Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Snead v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania | 929 A.2d 1169 (Pa.Super., 2007) | 2007 PA Super 204, 2007 WL 1990510 (Pa.Super.) |
This Pennsylvania case involves cross-appeals following a jury trial in which defendant SPCA, was found liable for euthanizing the dogs belonging to plaintiff Snead, who was awarded damages in the amount of $154,926.37, including $100,000 in punitive damages. The facts stemmed from a seizure several dogs at a seemingly abandoned property owned by Snead where Snead was arrested on dog fighting charges, which were then dropped the next day. However, Snead was not aware that the charges were dropped and that the dogs were therefore available to be reclaimed. The dogs were ultimately euthanized after Snead went to reclaim them. On appeal, this court first held that the SPCA does not operate as a branch of the Commonwealth and therefore, does not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity or protection under the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. The court held that there was sufficient evidence presented for Snead's Sec. 1983 to go to the jury that found the SPCA has inadequate procedures/policies in place to safeguard Snead's property interest in the dogs. As to damages, the court found the there was no evidence to impute to the SPCA evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of Snead sufficient for an award of punitive damages. |
Case |
| State ex rel. Humane Society of Missouri v. Beetem | 317 S.W.3d 669 (Mo.App. W.D.,2010) | 2010 WL 3167457 (Mo.App. W.D.) |
The "Missourians for Protection of Dogs" ("MPD") advocated a statewide ballot measure to enact a new statutory provision to be known as the "Puppy Mill Cruelty Prevention Act." The certified ballot title included a summary statement reading: "Shall Missouri law be amended to: . . . create a misdemeanor crime of ‘puppy mill cruelty’ for any violations?" One taxpaying Missouri citizen, Karen Strange, subsequently filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief against the Secretary of State, challenging the summary statement as being "insufficient and unfair." In this action, the Humane Society of Missouri sought protection from an order of the circuit court requiring it to disclose and turn over Document 10 - a series of focus group findings and related documentation developed by the Humane Society of Missouri and its partners to formulate political strategy. Writing on behalf of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, Judge Victor C. Howard, with all concurring, granted the HSMO’s writ of prohibition. HSMO’s preliminary writ of prohibition was made absolute, rendering Document 10 non-discoverable. |
Case |
| Cramer v. Harris | 591 F. App'x 634 (9th Cir. 2015) | Plaintiff William Cramer filed this lawsuit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 2, which requires California egg farmers to house egg laying hens in less restrictive enclosures. Plaintiff argued that, because Proposition 2 did not specify a minimum cage size for egg laying hens, a reasonable person could not discern whether the enclosures being used were compliant with Proposition 2 and that the law is void for vagueness as a result. The district court dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, the court reasoned that Proposition 2 did not need to specify a minimum amount of space per bird, and that the space requirements mandating that each hen be able to extend its limbs fully and turn around freely can be discerned using objective criteria. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court and dismissed the lawsuit. | Case | |
| Australia - Anti Cruelty - New South Wales Regulations |
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (General) Regulation 2006 are authorative in the state of New South Wales. |
Administrative | ||
| MO - Domestic violence - 455.045. Temporary relief available--ex parte orders | V. A. M. S. 455.010, 455.045 | MO ST 455.010, 455.045 | Missouri amended its laws on domestic violence protection orders in 2021 to include the protection of pets. Any ex parte order of protection shall be to protect the petitioner from domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault and may include "[a] temporary order of possession of pets where appropriate." “Pet” is defined as a living creature maintained by a household member for companionship and not for commercial purposes. | Statute |
| What Can Animal Law Learn from Environmental Law? |
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Policy | ||
| OH - Endangered Species - Chapter 1518. Endangered Species. | R.C. § 1518.01 - 1518.99; 1531.25, 1531.99 | OH ST § 1518.01 - 1518.99; 1531.25, 1531.99 | These Ohio statutes protect both endangered plants and animals as defined by the State of Ohio as well as those species listed on the federal ESA list. Taking of an endangered or threatened animal species constitutes a misdemeanor and the person is required upon pleading guilty to the offense, in addition to any fine, term of imprisonment, seizure, and forfeiture imposed, to make restitution for the minimum value of the wild animal illegally held, taken, or possessed. Notably, if the aggregate value of the animal(s) taken exceeds $1,000, a person is guilty of a felony. | Statute |
| MI - Cruelty, neglect - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. The Michigan Penal Code. | MCL 750.50 | MI ST 750.50 | This statute sets out the Michigan duty of care for all vertebrate animals, including what constitutes sufficient food, water, shelter, sanitary conditions, exercise, and veterinary medical attention in order to maintain an animal in a state of good health. Also explained are the penalty and forfeiture provisions for violations of the statute. The exclusions under the statute include those animals used in hunting, fishing, trapping, horse racing, farming, pest control, zoos, lawful killing under the Animal Industry Act, and scientific research. In 2019, the penalty provisions were revised. A first violation with one animal is a 93 day/$1,000 misdemeanor. If the violation involves two or three animals or the death of any animal, the penalty increases to a 1-year/$2,000 misdemeanor. If the violation involved 4 or more animals but fewer than 10 animals or the person had one prior conviction, it becomes a 2-year/$2,000 felony. If the violation involved 10 or more animals but fewer than 25 animals or the person had two prior convictions, it becomes a 4-year/$5,000 felony. If the violation involved 25 or more animals or the person has had 3 or more prior convictions, it becomes a 7-year/$10,000 felony. Finally, if the person is an operator of a pet shop and he or she has had 5 or more prior convictions, it is a 2-year/$5,000 felony. | Statute |
| Larry BARD et al., Appellants, v. Reinhardt JAHNKE, Individually And Doing Business as Hemlock Valley Farms, Respondent, et al., Defendant. | 848 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y., 2006) | 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 03440, 6 N.Y.3d 592, 2006 WL 1148098 (N.Y.) |
The accident underlying this litigation occurred on a dairy farm owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff Larry Bard, a self-employed carpenter, arrived at the farm to meet defendant John Timer, another self-employed carpenter to repair of the dairy barn. While working, Bard was seriously injured by a bull. Bard, with his wife suing derivatively, commenced an action against both Jahnke and Timer to recover damages for his personal injuries, alleging causes of action sounding in strict liability and negligence. In affirming the Appellate Division's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment, this court found that Jahnke was not liable for Bard's injuries unless he knew or should have known of the bull's vicious or violent propensities. The Court noted that the record contained no such evidence. |
Case |
| Wrinkle v. Norman | 242 P.3d 1216 (Kan. App., 2010) | 2010 WL 4539371 (Kan.App.,2010), 44 Kan.App.2d 950 (2010) |
Wrinkle filed a negligence action against his neighbors (the Normans) after he sustained injuries on thier property. The injuries stemmed from an incident where Wrinkle was trying to herd cattle he thought belonged to the Normans back into a pen on the Normans' property. The lower court granted the Normans' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, this court found that the question comes down to Wrinkle's status (invitee, licensee, or trespasser) to determine the duty owed by the Normans. This Court found that the district court properly determined that Wrinkle was a trespasser. Finally, the court addressed the K.S.A. 47-123 claim as to whether the Normans are liable for their cattle running at large. The court found that Wrinkle could not meet the burden under the statute. |
Case |
