidavit supporting the search warrant's issuance that HSUS would be assisting the police, and the warrant itself did not explicitly state that HSUS was permitted to assist in its execution. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress by violating two of her constitutional rights: her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and her right to privacy. As to the right to privacy argument, the court first noted that defendant grounded her argument in a recently enacted amendment to the state constitution. However, this new amendment, which states that an individual's right to live free from governmental intrusion in private or personal information is natural, essential, and inherent, did not apply retroactively to defendant. As to defendant's second argument that she had a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the court noted that it has not previously considered the extent to which it is constitutionally reasonable for the police to involve civilians when executing search warrants. The defendant argues that Strauch's failure to obtain express authorization for HSUS's aid from the magistrate who issued the search warrant was constitutionally unreasonable. The court found no instance in which a court has held that the failure to obtain express judicial authorization for citizen aid prior to the execution of a warrant rendered the subsequent search unconstitutional. While other courts have opined that is might be a "better practice" to disclose this matter when applying to the magistrate for a search warrant, failure to do so does not itself violate the Fourth Amendment. The pertinent inquiry is whether the search was reasonable in its execution, and any citizen involvement would be held to that scrutiny. The court concluded that the state did not violate the constitution by failing to obtain authorization for HSUS's involvement prior to the warrant's execution. Affirmed. | Case |
| Harris v. Barefoot | 704 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. App. 2010) | 2010 WL 3001399 (N.C.App.) , 206 N.C.App. 308 (2010) |
A mail carrier was attacked by two dogs, and sued the dogs’ owners for negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that a dog owner is not liable unless there is evidence that the dog had a vicious propensity and that the owner knew or should have known that the dog was dangerous. |
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