Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SD - Trust - 55-1-21. Trust for care of designated animal. | S D C L § 55-1-21 | SD ST § 55-1-21 | South Dakota's pet trust law was enacted in 2006. Amendments to the law in 2018 provide that trusts for the care of a designated animal or animals are valid. | Statute |
| NH - Veterinary - Chapter 332-B. New Hampshire Veterinary Practice Act. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 332-B:1 - 332-B:20 | NH ST § 332-B:1 - 332-B:20 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| Amburgey v. Sauder | 605 N.W.2d 84 (Mich. 1999) |
Plaintiff was bitten by a horse as she walked through a stable. The court determined that Plaintiff was a “participant” for the purposes of the Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA), and thus the Defendant stables owner was insulated from liability arising out of the unanticipated, abnormal behavior of the horse. |
Case | |
| Poarch Creek Band of Indians of Alabama. 8-6-31-Cruelty to Animals | Chapter VI, Title 8, Section 8-6-31 | Under Sec. 8-6-31, cruelty to animals is a Class A Misdemeanor. A person who, without justification, knowingly or negligently subjects an animal to mistreatment by actions defined in the statute commit the crime of cruelty to animals. | Statute | |
| City of Marion v. Schoenwald | 631 N.W.2d 213 (S.D.,2001) | 2001 SD 95 |
To keep excessive numbers of large dogs from becoming a public nuisance, the City of Marion, South Dakota passed an ordinance that, among other things, limited households to four dogs, only two of which could weigh over 25 pounds. Schoenwald owned three dogs: one shepherd-collie mix weighing 75 pounds and two golden retrievers, weighing 30 pounds and 20 pounds. She was then notified that by housing three dogs weighing over 25 pounds she was in violation of the ordinance. She failed to comply with the City's order to remove one dog and was issued a citation. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling in Schoenwald's favor and found that South Dakota law permits municipalities broad power to regulate the keeping of dogs; thus the weight limitation included in the City's comprehensive pet ordinance was within its authority. |
Case |
| OR - Endangered Species - Chapter 496. Application, Administration and Enforcement of Wildlife Laws. | O. R. S. § 496.171 - 996; 498.026 | OR ST § 496.171 - 996; 498.026 | These Oregon statutes set out the definitions and rules relating to the Oregon endangered species laws. Specifically, Oregon law provides rules for listing based on the federal ESA list as well as the state criteria. Violation of the law constitutes a Class A misdemeanor with an enhanced felony provision for subsequent convictions involving certain species (i.e., taking of game fish with a total value of $200 or more or the taking of antelope, black bear, cougar, deer, elk, moose, mountain goat or mountain sheep in violation of the wildlife laws) within a ten-year period. | Statute |
| MO - Pet Shop - Animal Care and Facilities Licensing and Regulation (Chapter 273) | V.A.M.S. 273.325 - 359 | MO ST 273.325 - 359 | Under these Missouri statutes, a license is required to operate animal boarding facilities, pet shops, pounds, dealers and commercial breeders. The canine cruelty prevention act makes it the crime of canine cruelty if the person poses a substantial risk to the health and welfare of animals in the person's custody. A violation is a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Clyncke v. Waneka | 157 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2007) | 2007 WL 570412 (Colo.) |
In this Colorado case, an inexperienced horse rider who was injured in fall from horse during a horse roundup, brought an action under the Colorado Equine Activities Statute against the owners of riding stable. The lower court, after a jury trial, entered a judgment for the stable owners. On appeal at the Supreme Court, the Court found that the Equine Statute places a two-pronged duty on sponsors; a sponsor is liable when he or she fails to make reasonable efforts to determine either a participant's ability to engage in the equine activity or a participant's ability to manage a particular horse. Here, a new trial was in order because the result may have been different if court had properly instructed the jury regarding the exception from civil liability for the sponsor. |
Case |
| Holland v Crisafulli | [1998] QSC 199 |
A dog, on two separate occasions, entered residential premises, turned over a cage and killed a guinea pig. The applicant claimed that this was insufficient evidence for the dog to be declared 'dangerous'. The judge found that a dog's propensity to pursue one animal should not be distinguished from a propensity to pursue all animals and that the finding of the dog as 'dangerous' should stand. |
Case | |
| Bone v. Vill. Club, Inc. | 223 F.Supp. 3d 1203 (M.D. Fla. 2016) | This case dealt with a woman's request to have her emotional-support dog live with her before purchasing land in a mobile home community, known as Brookhaven. Prior to purchasing her lot, the plaintiff allegedly received permission from the president of Brookhaven's board of directors to keep her dog, even though the plaintiff was purchasing a lot in the "no pet" section of Brookhaven. The plaintiff provided the president of the board with the documentation requested, and the president told plaintiff she had been approved by the board to have her dog. Approximately one year after plaintiff purchased her lot, Brookhaven's attorney sent a letter requesting that plaintiff remove her dog, citing Brookhaven's policies disallowing her dog. After several letters sent back and forth between plaintiff's attorney and Brookhaven's attorney concerning requirements of the Fair Housing Act and the party's respective actions, both parties cross-moved for summary judgement. The court held that 1) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether tenant had an actual disability; 2) landlord was not prejudiced by tenant's untimely disclosure of expert report; 3) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether landlord constructively denied tenant an accommodation; and 4) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether landlord retaliated against tenant for requesting a disability accommodation. As a result, all motions for summary judgement were denied. | Case |