Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Exotic Pets - Injurious Wildlife Species; Listing the Boa Constrictor, Four Python Species | 2010 WL 836553 (F.R.) |
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) proposes to amend its regulations to add Indian python (Python molurus, including Burmese python Python molurus bivittatus), reticulated python (Broghammerus reticulatus or Python reticulatus), Northern African python (Python sebae), Southern African python (Python natalensis), boa constrictor (Boa constrictor), yellow anaconda (Eunectes notaeus), DeSchauensee's anaconda (Eunectes deschauenseei), green anaconda (Eunectes murinus), and Beni anaconda (Eunectes beniensis) to the list of injurious reptiles. This listing would prohibit the importation of any live animal, gamete, viable egg, or hybrid of these nine constrictor snakes into the United States, except as specifically authorized. |
Administrative | ||
| State v. Fockler | 480 P.3d 960 (Or.App., 2021) | 308 Or.App. 765 (Or.App., 2021) | Defendant appeals his conviction of animal abuse in the second degree (ORS 167.315). Neighbors witnessed him throwing his dog to the ground and called police. He argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he previously threw a cat to the ground 13-years prior to the current incident and submission of this evidence created unfair prejudice. The prosecution contended that this evidence was admitted for a noncharacter/nonpropsensity purpose under OEC 404(3) to establish defendant's subjective awareness of the risk of throwing pets the ground. On appeal, this court noted that animal abuse in the second degree requires the state to prove that defendant was “aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk.” At trial, the state introduced evidence that, in 2003, defendant threw a cat of his apartment window causing injury to the cat because it had defecated on the apartment floor. Defendant argued that there was an insufficient connection between the cat throwing incident and the current charge, and that the probative value of the evidence was at "best minimalistic." However, this court found that the cat throwing evidence was offered for a nonpropensity purpose of knowledge where it was reasonable to infer that defendant had a subjective awareness of the risks in throwing a pet to the ground. Therefore, the trial court did not err in determining that the evidence was relevant for the noncharacter purpose of establishing knowledge under OEC 404(3). The appellate court found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence after hearing both sides and weighing the appropriate factors. Affirmed. | Case | |
| WI - Dog, licenses - Dogs. 174.07. Dog licenses and collar tags | W. S. A. 174.07 | WI ST 174.07 | This Wisconsin statute provides for collection of delinquent dog license fees. | Statute | |
| PA - Immunity - § 8331.1. Veterinary good Samaritan civil immunity | 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8331.1 | PA ST 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8331.1 | In Pennsylvania, any licensed veterinarian who, in good faith, renders emergency care to any animal which such individual has discovered at the scene of an accident or emergency situation is not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care. This immunity does not, however, apply to acts or omissions intentionally designed to cause harm, or any grossly negligent acts or omissions that cause harm to the animal. It also does not apply where the owner of the animal is present and can be consulted as to the proposed action by the veterinarian. | Statute | |
| R (on the application of Patterson) v. RSPCA | EWHC 4531 | The defendants had been convicted of a number of counts of animal cruelty in 2011, to include unnecessary suffering pursuant to Section 4, and participation in a blood sport under Section 8 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Mr Patterson was found to have breached an attached disqualification order under Section 34 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, on which this appeal is based. The order covered all types of animals for a period of five years. This prohibited him from owning, keeping, participating in the keeping of, or being a party to an arrangement under which he would be entitled to control or influence the way in which animals are kept. A number of animals were found and seized at the home. The appeal was allowed on the basis that Mr Patterson was not entitled to control or influence the way in which the animals were kept by his wife on the facts. | Case | ||
| Hogan v. Hogan | 199 So. 3d 50 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 7889623 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 4, 2015) | This case is an appeal of a judgment granting an Alabama divorce. With regard to animal law, the husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding the wife the couple's two dogs. Specifically, the husband argues that one of the dogs was given to him as a gift and is therefore his separate property. He also suggests that because the dogs lived with him since his wife moved out of the marital property (from 11/2012 until 02/2015), he is the "proper owner" of the dogs. While this court noted that evidence concerning ownership was disputed at trial, the evidence is undisputed that the wife entered the marriage with one of the dogs. The second dog was given to both parties by the wife's niece. In examining Alabama law, the court observed that it has long been held that dogs are property. Thus, evidence of ownership can come from documentary title (like a dog license or registration) or possession. Here, the court was persuaded by the testimony that when the wife moved out, she moved into an apartment and was unable to take the dogs with her. No evidence was presented that the wife's circumstances changed to allow her to keep the dogs, and there was no showing that the wife sought court intervention to regain possession of the dogs. Thus, the court stated the following: "Based on the presumption stated in Placey, supra, that the ownership of a pet is presumed to be in the person who possesses it, and given the wife's failure to present evidence indicating that she was in a position to take the dogs, we conclude that the evidence does not support the trial court's decision to award the dogs to the wife. Accordingly, that portion of the judgment awarding the dogs to the wife is reversed." | Case | |
| Animals Used in Entertainment |
Circuses and the Laws Governing Them
|
Policy | |||
| Humane Society v. Merriam | 2007 WL 333309 (D.Minn.) |
Minnesota allowed trapping and snaring activities. Plaintiffs sued the state, arguing that this policy was causing the death of some endangered Canada lynx, in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs and defendants had the case dismissed after they agreed that Minnesota would seek a permit from the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act, and that conservation measures would be taken for the protection of the lynx. |
Case | ||
| AR - Sherwood - Breed - Pit Bull Ordinance No. 1776 | SHERWOOD, AR., CITY ORDINANCE No. 1776 (2008) |
In Sherwood, Arkansas, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog, with the exception for those who are registered and reside in an area that is annexed into corporate city limits. However, if a pit bull is aggressive towards people or other dogs, the dog is not exempt from the ban. Registration requirements include: annual vaccinations, license, microchips, photo ID, insurance, proper confinement, 'Beware of Dog' signs, and mandatory disclosures. Any dog found to be the subject of a violation shall be subject to immediate seizure and impoundment or may be euthanized. The owner may be fined up to $1,000 and imprisoned for up to 30 days.
|
Local Ordinance | ||
| MI - Veterinary - Chapter 333. Health. Public Health Code | MCLA 333.18801 - 18838 | MI ST 333.18801 - 18838 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |