Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE - Property - § 3050F. Dogs deemed personal property; theft; penalty | 16 Del.C. § 3050F | DE ST TI 16 § 3050F | Dogs are considered personal property in Delaware. | Statute |
| US - Divorce/Custody - Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act. Section 307. Part III Dissolution. Section 307 Disposition of Property. | ULA Marr & Divorce s 307 | Uniform act created to address division of marital property upon divorce in equitable distribution jurisdiction. Two alternatives are given, directing equitable apportionment in one and division in just proportions in the other. | Statute | |
| WILDEARTH GUARDIANS vs. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE | 703 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. Ct. App.,2013) | 2013 WL 93169 (10th Cir. Ct. App.,2013) |
In this case, the WildEarth Guardians brought a suit against the National Park Service for violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Rocky Mountain National Park Enabling Act (RMNP)'s ban on hunting. The district court and the appeals court, however, held that the NPS did not violate NEPA because the agency articulated reasons for excluding the natural wolf alternative from its Environmental Impact Statement. Additionally, since the National Park Service Organic Act (NPSOA)'s detrimental animal exception and the RMNP's dangerous animal exception apply to the prohibition on killing, capturing, or wounding—not the prohibition on hunting, the use of volunteers to cull the park’s elk population did not violate the RMNP or the NPSOA. |
Case |
| People v. Maikhio | 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 74 (Cal. 2011) | 2011 WL 2437645 (Cal. 2011); 51 Cal.4th 1074 (2011) |
Defendant was charged with possession of a spiny lobster during closed season and failure to exhibit his catch as required by a statute. The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizes a warden to demand that a person who is or has recently been fishing or hunting to display his catch; the Fourth Amendment does not preclude a warden from briefly stopping a person. The warden's knowledge that the defendant lied in claiming he had caught nothing established probable cause to search his vehicle. By denying that he had caught anything, defendant failed to display his catch upon demand. |
Case |
| Caswell v. People | 536 P.3d 323 (Colo., 2023) | 2023 CO 50 (Colo., 2023) | This case concerns several charges of animal cruelty against petitioner Caswell. A welfare check was conducted by a deputy at the Lincoln County Sheriff’s office in response to a report on Ms. Caswell. After two welfare checks were conducted, the deputies executed a search warrant at the Caswell residence, resulting in the seizure of sixty animals. These animals lacked sufficient food or water, were kept in enclosed spaces filled with feces and urine, and many of the animals were underweight or had untreated medical problems. Respondent, the People of the State of Colorado, charged Ms. Caswell with forty-three class six counts of cruelty to animals, which were charged as felonies because Ms. Caswell had prior convictions of misdemeanor animal cruelty on her record. The jury found Caswell guilty of all forty-three counts and sentenced her to eight years of probation, forty-three days in jail, and forty-seven days of in-home detention. An appeal followed and the holding was affirmed. Petitioner filed for certiorari and the Supreme Court of Colorado granted. Here, petitioner argues that the use of her prior convictions for animal cruelty to enhance her charges to felonies violates the Sixth Amendment and article II of the Colorado Constitution. The court first considered whether the legislature meant to make the statutory provision used to enhance Caswell’s sentence as an element versus a sentence enhancer. The court here listed five factors to consider whether a fact is an element or sentencing factor: (1) the statute's language and structure, (2) tradition, (3) the risk of unfairness, (4) the severity of the sentence, and (5) the statute's legislative history. Four of these five factors signaled a legislative intent to designate it a sentence enhancer, so the court concluded that the legislature intended to designate the fact of prior convictions as a sentence enhancer rather than an element. The court also concluded that the sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment or article II of the Colorado Constitution, and affirmed the holding of the lower court. | Case |
| IN - Animal Sacrifice - RAJASTHAN ANIMALS AND BIRDS SACRIFICES (PROHIBITION) ACT, 1975 | Act No. 21 of 1975 | The law, specific to the North Indian state of Rajasthan, prohibits the sacrifice of animals and birds in temples or places of public religious worship. No person shall sacrifice an animal or birds or officiate at such a sacrifice—doing so is a criminal offence and violators may be imprisoned or fined. The Executive Magistrate may issue a prohibitory order if they receive information from a police officer that an animal sacrifice is going to be made | Statute | |
| CA - Abandonment - § 597f. Failure to care for animals; duty of peace or humane officers; | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597f (repealed) | CA PENAL § 597f | (Repealed in 2022). Every owner of any animal, who permits the animal to be without proper care and attention, shall, on conviction, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. It shall be the duty of any peace officer, officer of the humane society, or officer of a pound or animal regulation department of a public agency, to take possession of the animal so abandoned or neglected and care for the animal until it is redeemed by the owner. Every sick, disabled, infirm, or crippled animal, except a dog or cat, may, if after due search no owner can be found therefor, be killed by the officer. all injured cats and dogs found without their owners in a public place directly to a veterinarian known by the officer or agency to be a veterinarian that ordinarily treats dogs and cats for a determination of whether the animal shall be immediately and humanely destroyed or shall be hospitalized under proper care and given emergency treatment. | Statute |
| Canada - New Brunswick Statutes. Sheep Protection Act | R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S-7, s. 1 - 6 | This set of New Brunswick laws comprises the Sheep Protection Act. Under the Act, where a sheep is killed or injured by a dog, the owner of the sheep may, within forty-eight hours, notify the Minister. The Minister then appoints an investigator who reports his or her findings back to the Minister. The Minister may then recover the expenses of the investigation from the owner of the dog, and may order the destruction of the dog. | Statute | |
| Moreland v. Marion County, Miss. | 2008 WL 4551443 (S.D.Miss.) |
Plaintiff brought action against Marion County (“County”) and several animal control officers (“Officers”) in their official capacities, after the Officers crossed county lines and confiscated several dogs that appeared severely dehydrated and malnourished, and euthanized at least one dog. On Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Hattiesburg Division held that since there was no evidence to indicate that Defendants’ actions were anything more than negligence not rising to the level of reckless disregard, Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants should be dismissed. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, finding that the record did not support a finding of a pattern of inadequate training rising to the level of deliberate indifference to known or obvious consequence, and that the Officers’ actions could not be found to be a known or obvious result of the County’s training. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice. |
Case | |
| In the Matter of: Akiko Kawahara, Respondent | 1980 WL 26513 (N.O.A.A.) | 2 O.R.W. 340 (1980) |
The principle issue in this case is whether the planned stopover of a few hours in Kennedy Airport in New York constitutes an "importation" within the meaning of the MMPA. The respondent in this case was employed by a business dealing in the international trade of animals and was attempting to bring four dolphins captured off the coast of Argentina back to Japan. The respondent only landed the dolphins in New York as a stopover on their way to Tokyo, but the court found that there was no requirement of knowledge or specific intent under the MMPA to constitute civil violations. |
Case |