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Displaying 221 - 230 of 6637
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign v. Vilsack | 133 F. Supp. 3d 200 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 5726880 (D.D.C., 2015) | The American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign (Plaintiffs) brought this action against the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) to prevent the implementation of the new Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan (WHT) that Modoc County helped develop. Plaintiffs brought six claims against defendants, all under the Administrative Procedures Act. In Counts I, II, and III, plaintiffs alleged that the boundary clarification was arbitrary and capricious because it violated the Wild Horses Act, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and in Counts IV, V, and VI, they claimed that the adjustment to the "appropriate management level" (AML) range was arbitrary and capricious because it was contrary to the same three statutes. Because the Forest Service reasonably concluded that the disputed territory was never formally incorporated into the Devil's Garden WHT, and that any references to one contiguous territory were the result of administrative error, the Court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of the law for the Forest Service to act to correct the boundary in the 2013 Environmental Assessment and the 2013 Management Plan. Thus, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III. And because the Forest Service articulated a rational basis for its decision to adjust the AML range for the Devil's Garden WHT that was not counter to record evidence or otherwise contrary to the law, the Court found that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Counts IV, V, and VI. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, and because they sought the same relief as defendants, the intervenor-defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied as moot. | Case | |
| American Wildlife Law - An Introduction | David Favre |
This article provides a short introduction to the matrix of government interests in controlling wildlife in the United States. The powers of state and federal government are considered along with limitations on the exercise of the authority. |
Article | ||
| Ammon v. Welty | 113 S.W.3d 185 (Ky.App.,2002) |
In this Kentucky case, the plaintiffs brought an action against the county dog warden for shooting their dog. Before the statutorily imposed 7-day waiting limit had expired, the warden euthanized the dog by shooting him in the head. The Court of Appeals held that while a family dog can be beloved by a family, loss of the pet does not support an action for loss of consortium. Further, the dog warden was not liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress because his actions did not rise to the outrageous level where the dog was not shot in the presence of the family and there was no evidence that Brewer intended to inflict emotional harm. |
Case | ||
| Ammon v. Welty |
Amicus Brief about non-economic damages in case where warden shot a family dog. |
Pleading | |||
| Amons v. District of Columbia | 231 F. Supp 2d. 109 (D.D.C. 2002) | 2002 WL 31455095 (D.D.C.) |
Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 action against D.C. police officers alleging, inter alia , intentional infliction of emotional distress for the unprovoked shooting of his dog inside his home. The court found that the officers lacked probable cause for the warrantless entry into his home to make the arrest, the arresting officer made "an egregiously unlawful arrest," and the officers were unreasonable in shooting plaintiff's dog without provocation. |
Case | |
| Amos v. State | 478 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App. 2015), petition for discretionary review refused (Nov. 18, 2015) | 2015 WL 4043302 (Tex. App., 2015) | A jury found appellant guilty of the offense of cruelty to a nonlivestock animal after he beat a Shih Tzu to death with a broom. After finding an enhancement paragraph true, the jury assessed Appellant's punishment at thirty-one months’ confinement. Appellant asserted five issues on this appeal: (1) the admission of a State's witness's recorded statement to the police, which the court overruled because the evidence was received without objection; (2) the denial of his motion to quash the indictment for failing to allege an offense, which the court overruled because the indictment tracked the statutory language; (3) the denial of six of his challenges for cause, which the court overruled because the venire members gave the defense counsel contradictory answers meaning the trial court could not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse a juror; (4) the denial of his objection to the charge, which the court overruled because the jury charge tracked the statute’s language; and (5) the denial of his motion to suppress the dog’s necropsy, which the court overruled because the appellant had no intention of reclaiming the dog's body or her ashes and thereby relinquished his interest in them such that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy and lacked standing to contest the reasonableness of any search. The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed. | Case | |
| Amparo Directo D.A.- 454/2021 - Mexico | DA 10417/2021 | The administrative tribunal in Mexico City recognizes companion animals as family members, protected under Article 4 of their Constitution. Citing the Supreme Court of Justice, the tribunal stated that there are different types of families that are protected constitutionally, which includes some families that consider domestic animals their members. This is the decision to an Amparo against a resolution issued by the Institute of Administrative Verification (Instituto de Verificación Administrativa) holding that the owner of a pet boarding facility providing grooming and training services lacked the land use permits to have the commercial establishment. The owner of the pet boarding argued that she would only use 20% of her home for these purposes. After citing comparative law from countries such as Spain, Colombia, and Brazil, the court stated that “currently pets are considered sentient beings that are also part of the family nucleus and require attention and care. Therefore, the service provided by the Amparo promoter has become necessary for people or families also made up of domestic animals, who are looking for a place [to] care for their pets when they are away from their home for a long time” and, as such, these types of families ought to be considered by the authorities. The court stated that domestic animals “play a role of protection, support, company, affection, and care towards humans. Even the reciprocal attachment relationship between people and domestic animals is clear in multispecies families because they are treated as part of the family. They are, in a few words, members of it. Hence the name multispecies or interspecies family.” | Case | ||
| Amparo en Revisión 163/2018 - Mexico | AMPARO EN REVISIÓN 163/2018 | This decision concerns the review of a writ of Amparo filed in 2016, which looks at the constitutionality of cockfighting and whether it should be considered a cultural practice. The President of the Mexican Commission for Cockfighting Promotion and Efraín Rábago Echegoyen filed a writ of Amparo with a District Court of Veracruz, Mexico, against the governor and Congress of the state of the same state. Plaintiff argued that a newly enacted state decree banning cockfighting infringed upon fundamental rights, including the right to culture, right to property, freedom of work, and the right to equality and non-discrimination. Despite the Plaintiff’s arguments, the District Court affirmed the decree’s constitutionality, which amended Veracruz’s animal protection law. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought a review of the Amparo with the Supreme Court of Justice, which accepted the case and conducted a de novo review. In affirming the lower court decision, the judge used the proportionality test around the alleged violation of rights to culture, property, and freedom of work. The judge found that the defendant’s arguments had no legal basis. Regarding the right to culture, after an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of this right, the Supreme Court stated that cockfighting did not constitute a violation of this right. The court recognized that this practice was a cultural tradition. However, the question was whether such cultural manifestation was protected under the Constitution. In the case of cockfighting, the cultural expression did not directly affect humans, but rather the animals used and, to the high court, cockfighting was not covered by the right to participate in a cultural life. The court stated that culture is not admirable because it is traditional, but when it carries values and rights that are compatible with human dignity and mutual respect with other humans and nature. This means that the right to culture is not absolute, and, in fact, it is limited. Therefore, “any practice that involves the abuse and unnecessary suffering of animals cannot be considered a cultural expression protected by the Constitution. Regarding the right to property and the right to work, the court stated that these constitutional rights were not absolute and that their scope was limited by public interest. The right to work, in particular, was limited to the legality of the activity, the rights of third parties, and the rights of society in general. In weighing these rights, the court concluded that animal protection was a legitimate reason to limit fundamental rights, in particular, of the plaintiffs in this case because animal welfare is a purpose that is compatible with the purpose of a constitutional democracy. In other words, even though animals are not subjects of rights, their well-being is a legitimate limitation to some human rights. Cockfighting is a practice that inflicts severe physical harm on these birds, typically culminating in the death of at least one of the animals. Due to the nature of this practice, the court deemed that prohibition was the appropriate measure to safeguard the welfare of these animals. | Case | ||
| Amparo en Revisión 80/2022 - Mexico | AMPARO EN REVISIÓN 80/2022 | This is a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico pertaining to a 2019 decree of Nayarit declaring horse racing, bullfighting, cockfighting, and similar practices intangible cultural heritage of the state. A civil association whose mission is to help protect the environment and animals brought an Amparo against the decree, arguing a violation of the right to a healthy environment, as bullfighting and cockfighting are cruel activities where animals are tortured and killed. The Supreme Court analyzed three main questions: (1) What activities can be protected by cultural rights? (2) Does the right to a healthy environment protect animals from abuse or suffering by humans? (3) Can “bullfighting and cockfighting” be constitutionally protected by cultural rights? In answering the first question, the court held that the human right to cultural participation cannot be used as an excuse to violate or destroy other human rights. On the contrary, its exercise must allow the harmony and development of the other rights recognized in our country. Therefore, while some activities, expressions, or manifestations are perceived as “cultural” to society, it is crucial to acknowledge that, from a constitutional standpoint, only those fully aligned with human rights can be officially recognized as such by our nation. Regarding the second question, the court held that “[t]he human right to a healthy environment is a broad concept that includes animal life and well-being, conceiving animals not only as members of a single species or group of species, but also as individual living beings capable of experiencing fear, suffering, and pain.” Moreover, the court stated that it meant that “one of the demands of the right to a healthy environment implied that human beings must live in harmony with other species, not because these species are 'persons,' but because people – that is, human beings – should not behave in a way hostile and cruel towards animals. On the contrary, they must consider animals as beings that must be respected and treated in a decent manner to preserve and be faithful to their moral responsibility as the main driver of the destiny of other species.” Lastly, addressing the third question on whether “bullfighting and cockfighting” should be constitutionally protected under cultural rights, the court concluded in the negative. This decision was based on the recognition that these activities involved the infliction of agony, suffering, and even death upon animals solely for the sake of entertainment, sport, or recreation. The court granted the Amparo and held that the state of Nayarit lacked the power to declare bullfighting and cockfighting intangible cultural heritage as it is a power only the federation has, and not the states, according to the interpretation of the Federal Constitution and the General Law of Culture and Cultural Rights. | Case | ||
| An Analysis of Factors Responsible for the Decline of the U.S. Horse Industry: Why Horse Slaughter is not the Solution | John Holland and Laura Allen | Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, & Natural Resources Law: Vol. 5 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kjeanrl/vol5/iss2/4 |
Copyright © 2013 by Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, & Natural Resources Law; John Holland and Laura Allen. Reprinted with permission. |
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