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Displaying 51 - 60 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Heuer | 749 F.Supp. 1541 (D. Mont. 1989) |
Following his conviction for a violation of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371, et seq., Defendant Heuer moved for a new trial. Where defendant, who obtained guiding and license for hunting elk, engaged in conduct that involved purchase of elk, it was not necessary for government to prove such services occurred in interstate commerce for purposes of Lacey Act conviction. |
Case | ||
| MO - Lien, care and board - Chapter 430. Liens for Keeping, Training and Breeding Animals | V. A. M. S. 430.150 - 220 | MO ST 430.150 - 220 | This chapter of Missouri laws concerns liens for the keeping, training, and breeding of animals. Section 430.150 states that every person who keeps, boards or trains any horse, mule or other animal has a lien on such animal, and on any vehicle, harness or equipment that came with the animal, for the amount due. No owner or claimant has the right to take any such property out of the custody of the person having such lien, except with the lienholder's consent or on the payment of such debt. Section 430.160 outlines the procedure for enforcement of the lien, which includes where to file a claim and the notice requirements. | Statute | |
| IA - Ordinances - 331.381. Duties relating to services | I. C. A. § 331.381 | IA ST § 331.381 | This Iowa statute states that the county board shall provide for the seizure, impoundment, and disposition of dogs in accordance with chapter 351. | Statute | |
| Solicitud de Atracción 249/2023. Caso Elefante Ely. Ciudad de Mexico | Solicitud de Atracción 249/2023 | This is a writ of Amparo on behalf of Ely, a 38-year-old female African elephant that lived in a circus before being relocated to the San Juan de Arago Zoo in 2012. In this instance, a concerned citizen and activist affiliated with the Association "Opening Cages, Opening Minds" ("Abriendo Jaulas, Abriendo Mentes") filed an Amparo petitioning the authorities in Mexico City to take necessary actions for the relocation of Ely from the zoo to a sanctuary in Brazil. The petitioner asserted that Ely had endured abuse from a young age during her 25-year tenure in a circus, and was currently experiencing deprivation of freedom at the zoo. Ely is solitary and grappling with skin and nail injuries, infections, and ailments such as dermatitis and hyperkeratosis. The petitioner further argued that Ely was suffering from issues in one of her limbs due to an old fracture and jaw problems stemming from the use of a handling hook during her circus days, among other concerns. Moreover, the elephant's confinement in a cement enclosure has compounded adverse effects on her physical and psychological well-being. Observations indicate distressing behavior including self-harm, such as eating her own feces, and striking herself with her trunk and against the fence. Ely also exhibited repetitive behavior attributed to inadequate mental, physical, social, and environmental stimulation. The treatment she has received is deemed a violation of ethical standards for animal respect and protection. The judge determined that Ely received appropriate and ample care at the zoo, where her enclosure adhered to the needs of her species. It was noted that she was receiving the necessary attention to address the chronic ailments stemming from her time in the circus. Consequently, the San Juan de Aragón Zoo fulfilled its obligation to protect and care for the elephant, addressing her physiological, behavioral, and health requirements and ensuring her overall well-being. Following the verdict, the zoo enlarged Ely's enclosure and introduced Gypsy, another elephant of similar size and age, to provide companionship for Ely. After pursuing various legal avenues without success, the complainant sought review from the Supreme Court of Justice, and the high court accepted the request. The Supreme Court will review the decision of the Fourth Administrative District court, which ruled for the zoo, finding that Ely was being kept in adequate conditions. | Case | ||
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE ORISSA PREVENTION OF COW SLAUGHTER RULES, 1966 | 5 of 1960 | The Rules, drafted under the Orissa Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1960, prescribe conditions for the issue of a certificate for slaughter. | Statute | ||
| Illinois 1869: Cruelty to Animals Statute | 1869 Ill. Laws 3 | Historical Law: The first part of this Statute details the incorporation of the Illinois Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. The second part of the statute describes various laws concerning the treatment of animals. | Statute | ||
| Slavin v. US | 403 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2005) |
Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Animal Welfare Act after it created a regulation that prohibited the interstate or foreign commerce transport of birds that would be used in fighting ventures. She argued that the regulators did not consider whether fighting ventures were legal in the state where the birds were being transported to. However, the regulation was considered constitutional since under terms of section 2156(b), only the foreign and interstate transport of the birds was prohibited. |
Case | ||
| US - Funding State - Pittman-Roberson Act (Chapter 5B. Wildlife Restoration) | 16 USC 669 - 669l | The Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to cooperate with the States, through their respective State fish and game departments, in wildlife-restoration projects. However, no money shall be expended until the state in question assents to the provisions of this chapter and has passed laws for the conservation of wildlife, which includes a prohibition against the diversion of license fees paid by hunters for any other purpose than the administration of the fish and game department. | Statute | ||
| US - Wildlife - § 12.36 Donation or loan. | 67 FR 47660 | 50 C.F.R. § 12.36 | This provision describes the applicable donation or loan procedures for forfeited or abandoned wildlife property. Of particular interest is the section that requires that donation of eagle parts to Native Americans for religious purpose must proceed according to the Indian religious permit procedures outlined in 50 C.F.R. 22.22. | Administrative | |
| Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross | 598 U.S. 356, 143 S. Ct. 1142, 215 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2023) | Following the adoption of California’s Proposition 12, two organizations – the National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (Petitioners) – filed this lawsuit on behalf of the members of these organizations that are in the business of raising and processing pigs for the sale of pork meat. Petitioners allege that Proposition 12, which forbids the sale of whole pork meat in California that is made from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are confined in a cruel manner, violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by placing an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Under Proposition 12, confinement of pigs is cruel if it prevents a pig from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. Petitioners allege that the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will increase production costs, but concede that those costs will fall on both California and out-of-state pork producers. Petitioners also allege that, because California imports most of the pork it consumes, the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will be dealt to mostly out-of-state producers. The district court concluded that petitioners’ complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law and dismissed the case, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, rejecting petitioners’ arguments that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court found no violation of the dormant Commerce Clause because: (1) petitioners concede that Proposition 12 did not implicate the antidiscrimination principle, because it imposes the same burdens on in-state pork producers that it imposes on out-of-state pork producers, and (2) petitioners’ reliance on the Pike line of cases to prevent a state from regulating the sale of a consumer good within its borders on nondiscriminatory terms was rejected, as that line of cases had never yielded such a result. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed. | Case |