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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
ME - Dog, Dangerous - Maine Dangerous Dog Laws 7 M. R. S. A. § 3951 - 3955; 7 M. R. S. A. § 3961 - 3964; 7 M. R. S. A. § 3907 ME ST T. 7 § 3951 - 3955; ME ST T. 7 § 3961 - 3964; ME ST T.7 § 3907 This Maine statutory sections outlines the state's dangerous dog laws. It first provides that any person may lawfully kill a dog if necessary to protect that person, another person or a domesticated animal during the course of a sudden, unprovoked assault. A person who owns or keeps a dangerous dog commits a civil violation for which the court shall adjudge a fine of not less than $250 and not more than $1,000. The dog may be ordered to be muzzled, or euthanized if it has killed, maimed or inflicted serious bodily injury upon a person or has a history of a prior assault. Notably, if a dog whose owner refuses or neglects to comply with the order wounds any person by a sudden assault or wounds or kills any domestic animal, the owner shall pay the person injured treble damages and costs to be recovered by a civil action. The statute sets out the specific procedure for declaring a dog dangerous and the statutory definition of dangerous is also provided by reference to a companion statute. Statute
Motta v. Menendez 46 A.D.3d 685 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2007) 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 09778, 2007 WL 4328459 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), 847 N.Y.S.2d 612

This New York case arose following an incident that occurred on December 13, 2003, in which the appellant's two pit bull terriers entered the petitioner's property, and one of appellant's dogs ("Duke") attacked and injured the petitioner's pet dog. Following a special proceeding, the lower court determined that appellant's pit bull terrier named “Duke” was a dangerous dog and directed that it be destroyed. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division found that the dangerous dog statute in effect on December 13, 2003, did not provide that one dog attacking another was conduct subject to the penalty of destruction (Agriculture and Markets Law former §§ 108, 121).

Case
People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery 2014 WL 6802767 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 4, 2014) 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 08531 This case is an appeal from a Supreme Court judgment denying petitioner's application for an order to show cause to commence a CPLR article 70 proceeding. At issue is the legal status of a chimpanzee named Tommy who is being kept on respondents' property. Petitioners filed a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 on the ground that Tommy was being unlawfully detained by respondents. They offered support via affidavits of experts that chimpanzee have the requisite characteristics sufficient for a court to consider them "persons" to obtain personal autonomy and freedom from unlawful detention. The Court of Appeals here is presented with the novel question on whether a chimpanzee is a legal person entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus. In rejecting this designation, the Court relied on the fact that chimpanzees cannot bear any legal responsibilities or social duties. As such, the Court found it "inappropriate to confer upon chimpanzees the legal rights . . . that have been afforded to human beings." Case
Smith v. Lane 832 N.E.2d 947 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 2005) 358 Ill.App.3d 1126; 295 Ill.Dec. 497; 2005 WL 1714281

In this Illinois case, the passenger of horse-drawn carriage brought action in negligence and strict liability against driver of carriage and owner of horse and carriage for injuries passenger received when carriage went off road and overturned. The lower court dismissed all of passenger's counts.  On appeal, the Appellate Court held that, as matter of first impression, the passenger was not subject to provisions of EALA, and the alleged facts sufficient to state cause of action under state Animal Control Act.

Case
IL - Ecoterrorism - 5/48-2. Animal research and production facilities protection 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-2 IL ST CH 720 § 5/48-2 This new law replaces the Illinois' Animal Research and Production Facilities Protection Act, which was repealed in 2013. Under the new law, it is unlawful for any person to release, steal, or injure an animal held at a facility; to damage or vandalize any property; to obtain access to an animal facility by false pretenses for the purpose of performing unauthorized acts; to enter into an animal facility with an intent to destroy, alter, duplicate, or obtain unauthorized possession of records; or to enter or remain on an animal facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act. Violation of any of these acts is a felony, with classification based on the amount of property damage. Statute
The Legal Guardianship of Animals

Policy
Anderson v. Christopherson 816 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2012) 2012 WL 2913222 (Minn.)

This appeal asks two questions: whether defendant-dog owners (Christophersons) were strictly liable under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 for plaintiff Anderson's injuries suffered when he attempted to break up a fight between defendants' and plaintiff's dogs; and (2) whether one of the defendants was an "owner" for purposes of this law. In the case at hand, the court found that the events leading to Anderson's injury could produce three reasonable alternative inferences such that summary judgment was inappropriate. The court found there was an issue whether the father Dennis Christopherson was "harboring" the dog at the home for purposes of the animal owner liability statute.

Case
U.S. v. Proceeds from Sale of Approximately 15,538 Panulirus Argus Lobster Tails 834 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Fla. 1993)

This case arose out of the seizure of some 15,538 lobster tails of the species Panulirus argus, more commonly known as "spiny lobster," imported into the United States by the Claimant Lista Enterprises Seafood, Inc. from the Turks and Caicos Islands, a British territory in the Caribbean.  The court held the government had probable cause to seize the lobster tails based on the weight criteria established under Turks and Caicos law.  Under the Lacey Act, anyone who "knowingly" imports fish or wildlife taken in violation of foreign law may be assessed a penalty of $10,000 per violation, where "knowingly" refers to situations where the violator knew or should have known that the wildlife was taken in violation of law.

Case
FL - Domestic Violence - 741.30. Domestic violence; injunction; powers West's F. S. A. § 741.30 FL ST § 741.30 This Florida law allows petitioners to file injunctions for protection against domestic violence. Among the described incidents of domestic violence from which the petitioner may obtain protection is where the respondent has "intentionally injured or killed a family pet." The court may considers this as a factor when determining whether there is reasonable cause to believe the petitioner is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence. In 2020, Florida added this provision to (5)(a)(4): "Awarding to the petitioner the temporary exclusive care, possession, or control of an animal that is owned, possessed, harbored, kept, or held by the petitioner, the respondent, or a minor child residing in the residence or household of the petitioner or respondent. The court may order the respondent to temporarily have no contact with the animal and prohibit the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal. This subparagraph does not apply to an animal owned primarily for a bona fide agricultural purpose, as defined under s. 193.461, or to a service animal, as defined under s. 413.08, if the respondent is the service animal's handler." Statute
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law

Biodiversity, Species Protection, and Animal Welfare Under International Law, Guillaume Futhazar, MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2018-22 (2018).

Policy

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