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Displaying 6001 - 6010 of 6637
Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Facility Dogs/Courthouse Support Dogs As of 2024, twenty (20) states have laws that allow the use of facility/courthouse dogs in some legal proceedings. State map
Folsom v. Barnett 306 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1957)

Defendant-veterinarian sought appeal of a judgment against him for malpractice resulting from the injury to plaintiff’s thoroughbred colt that resulted in its destruction. The Court of Appeals held that an examination of the record revealed that sufficient evidence was produced to put in issue the question of whether appellant used such skill and attention as may ordinarily be expected of careful and skillful persons in his profession. Thus, the issue was correctly submitted to a jury.

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City of Houston v. Levingston Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2006 WL 241127 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.))

A city veterinarian who worked for the Bureau of Animal Regulation and Care (BARC) brought an action against the city, arguing that he was wrongfully terminated under the Whistleblower’s Act. The vet contended that he reported several instances of abuses by BARC employees to the division manager. In upholding the trial court’s decision to award Levingston over $600,000 in damages, the appellate court ruled the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the veterinarian was terminated due to his report . Contrary to the city’s assertion, the court held that BARC was an appropriate law enforcement authority under the Act to report violations of section 42.09 of the Texas Penal Code committed by BARC employees. Opinion Withdrawn and Superseded on Rehearing by City of Houston v. Levingston , 221 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App., 2006).

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WV - Hunting - § 20-2-2a. Interference with hunters, trappers and fishermen W. Va. Code, § 20-2-2a WV ST § 20-2-2a This law reflects West Virginia's hunter harassment provision. Under the law, a person may not willfully obstruct or impede the participation of any individual in the lawful activity of hunting, fishing or trapping. Violation is a misdemeanor with a fine of not less than $100 and not more than $500 or imprisonment for 10 - 100 days, or both. Subsequent violations within two years of any prior violation result in a fine of up to $1000 and imprisonment for up to one year, or both. A violator is also liable to the person for damages. Statute
People v. Lewis 23 Misc.3d 49, 881 N.Y.S.2d 586 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2009) 2009 WL 530996 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term), 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 29091 Defendants were charged in separate informations with multiple counts of injuring animals and failure to provide adequate sustenance.   Plaintiff, the People of the State of New York, appealed the lower court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion to suppress evidence obtained when a special agent of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals approached one of the defendants at his home upon an anonymous tip and inquired about the condition of the animals and asked the defendant to bring the animals outside for inspection, while the incident was videotaped by a film crew for a cable television show.   The Supreme Court, Appellate Term, 2nd and 11th, 13 Judicial Districts reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that Plaintiff met its burden of establishing that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search based on the fact that the defendant was not in custody or under arrest at the time of the search, was not threatened by the special agent, and there was no misrepresentation, deception or trickery on the special agent’s part. Case
State v. Crow 429 P.3d 1053 (2018) 294 Or. App. 88, 2018 WL 4353388 This Oregon case discusses whether 11 miniature horses, multiple cats, and a dog are separate victims for purposes of merger into one conviction. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for 13 counts of unlawful possession of an animal by a person previously convicted of second-degree animal neglect. The facts are not at issue: Defendant was previously convicted of multiple counts of second-degree animal neglect involving dogs and miniature horses and was subsequently found to be in possession of those animals. On appeal, defendant's primary argument is that "the public is the single collective victim" for purposes of the violation, so the trial court erred in entering 13 separate convictions for unlawful possession of an animal. In support, defendant analogizes it to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, where the public is deemed the collective victim for purposes of merger. The State counters with the fact animals are living beings, unlike firearms, and that living beings can be victims of crimes. Further, the State contends that the language of ORS 161.067(2) and legislative history demonstrate an intent to protect individual animal victims. The court found that the text of statute shows an intent to protect individual animals of the same genus as previous crimes rather than protection of the public, generally. The court was not persuaded by defendant's contention that established links between animal cruelty and domestic violence show that the legislature intended to protect the public rather than individual animals when it enacted ORS 167.332(1). Legislative testimony for amendments to ORS 167.332 from animal experts detailed how difficult it was for judges to impose bans on possession before the passage of the amendment due to the way the law was previously written. Thus, the court concluded that the principal purpose of ORS 167.332(1) was to protect individual animals from further abuse and neglect, and to deter animal abuse and neglect where those individuals convicted show "an identifiable threat to a particular genus of animal." Here, in defendant's case, the trial court did not err when it entered 13 separate convictions for unlawful possession of an animal. Affirmed. Case
The Duck Shooting Case (1997) 189 CLR 579 (1997) 146 ALR 248; (1997) 71 ALJR 837; [1997] 12 Leg Rep 14; [1997] HCA 31

The plaintiff was charged with being in an area set aside for hunting, during hunting season, without a licence. The plaintiff argued that he was there in order to collect dead and wounded ducks and endangered species and to draw media attention to the cruelty associated with duck shooting. The Court found that although the regulation under which the plaintiff was charged restricted the implied freedom of political communication, it was appropriate to protect the safety of persons with conflicting aims likely to be in the area.

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Spangler v. Stark County Dog Warden 999 N.E.2d 1247 (Ohio App. 5 Dist.,2013) 2013 -Ohio- 4774, 2013 WL 5820277

The appellant Robert T. Spangler appealed the decision of the Canton Municipal Court, Stark County that affirmed a dog warden's classification of his dog as "dangerous" under R.C. 955.11. While there are no cases on point that interpret this specific procedure on appeal, the court found the record did not reveal an abuse of discretion that would create a manifest miscarriage of justice. Even where there was potentially conflicting testimony whether appellant's dog actually bit the other dog's owner or whether it was caused by his own dog, the statute only requires a demonstration that the dog in question "caused injury" without provocation. Appellant's dog leaving the property lead to a "chain of events resulting in some sort of puncture injury" to the other dog owner's leg.

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VA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes Va. Code Ann. §§ 3.2-6500 - 6590; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-361; § 18.2-144.1 These Virginia statutes set forth Title 3.2, the Comprehensive Animal Care laws, which include the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. For the purposes of Sec. 3.2-6570, the operative animal cruelty law, animal means any nonhuman vertebrate species including fish except those fish captured and killed or disposed of in a reasonable and customary manner. The section has a misdemeanor animal cruelty law as well as a felony provision related to torture or willful infliction of cruelty. The section requires companion animal owners to provide adequate care. Statute
Hyatt v. Anoka Police Department 691 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 2005)

Plaintiff was injured by a police dog during the arrest of her husband.  Plaintiff sued under a Minnesota Statute requiring strict liability for dog injuries.  The trial court held the statute applied to police dogs, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court ultimately held the statute does apply to police dogs.

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