Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Law Index Volume 16, Part 2 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 (Spring 2010)
INTRODUCTIONINCORPORATING ANIMAL LAW INTO PRIVATE PRACTICE
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Policy | ||
| People for Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife | 57 F.Supp.3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014) | Plaintiff People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners (“PETPO”) filed the instant lawsuit against United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Daniel M. Ashe, in his official capacity as Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Noreen Walsh, in her official capacity as Regional Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's Mountain Prairie Region, the United States Department of the Interior, and Sally Jewell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior (collectively “Defendants”), challenging the constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate take of the Utah prairie dog on non-federal land under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Friends of Animals (“FoA”) intervened as a Defendant. The case before the District Court rests on the parties' opposing motions for summary judgment. The District Court found that although the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to do many things, it did not authorize Congress to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. Congress similarly lacked authority through the Necessary and Proper Clause because the regulation of takes of Utah prairie dogs was not essential or necessary to the ESA's economic scheme. Therefore PETPO's Motion for Summary Judgment was GRANTED, with prejudice; Defendants' Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment was DENIED, with prejudice. Held 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g) Unconstitutional | Case | |
| Sebek v. City of Seattle | 290 P.3d 159 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2012) | 2012 WL 6098265 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2012); 172 Wash.App. 273 |
Two Seattle taxpayers filed a taxpayer action lawsuit against the city of Seattle for violating Washington’s animal cruelty statute and Seattle’s animal cruelty ordinance with regard to a zoo’s elephant exhibit. After the lawsuit was dismissed by the King County Superior Court for lack of taxpayer standing, plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision. The appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision because the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged the zoological society, not the city, acted illegally and because the operating agreement between the city and the zoological society made it clear that the zoological society, not the city, had exclusive control over the operations of the elephant exhibit. Significantly, the appeals court found that a city’s contractual funding obligations to a zoological society that cares and owns an animal exhibit at a zoo is not enough to allege a city violated animal cruelty laws. |
Case |
| People v. Lohnes | 112 A.D.3d 1148, 976 N.Y.S.2d 719 (N.Y. App. Div., 2013) | 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 08471, 2013 WL 6670466 (N.Y. App. Div., 2013) |
After breaking into a barn and stabbing a horse to death, the defendant plead guilty to charges of aggravated cruelty to animals; burglary in the third degree; criminal mischief in the second degree; and overdriving, torturing and injuring animals. On appeal, the court found a horse could be considered a companion animal within New York's aggravated cruelty statute if the horse was not a farm animal raised for commercial or subsistence purposes and the horse was normally maintained in or near the household of the owner or the person who cared for it. The appeals court also vacated and remitted the sentence imposed on the aggravated cruelty charge because the defendant was entitled to know that the prison term was not the only consequence of entering a plea. |
Case |
| Ecuador - Environmental - Organic Procedural Code | Ley 0 Registro Oficial Suplemento 506 de 22-may, 2015 | Ecuador's COGEP | This excerpt is from Ecuador's General Procedural. It contains provisions concerning the representation of nature. These provisions state that any person may file a lawsuit claiming damages on behalf of nature. More specifically, under the articles in Chapter II, nature can be legally represented by any person, entity, collectivity, or by the ombudsperson, who may also act on their initiative. Article 30 establishes who can be a plaintiff and a defendant. Nature is within the definition of these parties. | Statute |
| NC - Lien - Chapter 90. Medicine and Allied Occupations. | N.C.G.S.A. § 90-187.7 | NC ST § 90-187.7 | This North Carolina statute provides that any animal placed in the custody of a licensed veterinarian for treatment, boarding or other care, unclaimed by its owner for a period of more than 10 days after written notice by registered or certified mail, shall be deemed to be abandoned and may be turned over to the nearest humane society, or dog pound or disposed of as such custodian may deem proper. The giving of proper notice relieves such custodian of liability resulting from the disposal. | Statute |
| Smith v. State | 491 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App. 2016), petition for discretionary review refused (Aug. 24, 2016) | 2016 WL 1444143, 14-15-00037-CR, 2016 WL 1444143, (Tex. App.--Hous. [14th Dist.] Apr. 12, 2016) | Defendant Jonas Smith was convicted of aggravated assault and appealed. He argued that the trial court (1) erred by denying his motion to suppress his warrantless arrest; (2) abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial after the Plaintiff referenced the Defendant’s previous incarceration; and (3) abused its discretion by allowing a child witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog. The Court of Appeal of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.)., held that: 1. The police officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed an act of family violence, which justified his warrantless arrest; 2. any prejudice resulting from the Plaintiff’s reference to Defendant's prior incarceration was cured by prompt jury instruction to disregard reference; 3. allowing the child witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog was not likely to prejudice the jury in evaluating the child's testimony; and 4.any error in allowing the witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog was harmless. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant did not present any argument during the trial about the jury being prejudiced by the presence of the service dog. Therefore, there was nothing present for review at the appellate level. Also, the Defendant did not identify any harm from the use of a service dog. The Defendant’s conviction was affirmed. | Case |
| US - AWA - 2008 Public Law 110-246 | 2008 PL 110-246 | 122 Stat 1651 | The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 amends the Animal Welfare Act by strengthening penalties related to animal fighting, including an increase in imprisonment. The 2008 bill also contained language prohibiting imports for resale of dogs unless they are at least six months of age, in good health, and have all necessary vaccinations, with some exemptions defined. Finally, fines for violations of the Animal Welfare Act increased from $2500 to $10,000 per violation, per animal, per day. | Statute |
| Daughen v. Fox | 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. 1988) |
Plaintiffs brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of companionship after defendant animal hospital performed unnecessary surgery based on a mix-up of x-rays. The court denied the first claim, finding the defendant's conduct did not meet the "extreme and outrageous" conduct test. With regard to plaintiff's claim for loss of a unique chattel and for loss of the dog's companionship and comfort, the court observed that, under Pennsylvania law, a dog is personal property, and, under no circumstances under the law of Pennsylvania, may there be recovery for loss of companionship due to the death of an animal. |
Case | |
| Ladnier v. Hester | 98 So.3d 1074 (Miss.App., 2011) | 2011 WL 5027176 (Miss.App.) |
Plaintiff motorist sued horse owner for negligence after he collided with the horse that was loose on the highway. The Court of Appeals sustained summary judgment for owner because the motorist produced no evidence that owner 1) had failed to act with reasonable care in enclosing his horses, 2) that horse had a propensity to escape or cause injury that gave rise to a heightened duty on owner's part, and 3) motorist produced no circumstantial evidence that would imply negligence, such as a dilapidated fence. This judgment was Reversed by Ladnier v. Hester, 98 So.3d 1025 (Miss., 2012). |
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