Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Marine Mammals - Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations | 1999 WL 379911 (F.R.) |
NMFS proposes regulations to implement provisions of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA). These regulations would allow the entry of yellowfin tuna into the United States under certain conditions from nations signatory to the International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP) that otherwise would be under embargo. |
Administrative | ||
| Argentina - Slaughter - Ley 18.819, 1970 | LEY N° 18.819 | This law contains the provisions for the procedures for the slaughter of animals. More specifically the slaughter of animals of the bovine, equine, ovine, porcine and caprine species. However, Article 2 establishes that executive power may extend these provisions to the slaughter of birds, rabbits, and other minor species. Slaughterhouses and meat packing plants in Argentina must comply with the desensitization requirements and procedures established by the executive power. This law prohibits the use of the clubs in slaughtering. The veterinary inspection services of the national and of the provincial or municipal administrations are the control entities for the compliance of this law. The Secretary of State for Agriculture and Livestock is the entity that imposes sanctions to establishments subject to national veterinary inspection and those that violate these provisions. | Statute | ||
| Syracuse Book 1 Symposium on Animal Law |
Syracuse Law Review
|
Policy | |||
| Volosen v. State | 192 S.W.3d 597(Tex.App.-Fort Worth, 2006) | 2006 WL 349713 (Tx. 2006) |
In this Texas case, the trial court found Appellant Mircea Volosen guilty of animal cruelty for killing a neighbor's dog. The sole issue on appeal is whether the State met its burden of presenting legally sufficient evidence that Volosen was "without legal authority" to kill the dog. By statute, a dog that "is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked ... fowls may be killed by ... any person witnessing the attack." The court found that no rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the dog was not attacking or had not recently attacked chickens in a pen in Volosen's yard; thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that Volosen killed the dog "without legal authority" as required to sustain a conviction for animal cruelty. Judgment Reversed by Volosen v. State , 227 S.W.3d 77 (Tex.Crim.App., 2007). |
Case | |
| TN - Domestic Violence - Part 6 Domestic Abuse | T. C. A. § 36-3-601 - 606 | Under Tennessee's Domestic Abuse Act, the definition section states that "abuse" includes inflicting, or attempting to inflict, physical injury on any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by an adult or minor. Section 606(9) allows the court to direct the care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor residing in the household. Further, in no instance shall the animal be placed in the care, custody, or control of the respondent, but shall instead be placed in the care, custody or control of the petitioner or in an appropriate animal foster situation. | Statute | ||
| NH - Dog Bite - Chapter 466. Dogs and Cats. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 466:31 to 31-a | NH ST § 466:31 to 31-a | Under this section, a dog is considered to be a nuisance, a menace, or vicious to persons or to property if it is "at large," if it barks for sustained periods, if it chases cars continuously, or if it growls, snaps at or bites persons. If a dog bites a person and breaks the skin, the animal control officer must inform the victim whether the dog was vaccinated against rabies within 24 hours. | Statute | |
| Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning | 301 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2002) |
This case questions whether Arizona's 10% cap on nonresident hunting of bull elk throughout the state and of antlered deer north of the Colorado River substantially affects commerce such that the dormant Commerce Clause applies to the regulation. The Court that Arizona's cap on nonresident hunting substantially affects and discriminates against interstate commerce and therefore is subject to strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. The case was remanded to determine the extent of Arizona's legitimate interests in regulating hunting to conserve its population of game and maintain recreational opportunities for its citizens. |
Case | ||
| Oshannessy v Heagney | [1997] NSWSC 482 |
The case focuses primarily on the procedural requirements for stating a case. However, there is also discussion concerning what are the appropriate steps that a motor vehicle driver, who has hit and injured an animal with their vehicle, must take. In this case, the trial judge found that a refusal to stop and inspect the animal did not constitute a failure to take reasonable steps to alleviate that animal's pain. |
Case | ||
| TX- Dangerous Animals - G. Caging Requirements and Standards for Dangerous Wild Animals. | 25 TX ADC § 169.131, 132 | 25 TAC § 169.131, 132 | This regulation establishes caging requirements and minimum standards of care for "dangerous wild animals," including: gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, baboons, lions, tigers, cheetahs, ocelots, cougars, leopards, jaguars, bobcats, lynxes, servals, caracals, hyenas, bears, coyotes, jackals, and all hybrids thereof. | Administrative | |
| David v. Lose | 218 N.E.2d 442 (Ohio 1966) | 7 Ohio St.2d 97, 36 O.O.2d 81 (Ohio 1966) |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In order to establish a prima facie case against a bailee in an action sounding in contract, a bailor need prove only (1) the contract of bailment, (2) delivery of the bailed property to the bailee and (3) failure of the bailee to redeliver the bailed property undamaged at the termination of the bailment.
2. In an action by a bailor against a bailee based upon a breach of the contract of bailment, where the bailor proves delivery of the bailed property and the failure of the bailee to redeliver upon legal demand therefor, a prima facie case of want of due care is thereby established, and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the bailee to to explain his failure to redeliver. (Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N.E.2d 658, followed.)
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Case |
