Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New York Pet Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York | 143 F.Supp.3d 50 (E.D. New York,2015) | 2015 WL 7017388 (E.D. New York,2015) |
(Aff'd on appeal to 2nd Circuit: New York Pet Welfare Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 850 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs, a non-profit group trade association of pet stores ("NYPWA"), dog and cat breeders and dealers, veterinarians, and pet owners, brought this action against New York City, the city council, and council members, alleging that defendants have adopted laws that violate the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as New York law that governs veterinary medicine, the treatment of animals, and equal protection. The challenged law relate to the sale of dogs and cats in the city that require pet stores to obtain pets from Class A USDA licensees in good standing and that the pet stores spay and neuter the pets before selling them. In rejecting NYPWA's federal preemption claim, the court found that the AWA specifically contemplates local regulation in § 2143(a)(8) and previous cases have found no conflict even where the local legislation bans what is otherwise allowed under the AWA. The court also found no conflict with state law (N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 753–d) or other laws concerning veterinary licensing, pet shops, and animal cruelty. In dismissing plaintiff's Equal Protection argument, the court was not persuaded that pet stores and shelters/rescues are "similarly situated" to support the claim. Additionally, the court found a rational basis to support any differential treatment. NYPWA also alleged that the Pet Shop Laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause, arguing that the laws impermissibly regulate extraterritorially and favor local interests. The court found that even if plaintiff's factual allegations were true, the law was not economic protectionism, but an attempt to curb problems with homeless animals and euthanasia. Finally, the court found not due process violations (substantive or procedural) where there is no interference with a constitutionally protected right. NYPWA's motion to dismiss the claims is granted and the motion for preliminary injunction was denied. |
Case | |||||||
| Slay v. Spell | 882 So.2d 254 (Miss. 2004) | 882 So.2d 254 (Miss. 2004) |
A slaughterhouse owner violated a Mississippi statute by failing to provide E. coli swab samples from hog carcasses for three weeks. The Circuit Court found in favor of the Mississippi Department of Commerce and the Court of appeals affirmed the decision. |
Case | |||||||
| Brazil - Animal Cruelty - Decreto-lei nº 24645, |
Art. 1º - Todos os animais existentes no País sno tutelados do Estado. |
Administrative | |||||||||
| MI - Dangerous - Chapter 287. Animal Industry. Dangerous Animals. | M. C. L. A. 287.321 - 323 | MI ST 287.321 - 323 | This Michigan statute defines "dangerous animal," which means a dog or other animal that bites or attacks a person, or a dog that bites or attacks and causes serious injury or death to another dog while the other dog is on the property or under the control of its owner. However, a dangerous animal does not include any of the following: an animal that bites or attacks a person who is knowingly trespassing on the property of the animal's owner; an animal that bites or attacks a person who provokes or torments the animal; or an animal that is responding in a manner that an ordinary and reasonable person would conclude was designed to protect a person if that person is engaged in a lawful activity or is the subject of an assault. | Statute | |||||||
| Commonwealth v. Duncan | 7 N.E.3d 469, cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. Massachusetts, 135 S. Ct. 224, 190 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2014) | 467 Mass. 746 (2014) | This case deals specifically with the issue of whether or not the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment extends to police action undertaken to render emergency assistance to animals. In this particular case, police officers were called to defendant’s property after a neighbor reported that two of defendant’s dogs were deceased and a third dog looked emaciated after being left outside in inclement weather. After showing up to the defendant’s home, police contacted animal control who immediately took custody of all three dogs, despite defendant not being present. The court held that the emergency aid exception did apply to the emergency assistance of animals because it is consistent with public policy that is “in favor of minimizing animal suffering in a wide variety of contexts.” Ultimately, the court determined that the emergency aid exception could be applied to emergency assistance of animals if an officer has an “objectively reasonable basis to believe that there may be an animal inside [the home] who is injured or in imminent danger of physical harm.” The matter was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. | Case | |||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 2 Núm 4 |
|
Policy | |||||||||
| GA - Ordinances - Jurisdiction and duties of local governments | Ga. Code Ann., § 4-8-22 | GA ST § 4-8-22 | This Georgia statute provides authority for local governing units to enforce this article. This statute further establishes that the local government shall designate an individual as a dog control officer to aid in the administration and enforcement of the provisions of this article; the dog control officer does not have the authority to make arrests unless the person is a law enforcement officer. Additionally, this article also allows local governments to make arrangements with each other for consolidation of dog control services. | Statute | |||||||
| Miller v. Dep't of Agric. | 168 Conn. App. 255, 145 A.3d 393 (2016) | 168 Conn. App. 255 (Conn. App. 2016), 2016 WL 4654364 (Conn. App. 2016) | The Plaintiff, Kim Miller, argued “a severe deprivation” of her rights when the Superior Court dismissed her appeal to prevent her dogs from being euthanized. Miller owned two Rottweiler dogs that attacked the victim Cynthia Reed, causing injuries to Reed's head, the back of her neck, and her back. An animal control officer issued two disposal orders to euthanize Miller’s dogs. The Defendant, Connecticut Department of Agriculture, then affirmed the orders and Miller appealed. The Superior Court also dismissed the appeal, and Miller appealed further to the Appellate Court of Connecticut. Here, Miller argues, among other things, that her Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses were violated when witnesses were not available for cross-examination. Plaintiff Miller also claims that there were procedural violations in the initial hearing because of lack of written rules that applied to dog disposal orders and claimed error when the hearing officer acted acted arbitrarily and capriciously by “interject[ing] his opinion” while questioning a witness. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) did not preclude the admission of statements from the victim and an eyewitness, even though the victim and witness did not testify at the hearing. The court reasoned that in administrative proceedings under the UAPA, evidence is not inadmissible solely because it constitutes hearsay, as long as the evidence is reliable and probative. Additionally, a party to an administrative proceeding under the UAPA is not required to call any particular witness. (2) A dog owner's appeal of disposal orders for a biting animal is not a criminal prosecution that invokes Sixth Amendment protections. The court reasoned that the issuance of a disposal order does not, by itself, trigger the imposition of a fine or prison term on the owner. Rather, by obviating the threat that dangerous animals pose to the public, the provision is remedial and civil in nature. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal was affirmed. | Case | |||||||
| Eslin v. County of Suffolk | 795 N.Y.S. 2d 349 (2005) | 18 A.D.3d 698 (N.Y.,2005) |
A woman was horseback riding at a ranch in New York and was injured when she fell off the horse. The woman had signed a Horse Rental Agreement and Liability Release Form before the accident. The court determined that the rider assumed the risk of injury and the lower court's decision to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment was reversed. |
Case | |||||||
| Stanford Journal of Animal Law & Policy (SJALP) | The Journal of Animal Law & Policy was founded in August 2007 to provide a high-quality, widely accessible forum for the publication and discussion of animal law scholarship. The Journal of Animal Law and Policy went on hiatus beginning Fall 2014. The SJALP website states that it will continue to have the website accessible. For more on the journal, go to the SJALP web page. | Policy |